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ABSTRACT
FORGING LAW AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT IN MODERN EGYPT,
1820-1920
Mina E. Khalil
Joseph E. Lowry
This dissertation studies the history of the criminal defendant as both a social and
legal subject of inquiry in modern Egypt from the 1820s to the 1920s. In doing so, this
dissertation thereby attempts to shed light on how Egypt was indeed a laboratory of social
and legal change across the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, unveiling the actual
details of the legal reforms and the impact they had on the formation of Egyptian society
by the end of the nineteenth century and into the first two decades of the twentieth
century. This dissertation, therefore, is not a discursive discussion of legal
transformations that took place in modern Egypt, but rather it sheds piercing light on how
the process of unfettering Egypt's figurative chains to two empires—the Ottoman and the
British Empires—inextricably entailed an unshackling of the chains that reconfigured and
bound criminal defendants in relation to their imperial state and reconstituted authority
within modern Egyptian society. Through this historical exploration, it sheds light on
how Egyptian society itself was reimagined and reconstituted through its criminal law—
both substantive and procedure—and how through these legal processes, modern Egypt
as embodied in the figure of the criminal defendant now stood in relation to its past and
its Islamic legal tradition. In doing so, this dissertation thereby confronts on a more
abstract level the deeper questions underlying the transformations that took place within
Islamic law and society.
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Introduction
“It is rare for people to be asked the question
which puts them squarely in front of themselves.”
― Arthur Miller, The Crucible
MAYHEM IN MODERN EGYPT (1882)
Although its own administrators adorned it “The Protected One” (al-Maḥrūsa),
Egypt appeared in an entirely different light to the eyes of experts who accompanied
Napoleon when he invaded the Ottoman province in 1798. One of these experts, an
Italian, Alexandro Buccianti (b.ca. 1772), observed this much in his memoirs of the
invasion: “Egypt is a country which above all requires to be well and ably governed—her
very existence, the preservation of her soil and the existence of her population require the
utmost vigour and firmness in the exercise of her Sovereign power.” 1 He added,
nevertheless: “yet by the strangest fatality, no country in the world has been so badly
governed during the past twelve centuries as Egypt, save for a few vary brief intervals.” 2
This description of a chaotic Egypt existing in time immemorial resonated a long century
later in a cartoon print referred to as l’imagerie d’Épinal of a type originally designed by
the famous French illustrator Jean-Charles Pellerin and popularized during the French
Revolution. Drawn immediately following the ‘Urābī Revolt led by local forces
demanding “Egypt for Egyptians” and its tumultuous aftermath, 3 this imagerie d’Épinal
Nº157 entitled “Bombardment d’Alexandrie – Massacre d’Européens” presented to its

1

Alexandro Buccianti, Alexandro Buccianti Collection, (University of Oxford, St. Anthony’s Middle East
Centre Archives [hereinafter, Oxford], GB165-0416): 52.
2
Id.
3
See Juan Cole, Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt's
`Urabi Movement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
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audience a scene of utter mayhem. The cartoon colorfully sketched the bombardment and
occupation of Alexandria in July of that year by British forces to establish order and to
protect foreign interests in the centuries-old Ottoman province. 4 Depicted in this image
were turbaned ‘Urābists grabbing the necks of several Europeans dressed in coats and
trousers and slaying them with elevated, unsheathed swords. On the ground lay the
corpses, including those of young children, drenched in blood, and chaos characterized
the background as smoke coming out of guns discharged by Europeans filled the air and
the heavy bombardment of Alexandria that ensued put the ancient city to total ruin.
Underneath this French cartoon, a caption captured the mood of the illustrated historical
events: “Alexandrie resemble actuellement a une ville de morts.” 5 Mayhem was imagined
in modern Egypt.
Mayhem did not only describe an imagined Egypt upon British Occupation in
1882, but also, historically under English common law, the crime, as depicted in the
imagerie d’Épinal above, of intentionally maiming another person. As Sir William
Blackstone remarked in his widely influential eighteenth-century legal treatise
Commentaries on the Laws of England, where he characterizes mayhem as the first crime
against the person, was exceptional in that it was also “an atrocious breach of the king’s
peace” as it deprived him of “the aid and assistance of his subjects.” 6 The crime of
mayhem eventually cut its way also into Napoleon’s 1810 Penal Code as the crime of
“massacre”—the same word used to title the illustration above. As Antoine Blanche
4

Imagerie d’Épinal Nº157 “Bombardment d’Alexandrie – Massacre d’Européens.” Bibliotheca
Alexandrina [hereinafter, BA].
5
Id.
6
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book IV (Of Public Wrongs), Ch. XV (Of
Offenses Against the Persons of the Individuals) (Yale Law School, The Avalon Project, Online). Accessed
15 September 2019.
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observed in his nineteenth-century legal treatise Études pratique sur le Code Pénal
(1864), the crime of massacre, which logically followed the other crimes against the
person of the King, thereby staining a “sacrilegious hand.” For by committing this crime
of royal patricide, “the civil family loses its father, general tranquility is disturbed, public
order is destroyed, the majesty of the throne and the republic is degraded.” 7 And while
both the crimes of mayhem and massacre were prosecutable against British and French
subjects, respectively, in their own consular courts sitting in Egypt throughout the
nineteenth century and during the ‘Urābī Revolt, these judicial bodies and the specific
crimes they punished in the name of their own sovereigns could not ultimately reach the
main authors of the Revolt who were local subjects of the Ottoman sultan. Local criminal
justice now had to deal with the ‘Urābists, not as revolutionaries, but rather as criminal
defendants.
Fear that criminal justice was not capable of dealing with the acts of violence
committed by the ‘Urābists, however, could have been allayed by recognizing that
Egypt’s existing criminal justice system punished a crime as severe as mayhem or
massacre. This crime was highway robbery or brigandage (ḥirāba or qatʻ al-ṭarīq, in
classical Arabic). Similarly to mayhem and massacre, brigandage had historically been
understood within Islamic jurisprudence that undergirded this local legal system as a
violation of the “right of God” (ḥaqq Allāh), not just a violation of the “right of man”
(ḥaqq ādāmī). 8 The ruler and Muslim community (the umma) as a whole, standing in to

7

Antoine Blanche, Études Pratiques sur le Code Pénal, vol. II (Paris, 1864). Commentaries on Article 91,
including the crime of ‘massacre’, and preceding articles.
8
The punishment of ḥirāba in Islamic law derived its scriptural basis in Qur’an 5:33: “Indeed, the penalty
for those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger and strive upon earth [to cause] corruption is

3

vindicate God’s right, were then required to punish the commission of this forbidden act
with a fixed punishment (ḥadd, sing., ḥudūd, plural), delimiting the rights of the
individual or individuals found to have taken part in it. 9 Within this framework, highway
robbery, which predates the creation of the several ad hoc “Commissions of Brigandage”
that the British erected after 1882, 10 was already punished severely by Ottoman law
(qānūn) and its administration of justice. Anticipating European fears, an OttomanEgyptian elite who had already imagined mayhem as being perceived within Western
minds forcefully voiced their opinions in August of 1882 on the front page of Egypt’s

none but that they be killed or crucified or that their hands and feet be cut off from opposite sides or that
they be exiled from the land. That is for them a disgrace in this world; and for them in the Hereafter is a
great punishment.” The word hirāba, etymologically related to the modern Arabic word for “war” (ḥarb),
derives from the Arabic root ḥ-r-b, “to be furious, enraged, angry.”
9
See Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964): 175-76.
Schacht referred to highway robbery, along with the other acts with fixed punishments in Islam, as “crimes
against religion” (175); yet he thereafter designated the exacting of punishment (ḥadd) for these crimes as a
“right or claim of Allāh (ḥaḳḳ Allāh)” (176). Seeing them as “crimes of religion” led Schacht to stress their
“religious character,” and specifically, the “part played by active repentance (tawba)” in highway robbery
as long as the brigand repents “before arrest” (176). See also Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in
Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005) [Hereinafter, “Peters”]: 27. Rudolph Peters was more precise with respect to the
acceptance of the bandit’s repentance: “Repentance in the case of banditry is only accepted if it occurs
before the bandit is caught. It consists in the expression of one’s intention to abandon crime and to lead a
straight life. Some schools [of Islamic law] specify a term during which the defendant must give evidence
of the seriousness of his intentions. The Malikites require in addition that the bandit give himself up to the
authorities. Repentance resulting in the lapse of the ḥadd penalties for banditry does not affect the liability
for homicide, bodily harm or theft, since these are claims of men” (27).
10
Harold Tollefson, Policing Islam: The British Occupation of Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Struggle over
Control of the Police, 1882-1914 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1999): 25-29. Without any
discussion of Islam’s long history of treating and punishing brigandage for centuries prior to the British
“policing Islam” or a discussion of contemporary social, political, or economic factors that may have
increased it in the nineteenth century, Tollefson, nevertheless, described a “Brigandage Problem” in 1883
(25). In the same vein of Buccianti’s chaos thesis and the French cartoon described above, British officials,
in apprehension of the tumultuous aftermath of the ‘Urabī Revolt, accordingly saw Egyptian brigands as
“not averse to indulging in gratuitous violence” (26). Because of what they perceived as the violent nature
of local brigands and “lax law enforcement,” (27) British authorities, therefore, felt the need to supplant
Islamic law and supplement newly-erected Egyptian native courts and codes with their own ad hoc
“Commissions of Brigandage” in order to ensure the punishment of suspected brigands and to establish
iron-clad “law and order” in their new, veiled protectorate.
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leading newspaper Al-Ahrām, decrying the ‘Urābī revolutionaries and their violence and
calling for their swift justice before “law and God” (qānūnan wa sharʻan). 11
FORGING LAW IN EGYPT, 1820 – 1920
As exemplified in the crime of highway robbery (ḥirāba), Egypt—against
Buccianti’s thesis—had its own legal order prior to 1882. This legal order would,
however, change with the administration of justice under British tutelage after 1882. The
main argument of this dissertation is that the significant administrative and legal changes
that ultimately reshaped modern Egypt had their groundwork laid prior to this fateful
date. The aim of this dissertation is, therefore, two-fold: first, it aims to uncover how
Egypt’s administration of justice during the nineteenth century molded, but still preserved
Egypt’s Islamic legal tradition prior to 1882; and second, it aims to trace how these
earlier nineteenth-century legal changes changed further after British Occupation in 1882.
To achieve this two-fold purpose, this project considers legal changes as they occurred in
Egypt from 1820 to 1920. To reiterate, this dissertation aims to answer how Egypt’s
modern administration of justice confronted its legal tradition, how it preserved it,
changed it, and how it, at times, also transformed it during the nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries. Challenging the dominant view within the legal historiography,
which reflects stereotypes similar to Buccianti’s thesis, on what the state of Egypt was
prior to 1882, this dissertation steps back from metaphysical and philosophical debates
about legal change and engages in historical research in order to unfold and make sense
of the legal changes—administrative and doctrinal —that came about in Egypt during the
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.
11

Al-Ahrām. 7 August 1882 (1/1416).
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More specifically, why and how did existing Islamic legal doctrine (fiqh)
embedded in Ottoman Egypt’s Islamic legal tradition (the sharīʻa) begin to change during
the nineteenth century? Did the legal codifications and institutions that took place after
1882, as viewed within the traditional historiography, transform existing legal doctrine
and institutions? Or rather, had legal doctrine as shaped and practiced by a sophisticated
administration of justice and its policy (siyāsa) of maintaining public order already
changed its social and legal landscape prior to the legal codifications of 1883? Moreover,
how did law and the underlying social relations, concepts, and institutions that emerged
by the end of the nineteenth century really come about in Ottoman Egypt’s marketplace
of ideas and power? Did they emerge, as the existing historiography has presumed,
simply due to the new legal codifications and institutions that buttressed them at the end
of the nineteenth century? Or rather, did legal change come about incrementally, through
new practices, institutions, and language, cultivated through a time of important
technological, scientific, social, and intellectual changes? Finally, and most importantly,
how did these legal and institutional changes subsequently forge not only law and its
supporting institutions, but more importantly, Egypt’s varied subjects within a new
concept of society?
By exploring these questions, the following chapters search for answers to these
larger questions that pertain to legal reforms as they unfolded in Egypt by studying their
impact on the criminal defendant. As a socio-historical subject, the criminal defendant
has not been studied in Egypt’s historiography, but neither has the history of criminal
procedure in nineteenth-century Egypt. The goal in the following chapters is to explore

6

the applied history of criminal procedure by studying its effects on the criminal defendant
in nineteenth-century Egypt.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
During the nineteenth century, Egypt would remain a province of the Ottoman
Empire until 1914. Nevertheless, the Ottoman province would became a more
autonomous laboratory of social and legal change, beginning with its ambitious governor
Mehmed Ali (r. 1805-1848). In this constructed laboratory, new experiments began to
redefine law, its purposes, its application, and its trajectory. As we will come to see,
Ottoman law (qānūn) had been an entity that emanated from the Ottoman state, molded
according to this state’s varied priorities, not least of which was maintaining public
order. 12 The Islamic legal tradition—the sharīʻa—and its application, however, stood in a
seemingly different space—both physically and conceptually—from qānūn and the state.
It was historically viewed not as a product of the state, but rather, it was interpreted as
God’s law by Muslim jurists and the Muslim community throughout the centuries, passed
on from generation to generation, with rules and doctrines (fiqh) that made it seem to be
formidably holy and strictly applicable to the Muslim community. Of course, the rules
and doctrines that defined the backbone of the sharīʻa continued to change both in theory
and in practice over the centuries, despite the notion that the “gates of ijtihad” and legal
reasoning had closed. 13 In practice, too, Muslim rulers and their state had always shaped
law through administrative policy (siyāsa) in order to meet the demands of the Muslim
12

Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization (New York: Cornell
University Press, 1994). See Brinkley Messick, The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in
a Muslim Society (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993).
13
Wael Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?” International Journal of Middle East Studies 16, no. 1 (1984):
3-41.
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community and to establish public order. Yet, during the nineteenth century, the historian
approaches an entirely different set of factors that lead to new doctrines, institutions, and
concepts that had not yet been part of the legal tradition or siyāsa prior to that point. In
this sense, the reconstructions in law and concepts that occurred during the nineteenth
century had not before been seen nor imagined in the previous centuries. The historian of
nineteenth-century Egypt has to confront the reality that Egypt in the nineteenth century
was no longer the same Ottoman province.
Beginning in the 1820s, Egypt’s new social and legal laboratory began to operate.
A new civilian army comprised of Egypt’s peasants began and ended campaigns on
behalf of Egypt’s new governor and his Ottoman sultan in Istanbul. The decade before,
Egypt’s governor, through this civilian army, had brought back the keys of Islam’s
holiest sites, Mecca and Medina, to the Sublime Porte. In the 1830s, Egypt’s army would
also bring Greater Syria under its control, bringing there its own administration of justice
and techniques of power and control designed and tested in the metropole. Central to this
administration of justice was the Khedive’s (Governor’s) Cabinet (al-Dīwān al-Khidīwī)
which existed as early as the 1820s. Hence, I refer to the “khedival state” that emanated
out of this Khedive’s Cabinet and the several other executive councils attached to it and
that heard petitions and adjudicated matters in the name of the Ottoman governor, serving
as a central nerve of this state. By the end of the 1830s, police stations were born and,
within them, forensic medicine took on a new shape and form. By the 1860s, new
technological and scientific innovations, from the telegraph to the fingerprint to the
photograph, continued to mushroom. Yet, throughout the century, foreign consular courts
sat in Egypt and adjudicated over foreign criminal defendants and transmitted ideas and
8

legal doctrines both within these courts and in the observations, translations, and thinking
that cross-fertilized between Egypt and Europe, especially after Napoleon’s invasion in
1798. This confluence of legal, institutional, scientific, and intellectual changes would
have a remarkable effect on the molding of new laws, legal doctrines, and institutional
transformations in nineteenth-century Egypt.
As important as these autonomous local steps were, Ottoman legal reforms
(collectively known as the Tanzimat reforms) brought into effect throughout the
provinces, including Egypt, new concepts, not least of which was the concept of equality
before the law. Legal reforms issued from the Sublime Porte were intended to effect the
provinces. In 1839, Sultan Abdulmecid (r. 1839 – 1861), in the first year of his rule,
issued an empire-wide legal decree known as the “Supreme Edict of the Rosehouse”
(Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif). 14 In addition to introducing reforms of the Ottoman army and
taxation, the Edict guaranteed equal rights of all Ottoman subjects irrespective of religion
or ethnicity. This first of the Tanzimat reforms would be followed by the Reform Edict of
1856, which called for an administration of justice, and became the springboard for the
Ottoman Constitution of 1876, reiterating this same principle of equality before the
qānūn. However, the effect of these legal documents on the internal legal structures of the
provinces, including on the application of the fiqh within sharīʻa courts, and on the
application of the varied legal rules of fiqh, remains less studied. 15 In other words,
whether the major Tanzimat eforms as described above immediately undid the
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application of the fiqh rules within the khedival state’s siyāsa councils and within the
sharīʻa courts, before these adjudicative bodies were dissolved with the new legal codes
and National Courts’ system in 1883, remains unclear. It seems most likely that the
traditional rules articulated within the fiqh continued to be applied within sharīʻa courts,
at the same time that the state’s siyāsa councils, and emerging Mixed Courts in 1876, as
we shall see, persisted in molding these rules—making law—and in seeing and treating
Egypt’s subjects differently before the state.
Still, 1882 Egypt became encumbered by significant legal changes. Legal thinkers
and architects like Nubar Pasha by the 1860s and 1870s, in response to the already
existing capitulations system, designed and drafted new European-modeled Mixed Courts
and legal codes to adjudicate over foreign residents living in Egypt. 16 Earlier scholarship
on these legal designs even extolled these Mixed Courts as a first step towards rule of law
in Egypt “to protect the Egyptian people against the despotism of their rulers by a
complete separation between the executive and judicial branches.” 17 As important as
these courts were in Ottoman Egypt’s legal landscape, they, nevertheless, did not have
direct jurisdiction over local subjects in criminal matters nor did they have full
jurisdiction over criminal matters regarding foreigners. Following and culminating this
line of legal change, in 1883, a year after British Occupation, a National (Ahliyya) Court
system along with its own civil and criminal codes, modeled after Napoleon’s 1808
Code, saw the light of day, taking substantial jurisdiction away from the sharīʿa courts, in
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contracts, torts, property, and not least of which, criminal law. While this trend of gradual
removal of legal authority from the sharīʿa courts’ began even earlier in 1880 with the
establishment of Ḥisbiyya courts that took over jurisdiction from the sharīʿa courts in
matters of legal guardianship, the architects of these legal changes were careful to leave
elements of the sharīʿa system in a syncretic fashion, as, for example, requiring the
presence of mufti in murder cases well into the twentieth century.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Between Sharīʻa and Law
Scholars have disagreed over the nature of Ottoman legal reforms within the long
arc of Islamic legal history. The late-nineteenth century European-modeled legal
codifications may be viewed as an extension of such reforms. Accordingly, several
scholars of Islamic law have argued that Ottoman legal codification (qanun), which
began as early as the fifteenth century with Mehmed II, existed on a plane entirely
separate from, if not in direct conflict with, the classical Islamic legal system (the
sharīʿa). Sherman Jackson in Islamic Law and the State (1996) observed that “the
Ottomans are commonly perceived as the terminus ad quem of ‘classical Islam,’ which
perception has resulted in a rather vague though extremely operative delineation between
classical and post-classical Islam.” 18 Colin Imber in his study Ebu’s-suʿud: The Islamic
Legal Tradition (1997) similarly argued: “occasional similarities between qanun and
sharīʿa are, however, entirely superficial, the result of sporadic efforts by the compilers
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of the qanun to bring it into the sphere of the Holy Law. In reality, the two systems of law
[emphasis added] had grown up independently of one another.” 19
Jackson’s and Imber’s casual observations about the Ottoman qānūn’s
compatibility with Islamic law do not, however, provide us with a detailed account of
how Ottoman qanun may have contradicted or trespassed on the domain of the sharīʿa.
Ottoman legal historians, including Richard C. Repp, Haim Gerber, Rudolph Peters,
Baber Johansen, and Guy Burak have pushed back on this simplistic characterization
within the traditional Islamic legal historiography and have argued that the Ottoman
qanun was intended by its drafters to be compatible with or even to complement God’s
law, not to contradict it. Further study, on the basis of specific examples, is needed to
determine where such compatibility or contradiction, or neutrality, may lie.
One area of law where such a discrepancy between qānūn and classical Islamic
jurisprudence may exist is in the traditional protections afforded by Islamic legal doctrine
to the criminal defendant, as studied by Intisar Rabb in Doubt in Islamic Law (2016). 20
Where Ottoman criminal procedure may have navigated around such traditional
protections which the Islamic judge (qāḍī) must provide to the criminal defendant in
order for his decision (ḥukm) to be valid, it appears that Ottoman legal authorities,
extending into nineteenth-century Egypt with Mehmed Ali, continued to do what made
pragmatic sense in the investigation and prosecution of accused individuals. Yet it was
not only in questions of criminal procedure where the Ottomans innovated in ways that
may have made Jackson deem them “the terminus ad quem of classical Islam.” Ottoman
Colin Imber, Ebu’s-Suʿud: The Islamic Legal Tradition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 39.
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innovation also affected other areas of classical Islamic legal doctrine: who would be
responsible for initiating criminal proceedings against the criminal defendant, traditional
mental states required for acts such as murder and arson, the appropriate forms of
evidence required in the qāḍī’s court, and even how the criminal defendant would appear
in front of official tribunals. All of these departures from classical Islamic fiqh, which
Ottoman law and later European-modeled legal codification seem to exhibit, require
further study before any determination of whether the Ottomans brought about the demise
of classical Islamic law.
Making Law in Ottoman Egypt
Still, scholars of nineteenth-century legal reforms in Ottoman Egypt have made
significant strides in plotting Egypt’s unique position as a province in the larger Ottoman
Empire, of which it constituted a part from the sixteenth until the beginning of the
twentieth century. Rudolph Peters, Khaled Fahmy, Ehud Toledano, Afaf Lutfi Sayyid
Marsot, Judith Tucker, amongst others have explored Ottoman Egypt’s court records
(sijillāt) to enrich our understanding of Ottoman Egyptian society and the communities
and individuals which comprised it prior to and during the colonial legal reforms, which
have been perceived to have a lasting effect on Egyptian law and society. In doing so,
they have revealed nineteenth-century Egypt under Mehmed Ali to be a pioneering
laboratory of legal reforms within the larger structural Tanzimat reforms taking place
throughout the Empire.
Yet, as important as this scholarship is in highlighting the specificities of Egypt’s
social and legal reforms, it does not situate these latter changes within larger Ottoman
legal and social trends. A richer portrait of the criminal defendant’s position in Ottoman
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Egypt requires contextualizing Ottoman-Egyptian society within the larger Ottoman
Empire, as a whole. Scholarship on the Ottoman Empire and its treatment of criminal
defendants would also benefit immensely from drawing Ottoman Egypt closer into the
Ottoman orbit and studying it through this relational lens. 21 Moreover, recent studies of
Egypt’s court records preserved in archives have illuminated our understanding of the
application of Islamic law and its treatment of certain Egyptian subjects (women, wives,
husbands, peasants, thieves, prostitutes, and soldiers, for example) in nineteenth-century
Egyptian courts (maḥākim), their treatment by state authorities in judicial-administrative
tribunals (majālis), and the complementary relationship between these parallel legal
systems. 22 These reforms, however, remain under theorized by those social historians
who have parsed the court records in order to investigate the treatment of individual legal
subjects in Ottoman Egypt.
The critical theorization of law in nineteenth and early-twentieth century Egypt is
often left for intellectual historians who study social and legal thought and the indelible
marks made on it by European and Ottoman legal thinkers. Most recently, Leonard Wood
in his thorough study Islamic Legal Revival (2016) has made headway in tracing
influences on, as well as the creative imagination within, Egyptian legal thought from the
late nineteenth century until the middle of the twentieth century. 23 Wood himself
acknowledged, however, that his theoretical study is not grounded in the practical
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application of the theories of “Franco-Egyptian law” that were purportedly envisioned by
Egyptian thinkers and their European confidants. 24 Moreover, Wood’s analysis, similar to
other legal scholars, is almost exclusively confined to theorizing about private law in
Egypt, which culminated in the tome of the celebrated Egyptian jurist and judge ‘Abd alRazzāq al-Sanhūrī (d. 1971), who drafted the influential Egyptian Civil Code of 1948. A
full appreciation of the transformation of Egypt’s legal system under British Occupation,
however, requires a thorough assessment of how intellectuals and lawyers in nineteenthcentury and early-twentieth century Egypt thought about and justified transformations in
public law, including the subtle and profound changes in their own criminal law and
procedures, as well as the institutions and actors that supported them. These elements
bear directly on the birth of a modern state in nineteenth-century Egypt and its legal
system, and even more directly, on the rethinking of and treatment of the criminal
defendant in Egypt during this critical period.
Seeing Change
The birth of this modern state and its techniques of power during the nineteenth
century have already received much attention outside and inside of Egypt. Since Michel
Foucault wrote Discipline and Punish, these techniques of power and control have been
studied more attentively, as calibrated within this modern state and its growing apparatus
as a means of punishment, replacing the apparent methods of punishment that predated
them. Building on Foucault’s work, a number of scholars began to reflect on his ideas in
various historical contexts, and to see the birth of this modern state not only as embedded
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in a colonial state, its laws, and its institutions, 25 but also as the work of historians of
nineteenth-century Egypt has already contended, as prior to that colonial moment.
Building on Foucault’s work, a number of anthropologists have also studied these
methods of control as expanding with “surveillance” tools that came about due to the
advances in science and technology that marked the nineteenth century. In India, Bernard
Cohn in Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge modeled this study of “tools of
surveillance” from cadastral surveys to photographs deployed by the British to take stock
of the local population in an effort to better order them. More recently, James S. Scott in
Seeing Like a State, configured the different modes that the modern state adopted in order
to produce efficiency and productivity amongst the populations that it governed. Scott
extended his analysis beyond the physical, from urban space to agriculture, to the
conceptual, including the concept of society itself as being conceived by this modern
state’s drive to create efficiency.
This modern state’s drive to discipline and to order for the sake of efficiency has
already been explored by social and legal historians of nineteenth-century Egypt, as
discussed above. What has not been explored is how this policy of ordering society
combined with the tools that became available during the nineteenth century, to bring
about actual pervasive change in legal doctrine in Egypt throughout this century. In other
words, how did the nineteenth-century policy of establishing order and efficiency as
noted by Foucault and Scott bring about actual specific change in legal doctrine from
within Egypt’s Islamic legal tradition, legal change which subsequently actualized or
affirmed this intended policy of maintaining public order?
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Practice versus Concept
That this policy of maintaining public order underlay the changes in legal doctrine
fits within scholarship that has investigated underlying bureaucratic changes as definining
legal outcomes. Amongst this scholarship is that of Bruno Latour who in The Making of
Law, noted how the bureaucratic became the “vehicle” upon which the rule of law was
transported. Similarly, Cornelia Vismann in Files also shed light on how the case file
during the nineteenth century became a mode by which the law itself was physically and
doctrinally stored and transported. Reflecting this materiality of law, the work of
Brinkley Messick in The Calligraphic State shed light on how the materiality of the
written text had an effect on the doctrinal and the conceptual within Muslim society.
In Egypt, this focus on the materiality of the legal sources and what effect it had
on the conceptualization and redefinition of the law has been less explored. While certain
physical and material objects have been studied, from the telegraph to the railroad to
dress during the nineteenth century, the materiality of the law’s sources—police stations,
courtrooms, case files, criminal records, the police uniforms, police forms, application
forms, and what the physicality of these sources signified in the representation of the
law—has not yet been explored in detail. In light of Latour’s and Messick’s scholarship,
one of the aims of this dissertation is to explore how law became forged in modern Egypt
not only through legal doctrine but also through the material sources of the law itself. By
investigating this representation, one of the aims of this dissertation is thus to study an
emerging, new representation of the law that became apparent within Egypt during the
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.
17

ARGUMENT
In light of recent scholarship, this dissertation challenges the dominant view
within Egypt’s legal historiography that 1882 and the legal codifications that came about
thereafter were indeed a watershed moment in the making of modern Egypt and its laws.
Rather, what I argue in this dissertation and in proving my argument is that the making of
law, and more specifically the criminal law, in Egypt should be viewed as having come
about through an incremental process throughout the nineteenth century, one in which the
legal transformations that followed 1882 built upon the molding of laws, legal practices,
and institutions that existed prior to the legal reforms that followed that date.
In addition to this, this dissertation also challenges a dominant view held within
Islamic legal historiography as to whether Ottoman law represented “the terminus ad
quem” of Islamic law and the Islamic legal tradition. Rather, what this dissertation aims
to show is that Ottoman law, as it manifested in nineteenth-century Egypt, more
specifically, was hardly ambivalent to the legal tradition, and remained constrained by it,
throughout the nineteenth century, even if an emerging administrative state persisted to
shape the application of the tradition’s legal doctrine (fiqh) to meet its priority of
establishing public order. The argument that Ottoman law, and its post-1882
reformulation in legal codes, developed separately from, if not at odds with, the sharīʻa,
is not supported by the existing case law, and one of the aims of this dissertation is to
dispel this imagined binary. Instead, what this dissertation aims to demonstrate is that
Ottoman (and specifically, khedival) siyāsa and the administration of justice that emerged
through it in Egypt during the 19th-century existed in parallel to the sharīʻa and the fiqh
substantiated within it in various institutions. Where Ottoman law undergirded by an
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emerging khedival administrative state forged the legal tradition in substantively new
directions and brought about new institutions, doctrines, and concepts, I try to make these
transformations clear, but also where the emerging law preserved aspects of the legal
tradition, I also try to make this clear.
Finally, this dissertation is both a legal and a social history of modern Egypt as
told through the history of the criminal defendant in modern Egypt. It is an attempt to
construct how a concept of society and its laws emerged historically through a crucible
constructed primarily by the efforts of an emerging modern administrative state in
nineteenth-century Egypt, but also to describe this society through the material and
intellectual forces, as well as the daily efforts of its subjects engrossed within this
crucible, subsequently shaped this society and its administration of justice. In this way,
this dissertation looks into and beyond the four corners of the legal document to derive a
compelling story of how modern Egypt and an Egyptian society were made through the
criminal law, and through it formulates a historical argument for how new legal reforms
at the end of the nineteenth century were ultimately absorbed in the making of law in
modern Egypt. This relationship between social and legal history is one of the aims that
this dissertation aims to shed light upon and how both the legal and the social remained
immersed within one another.
METHODOLOGY
To make this argument, this dissertation, standing apart from other studies of
modern Egypt’s legal history, draws its conclusions primarily by deducing change in law
through the analysis of cases as they unfolded in Ottoman Egypt across the nineteenth
and early-twentieth centuries. Charting the incremental change that occurred in law from
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1820 to 1920, what this dissertation then aims to show is how law as applied by an
emerging khedival administrative state driven by a policy to maintain public order and its
various institutions, ultimately brought about a change in the configuration of applied
legal doctrine as understood and previously applied in Ottoman Egypt, in which criminal
adjudication was governed by both Ottoman law (qānūn) and the Islamic legal tradition
(sharīˊa). While at times translucent and other times opaque, the shifts in law discussed
in the following chapters exhibited an incremental change. Specifically, hundreds of
cases pertaining to crime, including homicide, assault, theft, and negligence cases had to
be culled from hundreds of hand-written registers and case files and analyzed in order to
deduce these shifts in both law and in practice, shifts that stood both affirmingly and
distinctively from legal doctrine as thought and practiced within Egypt’s legal tradition.
Thus, in the following chapters, this dissertation explores these legal and social
shifts through the study of court records, laws, legal treatises, newspaper articles,
literature, and other material culture, including photographs and architecture, and in
doing so, I aim to shed light on the changing position of the criminal defendant, as well
as the khedival legal system, under the behest of an emerging modern administrative. I
propose to accomplish this through the study of several important legal reforms and
institutions that affected criminal adjudication and the criminal defendant directly, and
which implicate related areas of law within Egypt’s modern criminal justice system:
substantive criminal law, criminal evidence, criminal procedure, and constitutional law.
To trace these changes in law in nineteenth-century Egypt, I have from 2017 to
2019 conducted research in various archives. Primary of these archives is the Egyptian
National Archives (Dār al-Wathā’iq al-Qawmiyya, DWQ) and the Egyptian National
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Library (Dār al-Kutub, DK) both of which are located next to each other on the corniche
in Cairo. Prior to entering these archives, I also spent six months working in the
Bibliotheca Alexandrina, which contains older legal texts in Arabic, English, and French,
and which is where I conducted intensive archival research on Al-Ahrām, Egypt’s leading
newspaper from the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In DK and DWQ, I parsed
hundreds of court registers, cases, official documents, legal treatises, laws, included in
several registers (sijillat): Ḍabṭīyat Miṣr (Cairo’s Police Headquarters), Dīwān alJamʻīya al-Ḥaqqanīya (Justice Assembly), Dīwān Majlis al-Aḥkām (High State Council),
Dīwān al-Dākhilīya (Ministry of the Interior), and Wathā’iq ‘Ābidīn (‘Abidin Papers). In
the chapters that follow, I attempt to capture certain modes of the law’s evolution in
modern Egypt over the course of the long nineteenth century.
In addition to DWQ, records from the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BnF) as
well as in Le Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN) are relied on to
make the argument of gradual shift in law over the course of the nineteenth century. In
the former archive, I was able to read legal treatises, journals, photographs, newspaper
articles, and other material that detailed the scientific, social, and intellectual shifts that
defined Paris and ultimately also Cairo during the nineteenth century. In the latter, I was
fortunate to be able to delve every day for three weeks into the case files, analyzing
police letters, telegraphs, photographs, fingerprint forms, application forms, newspaper
and journal articles, and many other primary material that colored for me nineteenthcentury Egypt, both figuratively and literally.
In addition to France, records from Britain, including the British National
Archives (BNA), as well as in St. Anthony’s Middle East Centre at the University of
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Oxford, further illustrate these social and legal shifts. In the former archives, as in
CADN, I parsed case files abundant with consular court decisions, inquests of bodies,
photographs, telegraphs, but also diplomatic letters, annual reports, legal statutes, and
criminal record books that contain a plethora of information on how the British officials
and policy interacted with and came to see Egypt before and after British Occupation in
1882. At Oxford, I parsed several well-organized collections that contained “jewels,”
including files on the Cairo Scientific Society (which factors significantly in the
discussion of forensic science in turn-of-the-century Egypt in Chapter Three), as well as
diplomatic journals, case transcripts, newspaper articles that elucidate legal
transformation that took place under British Occupation.
CHAPTER SUMMARIES
The following chapters of this dissertation will explore these transformations by
studying the history of the criminal defendant. Beginning in the 1820s, laws and the
institutions that reconfigured them aimed to maintain public order, which became a
serious concern for an emerging khedival state. As we explore in Chapter One, “Making
an Ordered Society,” it is through this transposition of a certain policy of maintaining
public order (istiqrār al-amn al-‘umūmī) onto a new institution of the Public Prosecutor
(al-nā’ib al-‘umūmī) that brought about a new mode for the prosecution of crimes
previously not within the Islamic legal tradition. As we will see, this policy became a
major part in animating the administration of justice—a policy that came to be carried
through both law and language, which ultimately forged the criminal law in Egypt by the
end of this century.
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In Chapter Two, “Scrutinizing the Criminal Mind,” we explore how this
language—invented, deployed, and asserted by the state—came to order modern Egypt. It
was not the language used by the accused to define themselves, to express themselves, or
the dynamism of their minds. As Timothy Mitchell shed light in Colonising Egypt, the
nineteenth century was a time in which the mind also became an object of analysis within
European discourses on science and medicine. Indeed, the mind became an object of
scrutiny by which the state and, the criminal defendant as defined within a modern law,
also came to stand in for that scrutinized mind, like her body, before the state. While
Foucault showed us that disciplining the body saw its calibration beginning in the
nineteenth century, he also showed us how the mind was also disciplined as such. Such
discipline eventually came to be attached to reformulations of the criminal law that came
about at the end of the nineteenth century, ensconsed as they were, in new notions of “the
rational man” standard and “premeditation” (taraṣṣud) that moved away from legal
doctrine stated within the legal tradition and redefined the criminal defendant before the
law. As this chapter aims to shed light, disciplining the mind came about through a
practice by which the state, in contrast to the legal tradition, aimed to “see” criminal
intent. It is this search for criminal intent, in contrast to its traditional manifestation, that I
also aim to demonstrate in this Chapter, through the archival sources, and which I argue
changed the doctrine of criminal intent in Egypt by the end of the nineteenth century. In
doing so, I have chosen to explore the mind and its reconfiguration during the nineteenth
century, as both a subject and an object that is both observed and observable before and
by the khedival administrative state across the nineteenth century.
In Chapter Three, “Asserting Proof before the State,” we explore how scientific
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theories in shaping thinking and adjudication of the criminal mind during the nineteenth
century also changed the way that proof and evidence came to be understood and
practiced. While tradition may have eschewed some of these new methods of proof,
enveloping the criminal defendant in a presumption of innocence, an administrative state,
keen on proving crime and ordering society, deployed these new tools, and in doing so,
changed the way that the state came to see defendants as being guilty of crime. Egypt
adopted these new modes and methods of proving guilt, into a toolbox by which the
defendant and society as a whole became skeptically and analytically observed: through
criminal records, ballistic analysis, forensic medicine, fingerprints, and photographs, the
state reconceptualized the doubt (shubha) that had protected the criminal defendant as
one who stood both within and against society and its intended aims. In doing so, the
state thus came to resemble the defendant through a practice of “resemblance” (tashbīh)
through these various scientific methods. Throught the deployment of these methods, we
can place the defendant as part of a larger story of the transformation of the criminal law
in modern Egypt, and we begin to see how the scientific changes that came to define the
nineteenth century also contributed to the transformation of the law.
In Chapter Four, “Reconfiguring the Presumption of Innocence,” we explore
further how these scientific changes persisted to move the tradition into a different
direction, a direction where the progressive search for truth molded the traditional
presentation of the defendant before authority. Reconfigured according to the priorities of
the state and its goals of establishing public order, the defendant was required to speak, to
answer to authority even if the tradition had once enveloped him in a presumption of
innocence. In this sense, defendants increasingly became the object of scrutiny through
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the interrogation, their confessions signed and presented before the state; their fates
determined by the authority of the state. It is a transformation from a practice of
confession (iqrār) as an oral, intimate act into a written one (taqrīr), elicited and reported
by the state.
Finally, in Chapter Five, “Seeing Equality,” the rights of the accused may have
been born with an increasing independence of the judiciary from the state in 1882,
creating a society in such a way in which the fates of the accused became entertwined in
the priorities of the state. It is within the khedival state and its priorities, then, that we can
say that the criminal defendant in modern Egypt was born. Her rights were, if they in fact
fully came to fruition, were only secondary to the state’s priorities, as the independence
of the judiciary stood distinctly apart from the recognition of these rights. What 1882 did
to enshrine these rights including the equality of defendants before the law, will be the
the subject of this chapter.
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Chapter One
Making an Ordered Society
“The Deputy Governor will permit it?”
– Arthur Miller, The Crucible

ASSAULT AT A PLANTATION (1831)
On the morning of March 15, 1831 (the first of the month of Shawwāl in the year
1246), Jean Printz, a French overseer on a Nile Delta plantation, did not think he would
end up in serious trouble. Riding on his donkey that day and holding the infamous
hippopotamus-hide whip, the kurbāj, in his hand, he surveyed the crowds of local
peasants hard at work. Amongst the crowd of laborers, whose habit it was to sing as they
worked, was a young girl named Manṣūra, who was between the age of seven and eight
(Fâiller dahi adetleri üzere bülend-âvâz ile nâmekârlık ederek işlerdi). As Printz himself
later confessed before the police authorities, as he was passing by, young Manṣūra had
said something that did not sit well with him (o kız çocuğu bana ağır sözler söyledi).
Frustrated by the young girl’s slurs, the overseer slapped her with his kurbāj, meaning to
strike her on her back (ben de kırbaç ile arkasına vurdum). However, as Omar, another
plantation worker, later testified, the whip came down heavily not on Manṣūra’s back but
on her face—on her right eye—removing it (Gözüne rast geldi, gözü çıktı). The young
girl became blind as a result. It was then that the villagers arrested the Frenchman and
handed him over to the governor Ḥafiz Effendi (Nazırı Hafız Efendi’ye teslim olundu),
while Omar along with the young girl, was sent to the Khedive’s Cabinet (kız ile
mukaddem Ömer, Divan Hidivi’ne gönderildi). Although the French sovereign had
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jurisdiction over all his subjects living in Egypt, Mehmed Ali Pasha, Egypt’s Ottoman
governor at the time, felt compelled to act in order to punish Printz. Even before the 1837
Law on State Officials (Qānūn al-Siyāsa al-Malakīya) that allowed for the punishment of
overseers and officials for abuse of power, the Ottoman governor ordered Printz to be
banished for his assault of the young girl. This order led Ḥabīb Effendi, the Pasha’s
başbakan (chef de cabinet), to formally initiate Printz’s prosecution in French consular
court which had exclusive jurisdiction over him. 26
In an important way, Manṣūra’s story sheds light on the birth of public
prosecution in nineteenth-century Egypt, which at its core is the story of an emerging
administrative state that began to scrutinize those who committed wrongdoing and to
prosecute them for the sake of ordering nineteenth-century Egypt. That Ottoman Egypt’s
governors, while traditionally constrained in doing so, now actively sought proceedings
against defendants like Printz in the name of one of their own subjects bears directly on
the history of public prosecution in Egypt—that is, the initiation of proceedings against
defendants by the state in the name of society and its public welfare: why and how did it
come about, and who were its main designers and agents?
Moreover, the questions of who comprised this society, how its members related
to one another, and who stood for its interests concerned legal thinkers writing in Arabic
and knowledgeable in European laws, legal theories, and institutions at the turn of the
nineteenth century. 27 One of the most consequential of these ideas and institutions, which
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arose in 1883, was the powerful office of the Public Prosecutor—which came to be
responsible for initiating proceedings against defendants in the name of a new society—a
society that was envisioned as comprised of citizens equal before the law. 28 Yet what
Manṣūra’s story conspicuously sheds light upon is that the history of public prosecution
in nineteenth-century Egypt has a much longer history than the mere birth of the Public
Prosecutor at a particular point in time. Rather, the Public Prosecutor extends as part of a
history in which Egypt’s local subjects and their communities, facing everyday injustices
committed against them called upon their state to scrutinize and to punish in the name of
an ordered society.
Central to this argument is that Egypt’s subjects also compelled their state to see
them and brought their injustices—as Mansura did—before their state in a substantially
different way during the nineteenth century. Egypt’s Ottoman governors began to see
their subjects in a different way, for these subjects now held the key to the state’s success,
achieved through its rulers’ military and economic ambitions. 29 In maintaining public
order and redressing wrongs committed against Egypt’s subjects, as this figured within
other imperial domains, 30 Egypt’s rulers came to define a robust administrative state
policy (siyāsa) within khedival Egypt. This siyāsa of maintaining public order would
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gradually shift the extant rules that defined the initiation of proceedings against
defendants within Egypt’s Ottoman-Islamic legal tradition and its application. It would
also give rise to new laws and a legal lexicon that initially aimed towards the
“maintenance of public order” (istiqrār al-amn al-‘umūmī), gradually defining a
nineteenth-century legal order.
The aim of this chapter is to show how a new institution of the Public Prosecutor
became “fixed” into Egypt’s legal landscape by the end of the nineteenth century. Where
the institution had not ever before existed in Egypt, it now defined Egypt’s criminal law,
for it was the Public Prosecutor in the name of society who could now prosecute criminal
defendants, not the aggrieved individual nor the ruler in the name of the God. This new
institution now stood for the public, and represented a concept of “society,” but as this
chapter aims to show, this institution was molded not only in the abstract, but also in the
image of the state and its priorities of protecting and ordering Egypt as those priorities
became evident in the numerous cases that emanated out of a nineteenth-century
administration of justice. This chapter attempts to make this connection between the
order established by the khedival state at the beginning of the nineteenth century and the
institution of the Public Prosecutor and its theoretical underpinnings that came about at
the end of the nineteenth century.

To make this argument, this chapter will follow in three sections. The first
section, “God and His Community,” will explore the rules of prosecution within the
Islamic legal tradition, and it will aim to make clear how the rules of the legal tradition
delineated an important distinction in the rubric of rights that delimited prosecution of
29

defendants by the state, a theoreretical distinction that remained in effect into the
nineteenth century. The second section, “The Pasha and Siyāsa,” explores how an
emerging khedival state adhering to a policy of establishing public order gradually in
both language and action affirmed a legal change from the rules extant within the legal
tradition to allow for prosecution of criminal defendants in nineteenth-century Egypt’s
social and legal landscape. The third section, “The Public Prosecutor and Society,”
explores how the emergence of the institution of the Public Prosecutor became transfixed
into the social and legal changes that had already taken place throughout the nineteenth
century, and how underlying this new institution was a new concept of society that came
to represent the protection of the public order and the new mode of prosecution that
defined the end of the nineteenth century.
GOD AND HIS COMMUNITY
In God’s Name, In Man’s Name
Since its absorption into the Ottoman Empire in 1517, Egypt exhibited certain
legal commonalities with other imperial provinces. A province’s annexation meant that
the Sultan in Istanbul—the Sublime Porte—sent a governor (bey or pasha) who came
from the military class and a head judge (qāḍī) who came from the religious scholars to
administer his conquered province. 31 Egypt was no different from other provinces in this
regard. 32 Yet, when it came to administering the province, the “bey could not inflict any
punishment without first obtaining the kâdî’s judgment, but the kâdî could not execute
31
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any of his sentences.” 33 Where the governor held the power to execute punishment, the
qāḍī had the authority to pronounce a verdict (ḥukm) on defendants. Still, while a judge
had the authority in his court to issue a verdict upon defendants, the authority to summon
them did not rest with him, but within the law itself.
Judges sitting in Ottoman Egypt from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries
always had before them two separate bodies of law to apply in reaching a verdict: they
possessed both God’s law—the sharīʻa—as interpreted by jurists through texts of Islamic
jurisprudence (fiqh) and encompassed the Islamic legal tradition since the earliest Muslim
communities, and Ottoman codified law—the qānūn. 34 While the former (sharīʻa, fiqh)
delimited the initiation of proceedings against defendants according to juristic
interpretation of the divine text, the latter (qānūn) evolved as an amalgamation of local
customary practices compiled by sultans in conjunction with jurists over several
centuries. 35 In spite of the input of religious scholars in the latter and its persistent
application, some modern scholars have come to see qānūn as “secular, man-made” law
standing separate from God’s pure and divine law. 36 Some jurists, including the Ḥanafī
jurist Ibn Nujaym (d. 1563) in the sixteenth century, protested the precedence given to the
qānūn, as handed down to Egypt by its foreign Ottoman sultans over the sharī‘a. 37
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Idealist, or originalist, in their reading of the Islamic legal tradition through its venerated
texts, jurists saw the sharīʻa’s priority, perfection, universality, completeness, and
uncodified form as reasons for why it could not be supplemented, least of all by a
pragmatic and codified sultanic, “man-made” law. 38 The presumed tension between
sharīʻa (and its juristic interpretative tradition, fiqh) and qānūn (the codified law), 39 in
spite of their historical interdependence, would, incite such remarks well into the
twentieth century. 40 That perception of tension would also bear on the question of
whether the legal tradition allowed for the direct prosecution by the state and its adopted
institutions.
Still, although theoretically both bodies of law remained porous to one another,
the decision to initiate prosecution against defendants in Ottoman Egypt depended on
whether a judge applied rules from the sharīʻa or the qānūn. In her micro-study of the
“Ottoman legal system” and its application in Aintab during one year of the sixteenthcentury (1541), for example, Leslie Peirce observed that for procedural matters, judges
applied the rules of fiqh, while for substantive matters they applied the sultan’s codified
laws. 41 Thus, notwithstanding Peirce’s point that criminal adjudication in an Ottoman
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community was a communal affair, the right of prosecution remained clear in the fiqh. 42
For homicide and assault, the right to initiate proceedings against persons accused of
committing them—a claim referred to as a “right of man” (ḥaqq adamī or ḥaqq al‘abīd)—rested not with the community, but rather with the victim or, in the case of
homicide, with the heirs of the victim. 43 Therefore, if an individual chose to forego
prosecution of a murderer, as Ibn ‘Ᾱbidīn forewarned in his famous treatise on Islamic
law, The Reference for the Perplexed: On the Precious Pearl, 44 the governor could not
compel him or her to bring the murderer to justice, even when initiating such a
prosecution seemed to be in the interest of the rest of the community.
Prosecution for other acts entailed a different procedure. For theft, highway
robbery, adultery, drinking alcohol, and false accusation of adultery, all of which the
juristic tradition considered as implicating the “rights of God” (ḥuqūq allāh), 45 the ruler
and the community could have the accused brought to the qāḍī, who in many instances
played an “adjudicatory-cum-mediatory role.” 46 Although “the rights of God capture
those interests that serve the public well-being (e.g. order, security),” as Anver Emon
pointed out, they were in theory, to be vindicated in God’s name and not in the name of
the community or the ruler. The shift that took place at the end of the nineteenth century
with the establishment of the Public Prosecutor, as we will see, occurred most
fundamentally not in practice, as I argue, but rather in the theory underlying prosecution
42
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of these and all acts deemed to be deleterious to public welfare. Prosecutions by the
Public Prosecutor were now invoked in the name of society rather than in the name of
God or the individual.
Adjudicating over defendants through God’s law, the qāḍī applied the rules of
Islamic jurisprudence with respect to the right to initiate proceedings against defendants
and to punish them. The application of these rules of prosecution, in addition to being a
pragmatic matter of protecting the public welfare, involved a comprehensive way of
understanding right and wrong within the religious community. 47 But according to
Hallaq, the religious community, previously bound by God’s rules, became unbound
from its moral and ethical grounding in the nineteenth century, when the sharīʻa, 48
including its rules of initiating proceedings against the defendant, gave way to criminal
prosecution. By the end of the nineteenth century, the sharīʻa and the qāḍī’s court no
longer determined the traditional course of criminal justice. Nonetheless, the process of
this seeming dislocation was an evolutionary, not an abrupt one, and it involved an
interaction of some kind of legal ideas and practices that flowed between Egypt and
Europe, between East and West, and between nineteenth-century Egypt’s different legal
institutions.49 Although the embodiment of this “secular” system of punishment, as
Hallaq explained, would have transformational significance for the right to punish and for
those in whom it became vested by the end of the nineteenth century, and for how the
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sharīʻa’s divine rules of governance had existed both historically and contextually over
the lifespans of Islamic societies.
Bound by God’s Rules
The everyday governance of Ottoman Egypt required more than judges
adjudicating according to Islamic law. It also involved a number of other agents who, like
the qāḍī, were delegated by the ruler-governor (the sultan or caliph) to deal with the
community in God’s name and according to the divine rules of the sharīʻa. The inclusion
and continuity of the various policing agents within the fabric of everyday Ottoman
Egypt enforced legal doctrines and principles, not least of which was the principle of
“commanding the good and forbidding evil.” 50 The ruler’s agents embodied a normative,
prescriptive, fixed function within the larger Muslim community. One may see these
agents as institutions within Islamic history, not only as symbols of fixed moral principles
and doctrine found in legal texts, but also as adapting to local and exigent circumstances,
and subsequently bringing about a change in the understanding and application of legal
doctrine. As Kristen Stilt noted in Islamic Law in Action, to fully grasp the changes
undergone within Islamic law throughout the histories of Muslim communities requires
us to answer questions “beyond whether doctrinal rules were actually applied, questions
that begin with the premise that in any society the functioning of law is far more
complicated than the choices by legal actors to use or ignore legal texts.” 51
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As in other legal histories, texts serve as a crucial starting point in delegating the
authority of executive agents over the course of Islamic legal history. As Stilt pointed out
in her comprehensive study of the muḥtasib, the market inspector (‘āmil al-sūq or sāḥib
al-sūq), the sultan’s letters of appointment ordaining the muḥtasib constrained the content
and the limits of this public official’s authority. Several manuals over the ages stipulated
acts he was authorized to punish, including in flagrante violations such as cheating in
weights and other acts deemed reprehensible to the Muslim community. 52 Still, even
though the violations punished by the muḥtasib were for the sake of the Muslim
community, they were vindicated in the name of the Sultan (delegated in theory by the
caliph) who stood in as the “shadow of God on earth.” 53
Nevertheless, with regard to certain other violations, including adultery and
highway robbery, the public servant could not discretionarily punish, for he maintained a
“limited civil and criminal jurisdiction.” 54 In such instances, he was obligated to bring the
accused to the judge, who applied strict fiqh-based rules of evidence to the case in order
to issue a verdict. 55 If the muḥtasib could be a institutional precedent for the Public
Prosecutor, he was, nevertheless, limited—at least according to Islamic legal theory—in
his jurisdictional authority, for he could not adjudicate over crimes of homicide or
assault. In addition to the muḥtasib, other executive agents over the course of Egypt’s
Islamic history were involved in the process of initiating proceedings against the
defendant. Included amongst them was the chief of police (ṣāhib al-shurṭa or ṣāḥib al52
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madīna) who, along with other executive officials, was responsible for “the investigation
of crimes, the arrest, trial and punishment of criminals.” 56 Also, like the muḥtasib,
officials also assumed the “supervision of public morals.” 57 While they remain less
studied in the historiography, earlier police agents, as with the muḥtasib, may,
nevertheless, provide a line of continuity within Islamic history and with nineteenthcentury police (shurṭa), all the way to the Public Prosecutor.
Still, while a concern for morality in the public sphere still guided nineteenthcentury Egypt’s police, a concern for public order also defined it. In that sense, the
distinction between earlier modes of enforcement and a nineteenth-century police force
was the latter’s positivist transfiguration into an agent of the state motivated by its
rationally-determined purposes of punishment—purposes that were in addition to those
found in the sharīʻa. That is not to say that maintaining public order was not a motivating
concern for earlier administrations of justice, but rather, where maintaining public morals
may have been the raison d’être of earlier executive agents, the purposes of their
nineteenth-century counterparts appear to have adopted a more rational mode. 58
Accordingly, the evolution of the justices of the peace, who similarly protected English
and American society into the nineteenth century, could be described as a transformation
of a public concern for morality into a general positivist concern for public order through
which morals were also considered. Prosecuting Printz for the moral wrong he caused
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Manṣūra was also, quite importantly in 1831, also matter of a public policy aimed at
maintaining order and social cohesion.
Bound by the Ruler’s Prerogatives
The governance of Ottoman Egypt extended beyond judges and police agents to
the Sultan himself and to this ruler’s positivist—even if limited—practices of public
prosecution. The involvement of the Muslim ruler in adjudication has been brought to
light by recent scholarship, which has built on analyses of the role that Mamlūk rulers
played in the everyday affairs of their subjects. 59 In addition to the qāḍī’s court,
governors adjudicated over the more egregious crimes, including theft and highway
robbery, through their own executive councils. 60 Yet, these adjudicating councils,
referred to as maẓālim or dīwāns, also overheard petitions of everyday matters from
property disputes to divorce, in addition to the latter, more egregious public violations
that were deemed to threaten the community’s morality and order. 61 Since proving these
“public violations” in a local qāḍī’s court was difficult, public officials beckoned the
ruler to deal with such perceived violations. 62 In this way, the ruler’s council resembled
equity courts in contemporary medieval England. 63 When subjects were unable to obtain
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a verdict within the ordinary legal channels of justice, they petitioned the Sultan directly
in order to obtain justice.
Muslim jurists’ theories of moral governance in the name of God and the
community justified the intrusion of the ruler into criminal adjudication. This notion of
siyāsa sharʻīya (moral governance) received its first comprehensive treatment by the
Ḥanbalī jurist Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) during the Mamlūk period. 64 According to this
theory, the ruler was allowed to govern in ways that supplemented the strict juristic rules
of the tradition as long as, by doing so, he sought to maintain the morals of the
community as a whole. As N. J. Coulson observed in 1964: 65
The doctrine of siyāsa sharʻiyya, based on a realistic assessment of the nature of
Sharīʻa law and the historical process by which it had been absorbed into the
structure of the state, admitted the necessity for, and the validity of, extra-Sharīʻa
jurisdictions, which cannot therefore be regarded, in themselves, as deviations
from any ideal standard.
Still, it remains unclear to what extent this theory of governance—sharīʻa supplemented
by siyāsa—provided any foundation for a theory of public prosecution that came about at
the end of the nineteenth century. As mentioned with respect to the role of the muḥtasib,
and as will be illustrated in the cases of nineteenth-century siyāsa councils, morality
continued to be a state preoccupation; however, it was by no means the only
preoccupation. Throughout nineteenth-century Egypt: public order, hygiene, sanitation,
food supply, manufacturing, and transportation—amongst other concerns—shaped the
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purposes for the practice of prosecuting individuals. 66 These practical concerns would
subsequently infuse a theory of public prosecution, both on behalf of the moral wellbeing of the community, and as we shall see, based on the rationally-derived goal of
protecting this new concept of society (al-hay’a al-ijtimaʻīya).
History becomes a critical lens by which scholars can understand the evolution of
the legal tradition—the sharīʻa—and its evolution into the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. By virtue of the concept of siyāsa sharʻīya as practiced in history, the sharīʻa
evolved as a legal tradition. 67 The sections that follow illustrate how the history of public
prosecution in nineteenth-century khedival Egypt shaped the legal tradition itself, not
only through legal practice (case law), but also through an evolving language focused on
establishing public order and obtaining it for the public good. By the end of the
nineteenth century, this legal practice would be transformed into a robust theory of public
prosecution in the name of society, a theory that served as the foundation for the
emergence of the institution of the Public Prosecutor.
THE PASHA AND SIYĀSA
New Codes and Executive Councils
By the early nineteenth century, the khedival state seemed to have fully
capitalized on this traditional concept of siyāsa sharʻīya, but now it had also transformed
it into a positivist tool by which a bureaucratic state was able to establish order and
stability. Yet, the subtlety and mechanics of power inherent in this application of
66

See Heather J. Sharkey, American Evangelicals in Egypt: Missionary Encounters in an Age of Empire
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). See On Barak, On Time: Technology and Temporality in
Modern Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). See James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State:
How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1998).
67
Coulson, 134.

40

executive power went beyond corporal punishment, 68 and, as we shall see, embodied an
entrenched legal practice and language for the prosecution of defendants. Thus, seen
accordingly, the image of a disorderly Ottoman Egypt ruled by the whims of its governor
(wālī) did not fit the historical reality of the Ottoman province on the eve of British
Occupation in 1882. Rather, this reality fueled the ambitions of Egypt’s wālī
(governor)—the Pasha, Mehmed Ali (1769–1849, r. 1805-1848)—who forced the
province into a bureaucratic, military, industrial phase. 69 The Pasha, through his Cabinet
(al-Dīwān al-Khidīwī), hanged, flogged, and exiled subjects accused of violating his strict
codes’ prohibitions against: forgery (tazwīr), 70 murder, 71 public outrage, 72 and negligence
in carrying out official duties. 73 Even so, in spite of the seeming arbitrariness of these
punishments, maintaining public order predominated to guide the khedival administrative
state and its legal system across the nineteenth century, and consequently, as this chapter
argues, to change the legal precedents of public prosecution within the juristic tradition.
Because of the rise of a civilian army during the 1820s, and campaigns in the
Ḥijāz against the Wahhābī movement on behalf of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt saw an
expansion of its administrative system, a system that pioneered legal reforms within the
Ottoman Empire. This system included the sharīʻa courts in which state-appointed judges
68
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(qāḍīs) heard cases and issued verdicts (sg. ḥukm) within their communities, ranging
from contract and property disputes to divorce and alimony cases to theft and murder.
However, also having overlapping jurisdiction with these sharīʻa courts, the governor’s
own executive-judicial cabinet continued to hear and adjudicate petitions sent to it. 74 The
Khedive’s Cabinet (al-Dīwān al-Khidīwī) would come to be a central nerve of the
khedival state and its bureaucracy and a predecessor to the Ministry of the Interior
(Dīwān al-Dākhilīya, by the mid-nineteenth century and by the end of the nineteenth
century, Niẓārat al-Dākhilīya) delegated by the khedive himself to scrutinize and
maintain internal order and stability.
New codes promulgated by the khedival state guided the decisions of the
Khedive’s Cabinet. Foremost amongst these was Qānūn al-Filāḥa, or “The Agriculture
Code,” the first part of Qānūn al-Muntakhabāt (“Selected Code Provisions”),
promulgated in 1830 (Shaʻbān 1245). These 55 articles, as Rudoph Peters noted, “were
aimed at disciplining the rural population and the officials serving in rural areas.” 75
Nonetheless, a year before this Code, another decree was issued “concerning murder,
highway robbery, counterfeiting, extortion by officials, and embezzlement.” 76 While
some of these crimes were already punishable under Ottoman qānūn, their recodification
under the administrative state entailed a growing concern to order society and to ensure
the efficiency of its peasant population, but also to stem corruption among its public
officials, as in the case of Printz that began this chapter. However, re-articulations of
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Ottoman criminal codes, 77 as we will see in the second chapter, involved not only
punishment for acts of disobedience; these codes penalized persons thought to harbor
harmful intentions that made them keen to disrupt public order. While disciplining of
minds had already occurred in Mehmed Ali’s army, 78 it had also now become a means of
control of the general population, codified in the law itself, as we will see in more detail
in the next chapter.
The Khedive’s Cabinet was not the only site of adjudication and application of
criminal codes promulgated during the first half of the nineteenth century. In addition to
the local sharīʻa courts, which continued to adjudicate over most civil and criminal
matters pertaining to local Ottoman subjects according to the rules of fiqh, and the
consular courts that heard corresponding matters pertaining to foreign subjects, a parallel
system of gubernatorial authority came into existence. At its base, this system consisted
of the Khedive’s Cabinet. Another council that also embodied the khedive’s authority,
but operated at a certain distance from him, by his ketuda, was the Vice-regal Council
(Dīwān al-Maʻīya al-Sanīya). This Council heard numerous quotidian cases, from murder
to negligent arson to bribery to forgery cases as early as the 1820s. Budding from it, a
number of other ministries emerged within this khedival administrative system until it
dissolved in the 1880s, replaced by a National Courts’ system and legislation that gave it
its form. Also connected to it were three major ministries: the Foreign Ministry (Wizārat
al-Khārijīya), the War Ministry (al-Jihādīya), and the Ministry of Education (Majlis alMadāris). Correspondences in hand-written registers and letters written in Ottoman
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Turkish and Arabic abound in the historical record and were clearly exchanged between
these earlier nineteenth-century ministries, detailing cases of subjects who petitioned this
emerging khedival administrative state and its growing bureaucracy.
Paper became the backbone of this bureaucracy. Registers were kept,
summarizing in handwritten Arabic the correspondences between these different
ministries’ often detailed orders to investigate the facts of certain cases. Such paper
correspondences also included state executive-judicial councils, established across
Egypt’s governorates beginning in the 1840s, called majālis (literally, “assemblies”) that
heard evidence and adjudicated verdicts based on the existing qānūn as well as the
procedural and evidentiary rules of the fiqh. 79 The councils did not strictly adhere to the
latter, but they molded the rules in such a way in order to achieve the state’s objective of
establishing public order. 80 The administrators who ran these councils, nevertheless, were
always conscious, in appearances at least, of the need to be seen as issuing rulings on the
bases of both God’s law as well as the governor’s: “qānūnan wā sharʻan.” 81 This is an
important distinction, as the majālis continually deferred to the rules of fiqh, even if (as
we will see) they continued to change its rules in practice and through a precise language
that over the course of the nineteenth century, expressed a growing concern for public
order. 82 This latter point corrects earlier historiography that claimed that the majālis
stood practically against the local traditions vested in the local qādī and his court, even if
79
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these councils may have represented a different mode of thinking about the law and its
application.
More notable to the addition of these state councils, a judicial appeals structure
began to take form in the 1840s. In 1842, khedival orders gave birth to a Justice
Assembly (al-Jamʻīya al-Ḥaqqānīya) that reviewed lower council decisions involving a
range of cases, including theft, manslaughter, as well as official corruption and
incompetence. 83 The Assembly was a significant addition into the legal tradition because
it allowed for a contiguous structure—even if it did not resemble a court—to which lower
assembly decisions could be appealed. 84 It was in 1848, that this structure would be
replaced by Majlis al-Aḥkām, that heard appeals from councils throughout Egypt’s
different governorates, but for Cairo’s cases, it heard cases as a court of first instance,
taking over this function from police stations beginning in the 1840s. 85 While these
various fora suggest that a semblance of an appeals structure existed, that structure would
only take full-fledged form by the end of the nineteenth century with the establishment of
Egypt’s National Court System in 1883.
As the khedival state remained concerned with maintaining law and order, it
established police stations throughout Egypt’s various governorates during the nineteenth
century. Called ḍabṭīyas (police stations) and mudīrīyas (in the major cities), these
installations accepted varied complaints or petitions throughout the nineteenth century, as
will be discussed in Chapter Five. Serving as the courts of first instance in a number of
83
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locales, these local police stations became responsible for conducting thorough
investigations that included the identification of the crime, medical autopsies,
interrogations of defendants and witnesses, and they forwarded case files to the
aforementioned local state councils (majālis).
Along with this vital centripetal force emanating from the state and its councils,
criminal investigations and prosecutions were also a matter of concern to communities
throughout Egypt. They animated their own administration of justice and further
demanded order and stability from their ruling governors. Local watchmen (ghafīrs or
nāẓirs), who were supposed to be constantly on the look-out, especially at night, guarded
the community against crime and wrongdoing, and provided the bedrock of stability and
protection for local communities throughout late-Ottoman Egypt. 86 Ghafīrs, because of
their institutional familiarity and interconnectedness within their communities, were so
vital for this purpose. Evincing the persisting importance of the ghafīrs in protecting
Egypt, for example, on Dhū’l al-Qaʻda 29, 1262 (November 28, 1846), families sent the
Khedive’s Cabinet “a complaint regarding the Berber ghafīrs and the ghafīrs who were in
the protection of al-Waban” (‘alā tashakkī al-ahālī fī al-ghafara al-barabra wa al-ghafīr
alladhi fī ḍamān al-wabān). In it, they complained of the failure of the ghafīrs “to guard
the places and shops within Cairo (al-Maḥrusa), as well as to guard the gardens and other
places from the outside” (alladhī yaghfur al-amākin wa al-dakakīn bi-dākhil al-maḥrūsa
wa alladhi yaghfur al-janāyīn wa ghayraha wa khārij ḥawl al-maḥrūsa). 87 They
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complained that the watchmen to whom they paid a salary to protect them and their
property while they were asleep, failed to do so. Mehmed Ali Pasha, taking account of his
subjects’ complaints, then ordered his men to provide six guards (anfār) to the local
community in order to secure the families in this regard. 88 In addition to demonstrating
the involvement of the state in the lives of local communities, this incident further shows
how the administrative state’s practical authority remained driven, at least in part, by
local communities and their everyday needs. Egypt’s legal tradition developed out of this
practical authority, which became a critical factor in the evolution of the right to punish
within nineteenth-century Egypt.
Murder’s Weight
The penchant of the khedival state for maintaining stability and general welfare
became apparent in the way its administration of justice dealt with murder. Ottoman
criminal codes had already treated homicide (qatl), namely murder (that is, homicide with
an intent to kill, or qatl bi-‘amd, or qatl bi-qaṣd), which had been listed and punished
under Mehmed Ali’s 1830 Qānūn al-Filāḥa, and which aimed to control Egypt’s
industrious peasants more tightly. 89 Following the promulgation of this criminal code,
and in exchange for curbing his imperial ambitions in the region and agreeing to the
terms of the Balta Liman Treaty of 1838, Mehmed Ali would hold the right to punish
intentional homicide, which became a site of contestation between the khedive and his
Sultan in Istanbul. 90 Who held the right to punish homicide became a litmus test of how a
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more autonomous Egypt, still an Ottoman province until it became a British protectorate
in 1914, though under its formidable wālī Mehmed Ali Pasha and his heirs, fit within a
larger Ottoman orbit. In particular, it raised the question of how the legal reforms already
undertaken in Egypt related, if at all, to the universal legal reforms, the Tanzimat reforms,
declared by the Sublime Porte for the Ottoman Empire as a whole beginning in 1839.
Prosecutions of homicide by the local authority sitting on the majālis preceded the
birth of the public prosecutor. Nevertheless, the practical, immediate question that the
treatment of defendants convicted of murder within nineteenth-century Egypt exposed
was: who had the right to punish within the Ottoman province? At the end of Mehmed
Ali’s reign, a contentious battle ensued—between his grandson Abbas (Hilmi I) Pasha,
effectively now the dynastic ruler of Egypt, and the Sultan, Abdülmecid I (r. 1839-1861),
the titular figurehead of Egypt as an Ottoman province—over who held the right to
decide whether the death penalty would be imposed on convicted criminals. 91 Abbas’s
agents in Istanbul relayed the message to the Sublime Porte that any constraints placed on
executive power in order to safeguard the life and liberty of the defendant would hinder
the governor’s ability to protect his province from unruly characters. 92 However, in 1851,
the Sublime Porte’s Ottoman Privy Council retorted that the execution (or talion, qiṣāṣ)
of a defendant convicted of murder within any Ottoman domain remained “one of the
special rights of the High Caliphate vested in the person of His Most gracious majesty”
(the Sultan). 93 They also asserted that Ottoman Egypt, although administratively
autonomous under the Pasha, was still bound by this Sultan’s right to punish. After tense
91
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negotiations, an agreement devolving de-facto power for a limited time to the Pasha in
this matter was reached.
A closer look into the legal topography of khedival Egypt yields a more accurate
picture than of a state that, abiding by the prescriptions of the legal tradition, took a
laissez faire approach to dealing with homicide. On 17 Dhūˊl-Ḥijjah 1274 (July 29,
1858), under the reign of Muḥammad Saʻīd Pasha (1822-1863, r. 1854-1863), a petition
(or sharḥ) was sent to members of the Ministry of the Interior (Dīwān al-Dākhilīya, the
successor to Mehmed Ali Pasha’s Khedive’s Cabinet (al-Dīwān al-Khidīwī), from the
governorate of Fayyūm (mudīrīyat fayyūm). The petitioners (muqqadimatuhu) brought
forth a claim against a local Berber named ‘Ᾱfa for shooting and killing their father
almost sixteen years before (around Muḥarram 1258/February 1842), in broad daylight
on the road to the central market (qatala wālidahum muḥarram ۱۲٥۸ bil-raṣāṣ nahāran
bi-ṭarīq sūq al-zirrī). However, even though a concerted search for the named killer,
employing the community’s agents, led nowhere for many years (wa bil-baḥth ‘an alfāʻil al-madhkūr fa lam yūjad), the case was returned by the Khedive’s Cabinet to the
governorate in order to find the suspected murderer and bring him to justice (literally, “to
pull him in,” or li-yasīra jalb al-madhkūr). Significantly, despite the long time elapsed
since the perpetrated crime, the state’s agents unambiguously articulated the urgency in
tracking this identified defendant: for “the necessary investigatory procedure was to take
place with complete accuracy under the auspices of the investigatory body, in so far as
homicide cases hold special weight before us” (wa ijrā’ al-taḥqīq al-lāzim bi-kamāl al-

49

diqqa bi-ḥimāyat dīwān al-taḥqīq ḥaythu anna qaḍāyā al-qatl lā tuqās bi-khilāfina). 94
Bringing accused murderers to justice followed exacting investigatory procedures
established by the mid-nineteenth century. 95 But underlying heightened investigative
procedures in homicide cases was a policy of maintaining public order (istiqrār al-amn
al-‘umūmī), as we will see more concretely below, a policy that itself began to change the
existing rules of procedures extant within the legal tradition regarding murder.
Here, as with numerous other homicide cases that it confronted, the Khedive’s
Cabinet reconfigured the state’s prerogative to punish. That prerogative extended beyond
capitalizing on and disciplining the bodies of convicted criminals; it went much deeper
and further back chronologically to tracing, binding, and pulling in of accused killers
before the state’s authorities. In other words, where the Pasha’s various criminal codes
and edicts may have camouflaged his procedural prerogative to bring forth accused
murderers to justice, and suggested that his procedures were in keeping with the sharīʻaordained private right of a person (ḥaqq ādāmī) to initiate prosecution in cases of
homicide, the actual treatment of homicide before the state’s executive-judicial councils
told a more nuanced tale about murder. 96 By that account, archival records demonstrate
the fact that homicide cases held “special weight” in the hands of the state’s agents who
had to confront such cases and who ordered detailed investigations into them. In the midnineteenth-century, through the reign of Ismāʻīl Pasha (1830 -1895, r. 1863-1878),
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homicide cases reported in siyāsa councils almost invariably included the stock phrase
“homicide cases hold special weight” (qaḍāyā al-qatl lā tuqās). 97 The councils’ records
highlight a cognizant administrative state that prioritized and actively guided the
prosecution of those accused of murder for the sake of protecting Egypt and its
industrious subjects. 98 The prioritization of homicide cases obtained even if the murder
occurred decades prior and even if an investigation and subsequent state-led prosecution
may have trespassed on the exclusive, divinely-vested right of the heirs of murder victims
to initiate prosecution in homicide cases.
Potential plaintiffs in homicide cases—brothers and sisters, mothers and fathers—
did not bury the bodies of their slain siblings and children, but rather forcefully exercised
their prerogative to initiate prosecution against those whom they knew had caused them,
or suspected of causing them, serious grief. The voices of next-of-kin fill the historical
record. In Shawwāl 1291 (November 1874), for example, a Syrian named ‘Abd alRaḥmān voiced his grief to the Vice-regal Council “saying that his brother, who had
travelled from Greater Syria with a herd of camels of which he sold some at the local
fair,” was discovered murdered between the Cairo districts of Imbaba and Giza. 99 Raising
his petition, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, an Ottoman subject, demanded that justice be done for his
dead brother. The state’s administrators did not ignore the report of this mysterious
murder, as they must have been aware of the high price of camels in the market and, thus,
concerned to eliminate such disturbance to his provincial economy (which depended on
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traders like ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s brother). 100 Therefore, the Head Scribe of the Khedive’s
Cabinet responded by issuing an order on 19 Shawwāl 1291 (November 29, 1874) for a
thorough investigation into the brother’s murder. 101 The order compelled government
agents to undertake the following: “investigatory procedures with complete accuracy, the
arrival at the truth, and the arrest of the killer and his punishment according to the law”
(ijrā’ al-taḥqiqāt bil-diqqa wa al-wuqūf ‘alā haqā’iqiha wa ḍabṭ al-fāʻil wa mujāzātuhū
bi-ḥasab al-qānūn). 102 Before Ismāʻīl Pasha and his agents, this case urged special care
and attention, just as the search for the accused Berber in the earlier homicide case above
confronted Saʻīd Pasha and his agents. Flagged in the court registers, as were other
murder cases throughout the nineteenth century, the case carried the telling phrase:
“homicide cases hold special weight before us.” 103 On the eve of British Occupation, it
appeared that murder had already become a priority of the khedival administrative state.
In seeking justice for his dead brother, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān echoed Susan al-Khūry’s
petition on behalf of her brother, who had been slain a decade earlier. In Dhūˊl-Qaʻdah
1280 (May 1864), the Syrian sister sought answers to the murder of her brother Yūsuf alKhūrī who was killed in the district of Kafr al-Shaykh, which used to be part of the
Gharbīya Governorate in the northern Nile Delta. 104 But whereas ‘Abd al-Raḥmān had
elevated his claims to the Pasha’s Vice-regal Council, Susan al-Khūrī brought her
petition, through the French consulate (bi-wāsiṭat consulato faransa) as a protégé (or
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protected person), 105 to Egypt’s highest (and first) appeals council, Majlis al-Aḥkām
established in 1848. 106 In her petition, which she, like other women during the century,
had to make through a male legal representative (or wakīl), she demanded and was
granted the police case file (awrāq al-qaḍīya min al-mudīrīya) regarding her brother’s
murder. 107 Although the suspects had been detained, before she could present the Council
with the necessary evidence to find guilty those she accused of killing her brother, an
urgent procedural matter required by the sharīʻa had to be resolved—the central question
raised in this chapter: who had the right to initiate the prosecution? The question
confronted a special jurisprudential council called al-Majlis al-‘Ilmī within the larger
Majlis al-Aḥkām and which was comprised of both religious scholars (‘ulamā’) and state
administrative judges. The hybrid religious-secular nature of this body came to be
articulated by the experienced scribe who wrote: “and it was requested of them also to
make apparent the inculpatory evidence with respect to the matter in light of both Islamic
legal tradition and public policy [sharʻan wa siyāsatan] as it was presented to the
jurisprudential council [al-Majlis al-‘Ilmī].” 108
This parallel, dual function distinguished al-Majlis al-‘Ilmī in determining
answers to legal questions regarding homicide. Applying this function to the specific
facts of this case, the legal issue before the jurisprudential council was whether the
prosecution could go forward considering the fiqh rule that demanded unanimous consent
from the murder victim’s heirs. Thus, the case turned on whether Yūsuf al-Khūrī had
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other surviving siblings, other than Susan, or children who would forego prosecution.
Yūsūf, in fact, did have a brother who lived in Syria and who travelled specifically to
activate the prosecution, but it was also then “made clear that the murder victim also had
a son” (ittaḍaḥa anna al-shakhṣ al-muqāl yafqiduhu lahu waladun), who also lived in
Egypt. 109 Until this threshold procedural question was resolved, however, al-Majlis al‘Ilmī, keeping in line with the sharīʻa’s proffered protections to criminal defendants,
warned that the accused could not be detained without a ruling against them (la yuṣiḥḥu
iqāmatuhum masjūnīn bi-ghayr ṣudūr al-ḥukm ‘alayhim). The Council, therefore, issued
an order for their release, but also considering the risk of their fleeing on grounds of the
siyāsa’s policy of maintaining public order, required that a surety be provided for them
(ṣarraḥat bil-ifrāj ʻanhum bil-ḍamānāt). 110 By affirming the sharīʻa’s rules of protection
of the accused, al-Majlis al-‘Ilmī, here, shielded the accused from harsh punishment. 111
Even so, the religious scholars and legal experts who comprised this jurisprudential
council also extended procedural protections to defendants before the latter could even be
prosecuted (similar to what French grand juries, or jurys d’accusation, did before they
were eliminated by Napoleon’s 1808 Code of Criminal Procedure). 112 Thus, the khedival
body offered two different kinds of protection to persons accused of homicide, one
procedural and the other substantive.
Nevertheless, although it restrained itself, the khedival state did not hesitate to
step in to mediate between aggrieved, dueling parties in homicide cases through an
DWQ 0020-001806. Majlis al-Aḥkām. Case No. 1. Dhūl-Qaʻdah 1280. Mudirīyat Iskandarīya.
DWQ 0020-001806. Majlis al-Aḥkām. Case No. 1. Dhūl-Qaʻdah 1280. Mudirīyat Iskandarīya.
111
See James M. Donovan, Juries and the Transformation of Criminal Justice in France in the Nineteenth
and Twentieth Centuries (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014): 42.
112
Id.
109
110

54

exacting application of criminal procedure and evidence in order to restrict uncontrolled
vengeance and public disorder from spilling through the Nile. A case appeared before the
High Council, less than a year before it heard Susan al-Khūrī’s petition above, which
highlighted the administrative state’s agents with respect to nineteenth-century murder
cases. On 23 Jumādā al-Awwal 1279 (November 16, 1862), the High Council received a
letter (khiṭāb) from Ḥasan ‘Azzām seeking redress (taẓallama) on behalf of his father,
Sālim ‘Azzām, who had been detained by the authorities. 113 In revenging one of his
brothers’ murder and another’s assault at the hands of ‘Alī al-Mulīḥī’s sons, Sālim
‘Azzām took the law into his own hands and himself killed ‘Alī al-Mulīḥī (qīla minhu
anna Sālim ‘Azzām al-madhkūr ajrā qatl al-sayyid Mulīḥī). 114 While Ḥasan ‘Azzām
claimed that his father’s killing of ‘Alī al-Mulīḥī was, nevertheless, “foreordained in his
own brother’s murder” (yatīḥū annahu min kawn qatli akhī Sālim ‘Azzām maḥsūrun fī alsayyid al-Mulīḥī), 115 al-Mulīḥī’s children claimed that there was legally relevant doubt
(shubha) as to whether the killing of ‘Azzām’s uncle was caused by any of the Mulīḥī’s
in the first place. They subsequently petitioned the High Council to set free Mulīḥī
brothers, who had been detained on account of murder charges. This seemingly minor
family feud between the ‘Azzām’s and the Mulīḥī’s immediately caught the High
Council’s attention. Taking seriously the sharīʻa’s sanction against punishment of the
accused in the face of doubt (shubha, strictly, mistake of law or fact) that they had
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committed a crime, 116 the Council ordered the release of the al-Mulīḥī’s with the required
sureties, yet it hardly ended the matter there. Seeking to get to the bottom of this series of
reported homicides, the High Council sent the case back to the police station (almudīrīya), “demanding that the appropriate official get to the bottom of this matter and
achieve a firm grasp of its facts” (bi-ṭalabi man lazima min al-wuqūf ‘alā bawāṭin
hādhihi al-mādda wa al-mursā ‘alā ḥaqā’iqiha). 117 With respect to Sālim ‘Azzām,
provided the initial evidence that he killed the patron of his rival family, the Council, in a
move meant to send a warning to those who would take the law into their own hands,
approved the continued detention of the accused vigilante “in consideration of the
particular circumstances” (qad istaṣwaba ḥabsahu murāʻātan lil-ḥirs ‘alā al-kayfīya) and
until he could refute the accusation (by “presenting doubt”) that he killed the patron of
his rival family. In an unexpected turn of events, however, Ḥasan ‘Azzām in this petition
to the Council, reported that ‘Alī al-Mulīhī, whom his father was accused of killing, was
in fact alive (mawjūd), “as a group of people saw him about a month after the
incident.” 118
Confronted with this exculpatory evidence, the Council ordered ‘Azzām’s release,
as well. Nevertheless, the High Council was unambiguous about the administrative
state’s policy (siyāsa) of maintaining public order in the matter: “the legal principles and
justice require mediation between the two parties such that there be no complaints from
either party” (anna al-uṣūl wa al-‘adāla taqtaḍī anna al-muʻādala bayn al-ṭarafayn ḥatta
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lā yaḥsula tashakkī min aḥadihimā). 119 By the mid-nineteenth century in late Ottoman
Egypt, from the point of view of the emerging administrative state, that reflected a belief
that a “state that improved its population’s skills, vigor, civic morals, and work habits
would increase its tax base and field better armies,” 120 a public policy guided by a
utilitarian calculus for public welfare seemed to fuel the treatment and adjudication of
homicide in nineteenth-century Egypt.
Public Order
It was, thus, understood that this emerging khedival state and its agents—from
foot patrols to heads of police stations, to scribes who wrote down the details of cases
presented before state councils—valued stability and public order. In fact, “The Protected
One” (Al-Maḥrusa) referring to their inherited, precious Egypt, was the name that the
Pashas gave the royal yacht (the first ship to cross the Suez Canal when it opened in 1869
and the oldest active yacht in the world today). Ironically, it was this yacht, the symbol of
their safeguarded Ottoman province, that would later carry the Pashas—Ismāʻīl, ‘Abbās
Ḥilmī II (1874-1944, r. 1892-1914), and later King Farouk (1920-1965, r. 1936-1952),
the last ruling members of Mehmed Ali’s dynasty—to their exile abroad under British
control. 121 Protecting Egypt undergirded the khedival legal system, at least a century
before Egypt ever became a British “protectorate.”
In the first instance, keeping order meant keeping public places safe. Local cafes,
public squares, and mosques became the object of scrutiny of this emerging
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administrative state. 122 In the mid-1830s, for example, in addition to sending letters of
appointment to the position of the muḥtasib, the khedive (al-janāb al-‘ālī) also sent his
agent Mukhtār Bey letters sanctioning the licensing of a local pub (khammāra) in Abū
Zaʻbal, a district in Cairo where the first medical school was founded in 1827. 123 As
young medical students inhabited the area, the state subsequently developed a keen
interest in keeping an eye on local activities, and thus, one of the letters dated 6 DhūˊlḤijjah 1251 (March 24, 1836) referred to “a local pub whose license had been prevented
in Abu Zaʻbal” (bi-khuṣūṣ al-khammāra allatī muniʻa al-tarkhīṣ laha bi-abū zaʻbal). 124 A
decade later, on the 7th of Shawwāl 1262 (September 28, 1846), still under the reign of
Mehmed Ali, it was reported to a Cairene police station that around 3 o’clock in the
morning, while the foot patrol was passing (bi-murūr al-ṭawf) in Bāb al-Lūq, a wellknown neighborhood in Cairo, he found a coffeehouse that was still open. When the
patrol approached the owner of the coffeehouse to warn him that his premises were open
past three in the morning, the owner and his assistant (huwa wa ṣāḥibuhu) indignantly
confronted the patrol, (literally in Arabic, “became insolent towards the officer,”
(taṭāwalū ‘alā al-ṭawf), who then arrested them and brought them to the local police
station (qarāqūl or caracoal). 125 Based on the existing case law, the administrative state’s
agents had already begun to monitor public spaces carefully and place constraints
(including curfews) on them.
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By the mid-nineteenth century, rules of public decorum continued to fuel further
criminal prosecutions of both local and foreign subjects in police stations at first instance.
These new rules, aimed at controlling public behavior, arose for several reasons, and
engendered new social mores carried across the Ottoman Empire as well as in Europe. 126
In 1865, for example, the head of a local police station in Cairo arrested Louis Martin, a
French citizen living there at the time, and forwarded him to the French consular court for
criminal proceedings. 127 He sent the French consulate an Arabic letter stating this much:
“The foreigner Louis Martin, the Frenchman, arrived at the home of the foreigner Jean
Pluton and committed in it yesterday inappropriate acts (afʿāl ghayr lā’iqa), which the
government has made to be outside the bounds of law” (i.e., which have been made
illegal) (jaʻala al-ḥukūma khārijahu ʿan ḥūdūd al-qawānīn). 128
In asking the French consulate to do with him as it saw necessary, the Cairene
police prefect also offered the testimony of the “physician of the French hospital who
accompanied the accused and whose character, I consider, to be most upright,” in
addition to the testimony of the “noble Muḥammad Effendi, the head of the Police’s
Foreign Office [qalam al-afranjī], as well as Elias Effendi, one of the Department’s
assistants.” 129 In addition to this hearsay evidence, the prefecture of police also included
a separate addendum in one of the consulate letters, testifying that Martin “raised his
hand signaling that he would hit us, and he responded to the head of the Foreign Police
Department saying: ‘I am prepared to hit you and him both,’ in opposition to the
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government (khārij al-ḥukūma).” 130 Here, again, local authorities deployed all sorts of
evidence, whether wholly accurate or not, in order to force them to comport with
established social rules and norms of behavior, and to the extent that these norms were
reflected in the applied law.
What the police report clarified was a perpetual concern of the emerging khedival state to
maintain order (in this case, to suppress actions deemed scandalous) within public places,
and to assert the executive’s authority within them. Thus, as with the patrol who enforced
the curfew in the coffeehouse case above under Mehmed Ali’s reign, the authority of the
jāwīsh in this case was not to be disrespected, like the café owner and his assistant in the
earlier case, was accused of showing contempt for the authority of the police. And as
with the butcher shop’s case earlier on in the decade, the removal of a part of the state
agent’s uniform (in this case, that the ṭarbūsh that symbolized the elite by turn-of-thecentury society) mattered from the point of the view of this emerging administrative state
because it showed a disregard for authority.
Maintaining public order thereby determined public policy and fueled increased
criminal prosecution within Ottoman Egypt’s administration of justice, but it also defined
the language that state authorities now used to speak about criminal justice—decades
before it was theorized in the legal treatises penned by Arabic-speaking law professors.
By the 1870s, almost two decades before the birth of the public prosecutor, public
authorities already spoke a language of public order when initiating prosecutions against
the accused. Auguste Martres, a hotel bellboy residing in Cairo (“garçon d’hôtel
demeurant au Caire”), stood before a French criminal tribunal in January of 1873,
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arrested and accused by the police of stealing (“soustrait frauduleusement”) various
articles of clothing (“des effects d’habillments tets [sic] que pantalons, gilets,
chemises”). 131 In connection with escorting Martres along with the eye-witness evidence
collected against him to the French consulate, the Cairene prefecture of police also sent a
damning letter about his case. In the letter, after acknowledging that Martres was a
subject of the French government, the police prefect warned the consulate “that his
condition stands opposite to the public order (al-ḍabṭ wa al-amn al-‘umūmī), and those
like him have no place in Egypt, the protected one (wa mithluhu la ‘āda yu’man ibqā’uhu
bil-maḥrūsa).” 132
By the third quarter of the nineteenth century, keeping public order entailed more
than the regulation of public space in an increasingly urbanized Egypt; it also signaled a
move to stem, or at least to contain, vice wherever it was found. Observed in the
licensing of local pubs (khammāras) in the 1830s as with local brothels throughout the
century, 133 these efforts at keeping public order also manifested in 1863 through a
khedival decree forbidding, under the penalty of death, any cultivation of contraband,
including ḥashīsh. 134 While the siyāsa undergirding criminal prosecution affirmed or
coincided with several sharīʻa proscriptions (for example, against drinking alcohol,

131

CADN 1873/10 Auguste Martres. In its judgment in January 1873, the French consulate in the margins
of the opinion noted: “2 Janvier 1873 la police locale de la ville du caire a fait conduire sous escorte à ce
consulat comme coupable de vol le nommé Auguste Martres qui venait d’être arrêté au quartier Bab elCharié. Que par sa communication en date du même jour elle a signalé le dit Martres comme s’étant déja
rendu coupable de larciens à divers reprises et qu’elle a demandé que dans l’intéret de l’ordre public il fut
pris des rigeur à d’encontre de cet individu.”
132
CADN 1872/2 and 1873/10 Auguste Martres.
133
See Laura Panza and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Did Muhammad Ali foster industrialization in early
nineteenth-century Egypt?” Economic History Review, 68, 1 (2015): 79–100.
134
See Aḥmad Fatḥī Zaghlūl, al-Muḥāmā’ [Lawyering] (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub, 1900), for khedival decrees
in the 1860s against hashish cultivation.

61

fornication/adultery, or gambling), the siyāsa had a separate logic and a purpose of its
own to protect the public welfare. Moreover, inasmuch as the sharīʻa’s moral position
against vice may have prodded the state’s prosecution, the latter was calculated on
practical, immediate concerns, less from a high moral position. Vice became a practical
concern for the productivity (i.e., profits) of Egypt and its inhabitants.
The law’s aim to prosecute wrongdoing went beyond the proscriptions ordained
by fiqh. One case sheds a telling light on this. On Rajab 29, 1292 (August 31, 1875), the
Chief of Police of Giza (ḥākimdār qarāqūl al-Gīza) sent the local council a letter
reporting that two persons (shakhṣayn), ‘Alī ‘Abd al-Karīm and ‘Abd al-Qādir
Muḥammad, were delivered to the local police station on account of a fight that broke out
between them because of gambling (li-dāʻī shajaratihum min mā bi-sabab sīma
rahnuhum ‘alā luʻb al-qimār). ‘Abd al-Karīm accused ‘Abd al-Qādir of stealing money
from him, calling the latter to begin a counterclaim against the former. Yet,
notwithstanding the normative proscription of gambling by the fiqh, and even though the
accused men dropped charges against each other (qad tanāzalū ‘alā daʻwāhum ‘alā
baʻḍihim al-baʻḍ), the state authorities persisted in prosecuting both feuding parties, but
not only on account of their gambling. Rather, what the state authorities were more
concerned about were the deleterious effects of gambling on the rest of society—most
notably fighting—as determined by the disposition and character of the defendants to
commit other crimes, as could be gleaned from their criminal records. 135 And so, upon
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clear that one of the accused, ‘Abd al-Qādir, had two previous criminal incidents
(sabaqayn). In one of them, he was accused of stealing a donkey from one Ḥamad and
arrested for it, and in another, he had taken a traditional cloak (‘abāya) and not paid for it,
which led to this arrest and release, but only upon providing a surety. The Chief of Police
in forwarding the case, articulated his state’s concerns quite clearly: “it is required to
prosecute these two men on account of their gambling because of what results from it
(limā yatarattab ‘alayhi) the negative economic effects and failures of gambling given
the criminal record of one of the accused.” 136 Thus, the state’s instinct to prosecute those
who took part in acts deemed to be immoral, like gambling, was as much defined by
those acts’ social and economic harm, as well as the disposition of those who committed
them to cause further harm, as much as by the traditional normative proscriptions of such
acts.
THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR AND SOCIETY
Transfiguring Siyāsa
By the time of the British Occupation in 1882, maintaining public order (istiqrār
al-amn al-‘umūmī) had been established through a legal practice and language, which
coincided with a notable change within the legal tradition. It would be upon this concern
for maintaining public order that the institution of the Public Prosecutor would eventually
be grafted and accepted as part of the Egypt’s legal and social fabric. However, although
built on this concrete policy molded in the name of the administrative state and its
capacity to scrutinize crime and subjects, the new office would come to be articulated as
a neat theory in legal textbooks by the turn of the century, as an institution designed to
136
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stand for protecting society from harm before the law. Nevertheless, thinking about the
original historic design of the representative (al-nā’ib al-‘umūmī) requires us to ask for
whom this representative came to stand: the administrative state or society at large? In
other words, was the institution established practically as a mere representative of the
Pasha’s khedival state and its policy of maintaining public order? Or did it more
normatively stand for Egypt’s Ottoman subjects who now collectively comprised a new
unit called “society” according to and before the law?
The institution would, nevertheless, carry on with this historic precedent, reflected
in the language of the law that brought about its existence. As Egypt’s new Qānūn
Taḥqīq al-Jināyāt (Criminal Procedure Code) of 1883 would mark its birth, the public
prosecutor arose to play an executive-cum-judiciary role by the end of the century. In
1883, when the Criminal Procedural Code (Qānūn Taḥqīq al-Jināyāt, or Le Code
d’Instruction Criminelle) and the Native Courts that applied it effectively governed
criminal prosecutions, the Code created a category of executive agents called “officers of
the judicial police” (ma’mūr al-ḍabṭīya al-qaḍā’īya, in Arabic, or “les officiers de la
police judiciare,” in French), straddling both the judicial and the executive. In addition to
its institution’s members (aʻdā’ qalam al-nā’ib al-‘umūmī, or “les membres du
Parquet”), the category (as articulated in Article 6 of the Code) also included traditional
and recently deputized agents who altogether would animate criminal justice within
Egyptian society. 137 Article 8, taking the exclusive private right of individuals to
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prosecute certain crimes empowered and obliged all traditional and novel actors
constituting la police judiciare to scrutinize and to prosecute wrongdoing vis-à-vis the
Public Prosecutor (al-nāi’b al-‘umūmī, in Arabic, or le Procureur Général, in French)
now in charge of protecting the public. A significant conceptual leap from the delimited
authority held by the executive within the sharīʻa’s theoretical constraints on criminal
prosecution, the Code obliged every government employee, police officer, or
administrator to immediately inform the office of the Public Prosecutor of any crime,
misdemeanor, or violation committed under their watch (Article 8).
The law spelled out the limits of public authority in criminal investigations: that
the public now had the authority to initiate “a public claim” (daʿwā ‘umūmīya) against a
criminal defendant (Article 2) (no longer was the individual aggrieved or her heirs the
sole proprietors of this right as the fiqh held); that special warrants from magistrate
judges had to be obtained before a person could be searched (except in the hot pursuit of
crime, or talabbus) (Article 4); and that no authority existed to enter a dwelling except in
instances of hot pursuit of crime, authorized entry, or in cases of rescue, fire, or flood
(Article 7). The evolution of the prerogative to initiate proceedings against defendants
and to punish them that had taken place across the nineteenth century within the khedival
legal system was now codified into law as an unequivocal public prerogative.

aqlām al-dabṭiyāt, or “les préfets de police”); patrol (ḍubbāt al-qura’qulāt, or “les sols de police”); the
village elders (mashāyikh al-buldān, or “les anciens du village”); and more generally, “and all of the
officials who will be appointed in this capacity by the government” (wa ghayr man ẓukīra mi-man
taʻyanahum al-ḥukūmatu bi-hadhihi al-ṣifati min waẓīfiha, or “Et tous les fonctionnaires qui seront
nommés en cette qualité par le Gouvernement”). The deputized ghafīrs, included within the latter subgroup,
would then also join this select group of la police judiciare. In the 1920s, a project to amend the Criminal
Procedure Code was underway to amend a number of the articles of the original 1883 Criminal Procedure
Code. DWQ 0069-000594. Ministry of Justice. Office of the Judicial Advisor. 192X.

65

To be clear, this articulation of the state’s general prerogative to prosecute and
punish defendants for all acts deemed harmful to society had not been a feature of siyāsa.
While practically extant throughout the nineteenth century, the articulation of the right to
initiate proceedings against defendants on behalf of society was a late nineteenth-century
amalgamation into legal discourse. Along with this articulation of the society’s obligation
to punish was an articulation of protections of criminal defendants vis-à-vis the state. 138
In so far as defendants were protected within the khedival legal system, it was through
the state’s conscious application of the rules of the sharīʻa, which continued to limit state
action with respect to the prosecution of defendants and, in addition, required a strict
threshold of evidence to prove their alleged crimes. Even though such rights were largely
absent according to the blueprint of siyāsa, the protections of defendants’ rights had
already been vitiated through foreign consular courts sitting in Egypt throughout the
nineteenth century—as foreign consular courts kept defendants from the state’s intrusions
through the Capitulations system until that system finally came to an end with the
Montreux Convention in 1936. 139 In French consular courts, the Procureur Générale
represented the French sovereign at the beginning of the century, and later in the century
represented the French public (“le public”) as the concept of “a public” became clear in
court opinions penned by French judges by the 1860s. 140 Thus, we can see that
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overlapping with, or parallel to, the administrative state policy of maintaining public
order realized at the hands of the khedival executive, there also existed some concept of a
“public” or “society” for which and on behalf of which public prosecution would take
place.
Incrementally, the physical powers of the executive evinced through a growing
police force would also reconstitute a new society. The khedival state’s prosecution of
unlawful acts, not ordinarily the prerogative of the ruler as prescribed within the legal
tradition, evolved into an everyday reality by the end of the nineteenth century. The
transformation of homicide into an act that entered the state’s purview and called upon
public prosecution occurred gradually as individuals still held the exclusive right to
initiate proceedings against defendants. 141 Still yet, the harmful effects of homicide that
were now seen by the state endured through the khedival bureaucracy prior to the birth of
the institution of the public prosecutor under which the prerogative to punish acts of
homicide and assault on behalf of the state became vested. Crucially, through the latter
institution, the prerogative to prosecute and to punish such acts publicly (that is, by the
state on behalf of society) now became a fixed part of the socio-legal fabric that
constituted nineteenth-century Egypt.
Nevertheless, before this evolved mode of public prosecution could take root, it
depended as much on the legal practice of prosecution that evolved through the priorities
of a khedival bureaucracy executed by its agents. By the end of the nineteenth century,
and long before British Occupation in 1882 and the Western-modeled codification that seemed to transform
the entire Egyptian criminal administration of justice, foreign, including French, British, German, Swiss,
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executive agents had mushroomed to be a major part of local governance. In 1892, a
report detailed the configuration of this police force and statistics of crime, more
generally. 142 In the same mode of quantifying and surveying that characterized British
colonial rule in India, 143 this revealing report collected, analyzed, and published all
statistics related to the police and crime, through it, drawing a telling picture of the
configurement of Ottoman-Egyptian society by the end of the nineteenth century. One of
the first tables it presented revealed a snapshot of 1891, the year before the report was
published. It indicated that, in Cairo alone, Egypt’s subjects, referred to now as “resident
nationals” or al-sukkān al-waṭanīyūn, numbered 353,188; foreign subjects, referred to as
“foreigners” or ajānib, numbered 21,650; altogether totaling (al-majmū‘), 374,838 in the
capital. For all the urban inhabitants, the police force (quwwāt al-būlīs) totaled an
unprecedented 1,272, yet the total number of horses officially deployed in the urban
center was only 108. 144 It became clear that the powers of the khedival executive were
already proliferating and undergirding local governance of Egypt at the dawn of a new
century.
Redefining Rights
A new society was born, and it was this society, in theory at least, that now held
the power to punish. It would consist of “equal citizens” (muwāṭinūn mustawūn) before
the law. Such cases were generally limited to the ḥadd offenses, or violations of the
“rights of God” (ḥuqūq Allah), which included adultery (zinā), false accusation of
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fornication (qadhf), theft (sariqa), highway robbery (ḥirāba or qaṭʻ al-ṭarīq, as mentioned
earlier), and drinking alcohol (shurb al-khamr). 145 Because the Muslim community as a
whole had the obligation to punish such offenses, they generally fell within the
prosecutorial powers of the market inspector at least in so far as he could raise them sua
sponte to an Islamic judge (qāḍī) who would then adjudicate over the case in question.
Yet, the muḥtasib could not bring forth on behalf of Muslim society certain other acts,
namely homicide and assault cases, because the prerogatives to raise these latter
violations that implicated the “rights of man” (ḥuqūq adamī), according to the Islamic
legal tradition, rested squarely with the victim or the heirs of that victim. 146 The public
delegate, driven by public interest rather than tradition, now had the powers to prosecute
these latter violations at a level equivalent to the muḥtasib’s authority to intervene in
violations of the “rights of God.”
Provided this punctured shift that marked the greater powers delegated to this new
institution on behalf of society, the argument of rupture or loss takes on a more concrete
resonance with respect to the question of who had the right to punish. The Public
Prosecutor, who was armed with greater powers than the muḥtasib to detect wrongdoing
and to punish it in order to protect society from harm, now prosecuted defendants
accused of committing homicide as well as assault (violations of ḥuqūq adamī), in
addition to the crimes punished on behalf of God (violations of ḥuqūq Allah), all the
while standing in for the public itself (as its “public delegate” or al-nā’ib al-umūmī).
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Making Society
By 1904, Najīb Shakra published al-Mas’ūlīya al-Madānīya (Civil Liability), and
in it, the Ottoman-Egyptian lawyer made sure to articulate the crucial delineation
between the civil law and the criminal law: “the difference between civil and criminal
responsibilities,” he wrote, “is that criminal responsibility is a burden carried on the body
or a blemish to one’s reputation, and it is a price paid for the harm that society felt against
its ethical order [emphasis added]. As for civil responsibility, it is a monetary
compensation that is owed by the obligor to individuals.” 147 The idea of public order,
which rested on a substantively different understanding of society’s right to punish, one
expanded beyond the sharīʻa-based prerogatives of the Muslim community and its
agents, had now been transformed into an “ethical order.” Although public order had
already been relied on by Ottoman administrators to punish, it became a normative, not
just a practical, authority vested in Egyptian society, to watch over and to protect itself
from harm or wrongdoing, akin to but also substantially different from the traditional
obligation to punish violations of the “rights of God.”
Nevertheless, the reconceptualization of Egyptian society that appeared within
legal treatises penned by Egyptian lawyers and law professors from the 1890s onward
can hardly be underestimated in making th new public institution a reality. One of the
earliest legal treatises written on Egyptian government that was rethought and
reorganized under British Occupation was published in 1896 by a deputy public
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prosecutor in Alexandria, Morcos Hanna. 148 In his book The Structure of the Egyptian
Government (Niẓām al-Ḥukūma al-Miṣrīya), Morcos’ ideas appeared to fit squarely
within a new genre of legal discourse whose presuppositions, claims, and theories came
wholly packaged from the Western metropole to be translated into Arabic and
disseminated and taught in the new Khedival Law School. Yet, through a closer reading,
a different picture, one of a re-articulation of society, grafted onto the traditional concept
of the Muslim community, and bringing in its wake newly-designated individual rights
and duties. Hanna wrote in the first pages: “It remains upon us to understand what society
is. We contend that society (a collection of individuals consisting of rulers and ruled),
which for most philosophers and lawmakers, is a collection of equal individuals (afrād
mustawūn) in a given nation with certain known boundaries, and these individuals belong
to a government capable of stabilizing order and welfare (qādira ‘alā istitbāb al-amn wa
al-rāḥa) internally and capable of creating organized links and relations externally.” 149
Nevertheless, as novel as Hanna’s turn-of-the-century definition of society may have
sounded to ears accustomed to know it as a community (umma) bound by the Islamic
legal tradition (the sharīʿa), there was hardly much that was surprising at that point in
history about this definition with respect to the day-to-day powers held by the khedival
government. Exercising this power, local government officials had for at least half a
century already spoken the language of “public order” and “stability” and used it as their
grounds for initiating prosecutions. What Hanna and a new cadre of Ottoman legal
Morcos Hanna, Niẓām al-Hukūma al-Miṣrīya [The Structure of the Egyptian Government] (Cairo:
Maṭbaʻat al-Tawfīq, 1896).
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thinkers and practitioners did in turn-of-the-century Egypt was to articulate this already
existing authority, however embryonic it may have been in khedival Egypt, in such a way
as to cement it as part of Egypt’s enduring legal tradition.
Using this new unit of “society” for whose sake “public order” would be
achieved, legal thinkers preached reason as the primary mover in an administration of
justice. For example, a year after Morcos Hanna defined “society,” Muhammad Ra’fat in
Uṣūl al-Qawānīn (The Sources of the Laws), relying on Jeremy Bentham, placed reason
as the basis for determining the laws, including the criminal law that should govern this
society. 150 Foregrounding not only the legitimacy, but the moral necessity of the public
prosecutor, Ra’fat contended that society had a moral obligation to prosecute and to
punish an individual if doing so produced the greater utility for society (with that utility
measured in terms of physical pain and pleasure). 151 Conversely, however, where
punishment minimized this utility even if the act in question was itself wrong, then
reason compelled society to draw in its instruments of power and delimited its authority
to prosecute or to punish an individual. 152 This utilitarian calculus for legitimatizing laws
stood in some respects in stark contrast to a discursive Islamic legal tradition with
specifically set divine limits. Rather, it was the the normative rational authority that
Ra’fat and other legal thinkers set as a foundation for modern law in Egypt that was,
nevertheless, always co-extensive with a practical authority that shaped and defined the
Ottoman-Islamic legal tradition as much as the various legal texts of Muslim jurists.
Moreover, for Ra’fat and a new generation of Egyptian lawyers, already immersed in this
Muḥammad Ra’fat, Uṣūl al-Qawanīn [The Principles of the Laws] (BA, Cairo, 1897): 35-42.
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practical authority delineating an emerging modern administration of justice, they neither
viewed nor preached a disjuncture with their own Islamic legal tradition. In fact, they
insisted that laws and institutions had to be tailored to a modern Egypt and to its longstanding legal tradition.
By the 1920s, the Public Prosecutor (al-nā’ib al-‘umūmī) had been stitched into
the fabric of Egyptian society and its notions of criminal justice. Not only did this novel
institution hold pervasive authority to defend society against potential “harm” (ḍarar),
but it was now impossible to envision criminal justice without it. In 1920, law professor
‘Alī Zakī al-‘Arabī, a former public prosecutor, published The Principles of Criminal
Investigations and Procedures (al-Mabādi’ al-Asāsīya lil-Taḥqīqāt wa al-Ijrā’āt alJinā’īya). 153 The King Fouad University law professor, in explaining the basic difference
between public and private law claims, wrote: 154
The criminal law considered those actions that are harmful to society, and it
apportioned punishment for every crime to deter the criminal or others from
committing those acts. Nevertheless, the criminal procedure law also required
that no punishment could be exacted without a verdict issued by a criminal court.
Thus, a petition must be raised against the criminal defendant in calling for his
punishment. And this petition is called the public claim for it is endorsed in the
name of society.
Where certain acts before were hardly viewed as prerogatives of society, the right for
society to call for punishing those acts had now become transformatively “fixed” (thābit)
Alī Zakī al-‘Arabī, al-Mabādi’ al-Asāsīya lil-Taḥqīqāt wa al-Ijrā’āt al-Jinā’īya [The Principles of
Criminal Investigations and Procedures] (BA, Cairo, 1920).
154
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into Egypt’s legal landscape. And the office of the Egyptian public prosecutor now
carried the scepter for this right “in the name of society” (min ‘umūm al-hay’a alijtimāʿīya) along with the enormous authority that ensued from it.
As khedival police underwent a significant reorganization during the decades
following British Occupation, the Pasha’s authority itself transformed through a new
language of rights and obligations now held by a new unit of society. The Public
Prosecutor represented the interests of this society, which came to be imagined as
consisted of equal citizens (muwāṭinūn mustawūn). Thus, a theory of public prosecution
would transform the existing rubric of rights as understood within the legal tradition.
When it came to the right to punish, and specifically to punish in the name of a new unit
of society, the question of whether that right evolved out of an already existing one or
rather came about ex nihilo became a fraught one. It was fraught because even the
muḥtasib who most traditionally resembled the vigilant powers of executive authority to
bring forth cases in front of the traditional judiciary, was still limited in his jurisdiction
over which illicit acts he could bring forth to the latter. Such cases were generally limited
to the ḥadd offenses, or violations of the “rights of God” (ḥuqūq Allah), which included
adultery (zinā), false accusation of fornication (qadhf), theft (sariqa), highway robbery
(ḥirāba or qaṭʻ al-ṭarīq, as mentioned earlier), and drinking alcohol (shurb al-khamr). 155
Because the Muslim community as a whole had the obligation to punish such offenses,
they generally fell within the prosecutorial powers of the market inspector at least in so
far as he could raise them sua sponte to an Islamic judge (qāḍī) who would then
adjudicate over the case in question.
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Yet, unlike the Public Prosecutor, the muḥtasib could not bring forth on behalf of
Muslim society certain other acts, namely homicide and assault cases, because the
prerogatives to raise these latter violations implicating the “rights of man” (ḥuqūq
adamī), according to the Islamic legal tradition, rested squarely with the victim or the
heirs of that victim. 156 The new delegate, driven by public interest rather than tradition,
now had the powers to prosecute these latter violations as the muḥtasib had the authority
to intervene in violations of the “rights of God.”
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Chapter Two
Scrutinizing the Criminal Mind
“Your soul alone is the issue here…”
– Arthur Miller, The Crucible
NEGLIGENCE IN A KITCHEN (1868)
On January 29, 1868 (Shawwāl 4, 1284), a Cairo police station received a
grievously injured young girl named Jamīla. Brought there by her father, ‘Alī Ḥasan, a
stonemason (naḥḥāt), the state’s local head physician (ḥakīm bāshī) examined the young
girl. Noting her tender age of four or five years old and that she had deep burns on her
face, chest, and thighs, the physician then ordered that she be taken immediately to the
nearest khedival hospital. However, Jamīla died on the way. The police looked to her
father for answers. He informed them that he had left his daughter with her mother
Badawīya earlier that Saturday morning to go to Cairo’s thousand-year old cemetery (alQarāfa), and when he returned home later that evening, he found her covered with burns.
When he asked Badawīya what had happened to their daughter, she explained to him, and
later relayed to the police who confirmed her testimony with the neighbors. She said that
she was cooking in the kitchen with their daughter sitting next to her, and she left her by
herself for some time, as she stepped out to buy some food from the local store. When
she returned she found her on fire from the flames emanating out of the coal stove (fa
wajadat al-nār muwwaqada fīha). Terrified at the sight she saw, Badawīya ran to
extinguish the flames that had consumed her daughter, but they had already marked the
young girl and her fate. The police investigation that ensued concluded that the burning
that took Jamīla’s life was “without the act of an actor” (min dūn fiʻl fāʻil), noting that
76

“there was no one at all present in the house” (lam yakun aḥadn ḥāḍir bil-manzil
muṭlaqan). With no signs of a criminal actor having the intent to inflict pain on the young
girl, her death was accepted as a destined act of God (fā huwa bil-muqtaḍā wa alqadar). 157
Why were neither Badawīya nor her husband censured or punished by the
authorities for the negligence in caring for their infant daughter? The history of criminal
negligence in nineteenth-century Egypt raises important questions about the treatment of
others, and how such treatment was affected by the state and the laws it applied. It also
raises equally important questions of why and how someone came to be seen as culpable
and worthy of punishment before a modern criminal law in nineteenth-century Egypt. In
Formations of the Secular (2003), Talal Asad answers these questions by interrogating
the idea of criminal agency that became part of modern criminal law, positing it as a
modern secular concept foregrounded in an agentive resistance aimed at eliminating pain
and suffering. 158 Seen in this light, the modern criminal law came to be based on a notion
of criminal agency, in which defendants bore harmful intentions that could in essence be
changed according to an actor’s desire, and that the criminal law would be an incisive
tool to mold individual behavior in order to eradicate pain and suffering in society. Asad
assumes that this concept of criminal agency within the law had been absent prior to the
late-nineteenth-century European-modeled legal codifications that took place in Egypt
and finally gave birth to concepts of criminal negligence and criminal intent aimed at
eliminating pain and suffering, notions that were absent in the adjudication of Jamīla’s
DWQ 2003-001121. Dabṭīyat Miṣr. 5 Shawwāl 1284.
Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, and Modernity (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2003): 68.
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tragic case. In making this argument, Asad then set out to provide a clear answer to his
own question of “how did a model of agency become paradigmatic?”
In this chapter, however, I problematize this historical account of criminal agency
and how it came about in modern Egypt. I argue that the practice of finding culpability at
the behest of a khedival state across the nineteenth century had already existed prior to
the legal concepts found in the codes and treatises that eventually reached and were
brought to Egypt at the behest of Western powers, and that designed and explained new
institutions that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. Through close readings of
administrative court cases, police logs, consular court records, public administrative
letters, as well as numerous laws and legal treatises across the nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries, I illustrate how a modernizing khedival state had already set out to
search for and to apprehend those it deemed to have dangerous minds worthy of
punishment within the Pasha’s domain prior to the seemingly upending colonial legal
changes that took place at the end of the nineteenth century. This khedival search for
culpability, I argue, transformed into a certain introspection of the criminal defendant
before judicial authority by the early twentieth century.
A central point in this chapter is that this judicial introspection of the defendant’s
guilty mind took place gradually across the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries
before Egypt’s modern administration of justice. The change in the treatment and
definition of criminal intent, therefore, did not occur suddenly at end of the nineteenth
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century at the behest of colonial powers or colonial legal transplantation. 159 Instead,
shaped by the needs of a khedival administrative state and its administrative practices
across the nineteenth century, this transformation first entailed the search, investigation,
and apprehension of culpability beyond observing its traditional manifestation. These
attendant changes in culpability before the law also entailed looking for motive or
perceived negligence when committing crime. Essentially, this modern search for
culpability before khedival authority in ways distinct from what the legal tradition
prescribed would morph into a judicial introspection under colonial authority by the end
of the nineteenth century. This judicial introspection became noticeable in the
redefinition of existing crimes, including premeditated murder and the birth of new
intentional crimes including attempt. Beyond the administrative state’s needs, the legal
changes in the definition of criminal intent were also fueled by the emerging sciences of
criminal psychology and their assessment of the criminal psyche. 160 In light of these
theories, I argue in this chapter that a new “criminal mind” emerged, rethinking the
criminal defendant. The transformation entailed a considerable shift from what was
considered “apparent” (al-ẓāhir) to what was traditionally considered “hidden” (al-bāṭin)
in the mind of the defendant. In this sense, the shift took place from one doctrine into
another doctrine that this chapter aims to show.
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To make this argument, this chapter follows in three sections. The first section
draws out some of the elements of criminal agency and negligence within the Islamic
legal tradition as applied in Ottoman Egypt for centuries prior to the nineteenth
century. In doing so, it challenges characterizations of the Islamic tradition as devoid of
applied concepts of criminal agency or negligence—highlighting the physical
externalized circumstances in intending, knowing, and completing a harmful or negligent
act. The second section shows how criminal intent and criminal negligence, thus, came to
be treated within the legal system of Egypt’s emerging modern state during the first three
quarters of the nineteenth century. By considering defendants’ motives to commit crime
and their subjective states of mind, the khedival administration of justice went beyond the
legal tradition to determine whether defendants were guilty and worthy of punishment.
The third section of this chapter then examines how this administratively-molded
criminal intent changed further through the second decade of the twentieth century.
During this period, new definitions, legal expressions, and applications of intentional
crimes—notably premeditated murder, attempt, suicide, and other crimes considered
deleterious to society’s well-being—formed a new legal discourse and substantively
redefined the substantive criminal law. Nevertheless, as this chapter argues, the process
of legal transformation of a criminal mind deemed harmful to society began not only in
theory that arrived from Western laws and legal treatises but also through practice,
internally, across the nineteenth century, paving the way for the theoretical reassessment
of the criminal defendant’s guilty mind within modern Egypt.
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SHARĪʻA’S INTENT
Intending to Harm
Prior to the nineteenth century, illicit acts such as homicide would have been
scrutinized by an Ottoman administration of justice. Indeed, if someone were found to
have directly caused the death of a young girl like Jamīla, he or she would have been
handed some form of punishment. A person—whether man or woman, Muslim or nonMuslim, free or slave—who intentionally or deliberately killed another (i.e., murdered)
received punishment, 161 qualified for the death penalty following precise rules of
retaliation (lex tallionis, or qiṣāṣ in Arabic). 162 Yet before these harsh rules of
punishment determined the fates of those found guilty of murder or other crimes,
plaintiffs first had to assert and prove in court before the judge that the defendant had the
requisite intent to kill or harm, thereby bearing a so-called “guilty mind” (or mens rea,
referred to in Arabic as ‘amd or qaṣd). 163 In the absence of the prosecution’s proof, the
defendant had to confess to having killed or injured another intentionally. 164 Whether
through proof or confession, in order to find the defendant worthy of bodily punishment,
the condemned act could not simply be the result of a tragic accident or the veiled will of
God.
161
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Criminal intent, however, could not be easily disentangled from the mental and
physical capacities of its actor. Guilt depended on sanity, and guilty defendants had to
appreciate the nature of the crimes they committed in order to be held accountable for
them. 165 While literary accounts of the madman (majnūn) in medieval Islamic society
abounded in the literature, the treatment of the insane and their culpability before Islamic
law remained distinct. 166 In doing so, like their medieval and their modern counterparts,
Muslim jurists turned a defendant’s insanity into a valid legal defense against
punishment. 167 They also recognized a correlation between mental capacity and physical
capacity (both age and sexual maturity) as puberty (or bulūgh) also made a defendant ripe
for prosecution. 168 Measured by these physical metrics of legal responsibility, 169 both
minors and the insane, therefore, could not actually be capable of bad intent (‘amd), and
their acts were viewed as an accident or mistake (khaṭa’), thus saving them from the
sword. 170 Women, as they were also seen in other contemporary settings, were
considered by some schools of law to be less rational and thereby not capable of forming
the requisite criminal intent in some instances to warrant punishment, such as the crime
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of highway robbery. 171 Mapping the mind onto the body of the defendant, however, did
not always work out so neatly. While minors escaped capital punishment, some jurists
equivocated on eliminating their criminal responsibility altogether because these jurists
could not squarely fit as to whether their acts were committed “between malice and
mistake.” 172 An acceptance of the evolving mental capacity of the child brought to bear
the equivocality that persisted regarding the defendant’s mind and body within some
corners of the legal tradition. Proving culpability, thus, appeared to depend not only on
the accused’s awareness of the harm caused (the defendant’s mind), but it also subsumed
into it the accused’s physical attributes (the defendant’s body) as a prerequisite for
committing the crime.
Considering a defendant’s mind and body, judicial actors, therefore, looked for
the voluntariness or willfulness of the accused, setting it as the centerpiece of culpability.
In some way, the will of the accused had to pierce through the presumption that the harm
caused was not the result of coercion, an accident (i.e., without a human actor), or an
inexplicable act of God. 173 Rather, to be found guilty of murder or assault, for example,
as classical Muslim jurists put it, a defendant had to have “freely chosen to act directly”
(mukhtāran lil-qatl mubāshir). 174 What it meant to act directly (mubāshir), however,
became the subject of intense debates and raised a number of questions regarding the
agency of the defendant (or her legal capacity) to commit crime. For instance, some
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jurists thought that a master or prince (amīr) who coerced a servant (mā’mūr) to kill or
injure another was the one to be found guilty of murder or assault because they saw his
servant as being entirely under duress and, thus, lacking the requisite free will to harm. 175
The coerced agent thereby entered the classical legal textbooks portrayed “as one falling
from a height, or swept by the wind from place to place.” 176 Still yet, while this image of
an aimless actor informed fiqhī views on criminal agency, it defined less a defendant’s
disposition, let alone his or her predisposition, to commit crime than it categorized an
illicit act as existing entirely within or without the bounds of human will.
A defendant’s criminal intent within the tradition, nevertheless, remained cast into
doubt. The specific intent or purpose (‘amd) to kill, injure, or steal was situated not
within the inner corners of the defendant’s mind, but rather upon the external
circumstances by which the guilty act (whether homicide, assault, or theft) was carried
out. 177 For homicide and assault, for example, these circumstances involved not only the
manner by which “the blow was struck” (for example, aggressively or inadvertently), but
also quite crucially, the kind of weapon used to bring about death or injury. 178 Classical
jurists agreed that in the absence of a defendant’s confession of murder or assault, some
injurious weapon (āla jāriḥa) had to be used in order to prove deliberate intent, 179 but
they disagreed about the type of weapon that was to be used. The majority of jurists
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thought that it was a weapon (such as a sword) that “normally would produce death or
injury” that clearly transferred intent unto a killer. 180 Still, others who were cognizant that
a maligned heart also hid behind other deadly means, such as fire, 181 carved out a
category of semi-intentional homicide (shibh al-‘amd) and placed less conspicuously
deadly weapons such as sticks, poison, or water within it.182 More strict jurists, however,
viewed this created, middle-ground category as judicial overreach into the defendant’s
heart—removing substantive doubt regarding true intentions knowable only to an
omniscient God. Responding to this attack, those jurists who defended a gradient of
mental states argued that since only God really knew true intentions, assigned verdicts
(ḥukm) practically interpreted intent solely based on the so-called “apparent
circumstances” (wa innama al-ḥukm bimā ẓahara). 183 It appeared that within the legal
tradition, a notable reticence kept jurists from deciphering the intent of criminal
defendants, but rather limited their scope of rational inquiry to the outward, physical
circumstances of the criminal act.
In this same vein, while skepticism of human motives redirected the apprehension
of a guilty mind during the nineteenth century, it had also motivated certain evaluations
of maliciousness. A clear example of this was the case of murder by strangulation. 184 As
no deadly weapons other than the killer’s hands stained the victim’s body, classical jurists
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still confronted unadulterated evidence of latent malice even in the absence of the deadly
weapon they normally required for murder. Confronted with the serious problem of serial
killers who strangled their victims to death, they had to find a solution for it outside of
legal doctrine: administrative decree (siyāsatan). 185 And as Ottoman criminal law
declared, authorities could execute the recidivist murderer who repeatedly killed by
strangulation. 186 Propelled to order Ottoman society, an administration of justice had
already begun to dissociate the intent to harm from its transparent circumstances through
some direct reading of the criminal defendant’s subjective state of mind.
Nevertheless, aspects of the traditional concept still continued to shape the
modern concept of criminal intent. For one, self-defense continued to be a valid excuse
against punishment. 187 Heat of passion served as a valid excuse for killing adulterous
lovers caught in the act in the modern period as it did in the past. But conspicuously, an
injurious weapon continued to symbolize criminal intent by the dawn of the twentieth
century as it previously had within the legal tradition. Nevertheless, by the modern
period, a guilty mind would be apparent for reasons beyond the physical circumstances
that had circumscribed it.
Knowing the Wrong
In other significant ways, the defendant’s state of mind continued to balance the
scales of justice. Medieval Muslim jurists like their contemporaries elsewhere
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apprehended the criminal mind. 188 They delineated three separate categories that
approximated a defendant’s knowledge of wrong: intentional, quasi-intentional, or
accidental acts. Yet, they did not fully articulate a framework by which to assess criminal
negligence—or what the defendant knew or should have known to be wrong—outside
discrete rules of liability. 189 This led Islamic law scholar Joseph Schacht to forcefully
assert: “The concept of negligence is unknown to Islamic law.” 190 More recent scholars
similarly concluded that the treatment of criminal negligence within Islamic law
holistically amounted to a system of strict liability. 191 By this, they meant that whether or
not defendants knew about the wrong they caused, barring clear manifestation of their
will to do wrong (through the weapon used or by confession), that fact did not
subsequently affect their punishment or liability. 192 Similarly, this perceived reluctance
within Islamic law to reconstruct and punish the defendant’s scienter (intent or
188
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knowledge of wrongdoing) reflected to some Orientalist scholars what they came to
observe as a dulled individual subjectivity within Islamic art and literature. 193 Perceived
through a modern Cartesian lens (cogito ergo sum), ascertaining culpability within
Islamic legal doctrine appeared to delve less directly into the defendant’s mind than it
assessed its externalized circumstances.
Some notion of negligence, nevertheless, seemed to approximate a defendant’s
knowledge of wrongdoing within the legal tradition. For one, a concept of negligence
(referred to in the legal literature as taqṣīr, meaning “to shorten” or “to cut short”) guided
the doctrine regarding the practice of compurgation (or qasāma). 194 Through this ancient
practice, a community itself was held liable for a homicide committed by an unknown or
unwitnessed killer. For this to be the case, however, the victim’s body discovered
presumably where the homicide took place had to be within a certain distance or “zone of
danger” from the community itself. 195 In other words, for the community as a whole to
be considered negligent in not preventing the unknown homicide, the act of killing had to
make itself known to the ears (if not also the minds) of at least some members within that
community. It was this “zone of danger” covered by a community’s protective shield that
also determined whether killing one’s attacker qualified as valid self-defense, for if a
homicide evaded the communal consciousness by avoiding the proverbial “zone of
danger,” then liability would not rest on the defendant who killed to protect herself. 196
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Thus, at least from a communal perspective, a certain level of awareness of the
committed wrong determined liability or punishment even if such knowledge only
approached certain physical circumstances and did not search defendants’ minds directly.
While a certain awareness of wrong continued to determine group liability, it also
pointed to individual responsibility for reckless acts. Beyond delineating culpability into
separate categories of intentional, quasi-intentional, or accidental acts; Muslim jurists
also carved out another category for acts committed, albeit unintentionally, by the
defendant. 197 Referred to in the legal literature as homicide or injury “by cause” (qatl bisabab; jarḥ bi-sabab), this category of indirect causation (tasbīb) held defendants
responsible (and their communities liable) for acts that came close to causing death or
injury, not for those intervening and ultimate causes beyond their sensibilities and
control. 198 Thus, for example, if a person fell into and subsequently died in a well that
had been dug by another person on a public road because he tripped over a nearby stone
placed there by a third person, then the third person paid because his act was the most
immediate cause of the death. 199 By that same logic, if one person became injured by the
kick of a donkey ridden by another person because a third person prodded that donkey,
then the third person was responsible for the injury. 200 Through this constellation of
separate rules, 201 some embryonic notion of criminal negligence appeared within the
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doctrine as defendants (vis-à-vis their communities) had to account for some acts
recognizable, or at least recognized by the law, for their physical proximity to effected
harm.
Some intimation of defendants’ minds—what they actually believed—confirmed
the commission of negligent acts, if less the omission of certain obligatory ones. Within
the legal tradition, for an act to be judged as intentional, both the act and the result of that
act had to be intended by the defendant as if he had intended to kill and actually did so.
Conversely, for an act to be deemed accidental, both the act and its result had to be
mistaken in the defendant’s mind as if he had aimed to shoot an animal, but hit a person
instead. 202 The accidental or negligent actor, like the coerced agent portrayed earlier,
entered the corpus juris as one whose unrecognizable acts were labeled as “without an
actor” (bi-dūn fiʻl fā’il). 203 Still, the majority of jurists required an outward act by the
defendant, especially for willful homicide; thus, negligently failing to act (or an
omission) generally did not suffice to find liability, let alone a guilty mind. 204 Some
classical jurists, however, did hold a defendant responsible for certain omissions “but
only if the omission [was] linked to a positive act,” such as withholding food and drink
from a prisoner or “for the negligence of a midwife who fails to tie off the umbilical cord
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after cutting it.” 205 It stood that while rationally examined within the legal tradition, a
defendant’s negligence, as with purposeful intent, remained intrinsically and
predominantly tied to an apparent act in question.
While rules of negligence within the legal tradition became refined from the
fifteenth to the sixteenth centuries, a more robust concept of it and its application would
come about by the end of the nineteenth century. As Colin Imber has already noted,
negligence continued to be recalibrated through the individual opinions offered by
Ottoman jurists-consults as early as the sixteenth century. 206 Alongside these subtle
changes in the law of negligence, more traditional practices like compurgation that
evinced the treatment of negligence continued to take place in Egypt until the late
nineteenth century. 207 This recalibrated modern notion of negligence, as we shall see
below, would crystallize even further under khedival and colonial administrations of
justice across the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Completing the Crime
Quite noteworthy of these modern legal shifts, a defendant’s mind began to stand
out as more culpable in the light of a completed crime, how it was performed, and by
whom. A defendant’s persona historically mattered for the perpetration of crime. But it
was not only mental clarity and adulthood upon which the law predicated culpability; at
times, it was also on the defendant’s status as a free person or slave, or even on one’s
religion or sexual preference. For example, to be guilty of the capital punishment of
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adultery (zinā), both partners had to be adult, free, and Muslim (a combined legal status
called muḥṣan). 208 Consequentially, the act of adultery had to be completed by the
penetration of the penis into the vagina, absolving anal sex from prosecution. 209 As for
drinking wine (shurb al-khamr), this divine proscription generally punished the
individual who imbibed alcohol, not the person who contemplated doing so. 210 Social
standing, thus, determined different defendants’ fates not only by affixing different
punishments to them, but in some instances, it also revealed whether—on the authority of
tradition—they committed any crime in the first place.
Yet, apart from a defendant’s social status, the litmus test for culpability remained
to be the accused act itself. The elements of the guilty act—the actus reus—not only had
to be completed to warrant putting blame on the accused, but in some instances, they also
had to be performed in a specific way in order to manifest willfulness. Thus, for
defendants to be found guilty of murder or assault, they had to bring about the actual
death of or inflict a visible wound on a victim, respectively: they could not simply
contemplate or partially perform (attempt) the crime. 211 For theft (sariqa), similar to the
requirement of asportation in the common law tradition, the culprit (or culprits) not only
had to carry away the stolen property of another in order to signal the intent to steal, but
also had to do so with stealth. 212 And notably for the crime of adultery to send lovers to
the gallows, its consummation entailed the witnessing of the actual penetration of the
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penis in the vagina “like the pen in the inkpot” (ka’l-mīl fī’l-makḥala). 213 As for the
serious crime of banditry (ḥirāba), the defendants’ intent to disturb the peace became
embroiled in the elementary drawing of their weapons on a public road in order to
frighten those passing by on their journey. 214 To be worthy of blame, according to the
tradition, the defendant had to intend the crime, but her intent, especially after the
example of highway robbery which some jurists excluded women from, or signs of it at
least, arose from the performance of the act itself.
Still, other signs or signposts along the way to a completed crime captured, or
suggested at least, a defendant’s state of mind when carrying it out. The circumstances
enveloping the culpable act tellingly betrayed before the court if the defendant held an
intent or motive to do something wrong. Judicial actors looked for these signals and often
built their verdicts of guilty or innocent upon them. Therefore, the type of weapon
revealed the intent required for the corporal punishment of murder and assault (qiṣāṣ).
Similarly stamping the crime of theft and signaling an underlying intent to steal, the
completion of the crime involved the carrying away of stolen property (of a value of
more than ten dirhams) from inside a securely guarded and locked place (referred to in
the legal literature as ḥirz). 215 And to complete the crime of banditry, Muslim jurists
agreed that the culprits not only had to be armed, but their entire act had to take place
“outside a city”—knowingly performed within the proverbial “zone of danger.” 216 These
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attendant circumstances of an act not only defined it as a crime, but that also pointed to a
defendant’s guilty mind while carrying it out.
Being guilty, thus, depended on the defendant’s intent to complete the crime in
question and actually accomplishing it. In fact, so pragmatically merciful was the juristic
tradition that it found repentant culprits blameless in some instances even when they fully
completed culpable acts. 217 Such was the case with highway robbery, which as a crime
against God, was prosecutable only after arrest by the authorities, and not before in the
case of a culprit’s active repentance (or tawba). 218 Similarly for theft, if the culprit
returned the stolen property even after carrying it away, the crime lapsed and the accused
could no longer be prosecuted for it. 219 It came to be that neither attempted theft nor
attempt in general existed as separate crimes within the legal tradition, 220 let alone did it
aim to punish a culprit’s so-called malignant disposition towards committing further
wrongs. 221 And while an individual disposition to kill oneself was viewed as a sin (or
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ithm), delineating the relationship between the individual and Islamic society, neither
suicide nor attempted suicide ever rose to the level of being punished as crimes within the
legal tradition. 222 The legal tradition concerned with doubt of the accused’s guilt
fashioned culpability primarily on the defendant completely and without remorse
committing the crime in question, not on any wavering attempts or even sufficient, yet
retracted steps to do so.
Even if earlier administrations of justice forgave attempted or renounced crimes,
they tended to be more alarmed by those who participated in or conspired to do wrong.
Ottoman sultans were less forgiving of subjects who conspired or were complicit in
political machinations and collective action taken against them. 223 This vigilance became
especially heightened during the nineteenth century, as new surveillance methods
including telegraphs, telephones, and railroads met an existing concern—if not
paranoia—of spies within the late Ottoman Empire. 224 When it came to conspiracy, the
so-called “meeting of criminal minds” called for the capital punishment of highway
robbers, 225 as classical jurists declared all the robbers guilty of this “collective crime”
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even if only one of them committed the “aggravating act.” 226 Still, the law of conspiracy
as with the law on attempt remained constrained within the Islamic legal tradition.
Notwithstanding their limits within the legal tradition, inchoate offenses reached
their apex in Egypt by the end of the nineteenth century. A new legal practice and lexicon
developed to cover premeditated murder and attempt by the early twentieth
century. Underlying these significant shifts in the law was also a transformation of the
substantive doubt contained in the legal tradition and that subsequently shielded the
criminal defendant from judicial introspection of her mind. Where that doubt predicated
the accused’s guilt directly on the performance of the act itself, accounting mainly for its
externalized circumstances in the physical world, the modern period saw a substantive
shift from this act-based culpability to an intent-based one.
SIYĀSA’S INTENT
Deciphering Destiny
Determining guilt changed considerably across the nineteenth century before
Egypt’s administration of justice. Within these erected judicial councils (majālis) in
liaison with police stations across various districts, khedival agents listened to tragic
accounts, separating those acts they deemed to be accidents or destined acts of God from
those they suspected to be designs of criminal actors worthy of rebuke and
punishment. 227 Reading numerous files of complicated narratives and characters
contained in detailed police reports and petitioners’ letters, these judicial administrators
became skeptical of natural causes or accidents as explanations of tragic results, whether
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human deaths or the destruction of property and profit. 228 In doing so, they apprehended a
guilty mind by looking for suspected motives to commit crime beyond the specific intent
to do so.
Even with this move towards a judicial search of a defendant’s mind, aspects of
traditional criminal intent that focused on the act in question remained intact. For one,
self-defense continued to excuse murder before the state’s executive councils. On January
20, 1837 (Shawwāl 12, 1252), for example, the Vice-regal Council sent Muṣṭafā Bey, a
governor of Lower Egypt, a letter explaining that Aḥmad Ḥaḍr should not receive the
death penalty for “his intentional killing of Aḥmad if it were proven that the victim had
first fired upon the killer gunshots that did not injure him, and thereafter the killer pulled
out his rifle and shot him” (idhā thabuta anna al-maqtūl aṭlaqa ‘alā al-qāṭil ruṣāṣan
thumma ṣawwaba ilāyhi al-bunduqīya fa qatalahu). 229 Moreover, some of the traditional
elements of the crime of theft reached the last quarter of the nineteenth century, because a
guilty thief still had to show his intent by carrying away stolen property of a certain
value. In one case involving a son who was said to have stolen from his father five
Egyptian pounds (khamsa junayh), a watch (sāʻa), and an amber combination (tarkība
kahrabān), 230 the court pointed out that the defendant had “taken” (akhadha) the property
“with criminal intent and carried them away with him” (bi-qaṣd wa tawajjah ilayhim bilibʻād bihi), escaping (farra harib). 231 Here, the traditional requirement that the property
be taken from a place of safe-keeping (ḥirz) did not concern the administration of justice
228
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as much as did the fact that it was taken without permission. Aspects of the traditional
continued to define the modern.
A more concerted search for culpability began to mark a khedival administration
of justice. As early as the 1820s, various subjects across Egypt—peasants, slaves, scribes,
captains, and entire villages—confronted the khedival state with their concerns. In
numerous petitions, hardworking local peasants supplicated their overlord to forgive
them for not being able to provide him and his army the agricultural yields expected of
them because they were destroyed by fire. 232 For instance, on October 2, 1822
(Muḥarram 15, 1238) the Council sent the local overseer in the Nile delta village of
Sharqīya (kāshif qism awwal al-sharqīya) to investigate the truth of a petition it received
to forgive the local peasants the yields of six feddāns because “fire caught hold of the
granary by the will of God [fate and divine decree]” (anna al-nāra ittaṣalat al-jurna biqaḍā’ allāh wa qaḍar). 233 A year later on April 28, 1823 (Shaʻbān 16, 1238), the Council
gave a similar order this time to the overseer in Giza to verify the truth of a petition made
by a village elder (shaykh al-balad) to forgive thirty-six feddāns of yields because they
were “burned by the destined act of God and without anyone involved in the events that
took place ” (kāna hādhā al-iḥtirāq bil-qaḍā’ bi-dūna an yakūn li-aḥadin ‘alāqa min alumūr). 234 Human agency was sought for in the fire of calamity in order to eliminate
criminal intent as a potential cause that destroyed profits.
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Deliberate intent still had to manifest itself through the flames. Ottoman sultans
and jurists understood this ambiguity when they drafted Ottoman criminal codes based on
Ḥanafī legal doctrine, which treated offenses involving fire as a matter of quasi-intent
(shibh al-‘amd). 235 Egypt’s governors had already inherited Ottoman criminal laws over
the centuries. 236 Some of these laws penalized defendants for burning they committed
intentionally versus that committed accidentally. 237 In Qānūn al-Filāḥa, 238 in controlling
Egypt’s industrious peasants, 239 the khedival state maintained this distinction and built
upon it further offenses. As Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot noted in her comprehensive
study of Mehmed Ali: 240
The document was a mixture of how to improve agricultural practices along with
rules of criminal and civil procedure. […] For example, if the beasts belonging to
an individual trampled and destroyed the crops of another person and the owner
had deliberately [emphasis added] allowed his beasts to enter that field, he was to
be beaten with 50 lashes of the kurbāj, and was to pay damages to the owner of
the field. […] Should a shaikh or a fallah deliberately [emphasis added] set fire to
the barn or house or property of another, then if he had means restitution should
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be made, and he was to be sent to the penitentiary for a year, but if the arsonist
were destitute he was to serve a life sentence in the penitentiary. 241
This distinction between deliberation and accident within the defendant’s mind while
already present would develop further by the early-twentieth century. It would represent a
growing administrative concern or suspicion about the orientation of a defendant’s mind
to commit crime, and would define a new understanding of criminal intent before the law.
Khedival suspicions of criminal intent were inflamed by more than fire. For the
water of the Nile did not always flow according to the Pasha’s whims or desires, and in
those currents often sank entire ships with the state’s subjects and profits. 242 For instance,
on June 26, 1820 (Ramaḍān 15, 1235), the Vice-regal Council called on the governor
(muḥāfiẓ) of Alexandria to investigate the matter pertaining to “the captain whose ship
capsized and three of the men who were on their way to the Pilgrimage in Mecca
drowned in it, for this occurred by a destined act of God” (bi-sha’n ikhlā’ sabīl almarākib alladhī inqalaba markabuhu wa ghariqa thalāthat anfār min al-ḥujjāj alladhina
kānu fīhā li anna dhālika ḥaṣala bi-qaḍā’ wa al-qadar). 243 There and then, the captain
and his intentions became the object of state inspection, examined for whether his steps—
or rather missteps—in steering brought about the loss of life and property within the
Pasha’s domain.
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Similarly, while water like fire did not fit the traditional mold of a weapon
conveying malice, a more exacting search for the underlying cause of calamity gradually
recalibrated the law. On Friday, July 18, 1823 (Dhul-al-Qaʻdah 9, 1238), the Vice-regal
Council ordered the overseer of Minufīya’s second district to investigate the petition
regarding a ship bound for Alexandria that sank (ghariqa) accidentally in front of the
French village (al-qarya al-faransīya). 244 The petition claimed that the sinking ship cost
the treasury 60 bushels (arādib) out of the 270 bushels it had carried. 245 The
memorandum order was quite clear in what it sought to know: “Is it in fact true that the
aforementioned ship drowned by a destined act of God in front of the aforementioned
village and the yields it was carrying from the treasury were the amount mentioned in the
petitioner’s letter?” 246 Lamentable events from sinking to burning ships were tested for
human intent, whether direct or indirect.
This khedival air of suspicion sustained further change in the traditional
understanding of the intent to harm, including the intent to kill. As discussed above,
murder by strangulation had already raised official eyebrows and called on Ottoman
administrations for action. These clarion calls did not change the traditional jurisprudence
(fiqh), which still required some kind of a weapon (āla jāriḥa) to manifest the will to
harm. 247 Yet, in the middle of the nineteenth century, a noticeable change occurred in the
legal necessity of a murder weapon in order to establish a defendant’s criminal intent in
cases of murder by strangulation. A number of these strangulation cases involved strained
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domestic relations. Confessions by defendants in these cases continued to establish
culpability during the nineteenth century. 248 Therefore, administrators and religious
scholars (‘ulamā’) who sat on these majālis proceeded to uncover latent intent in
homicide by strangulation (qatl bil-khanq). 249 For example, on January 10, 1857 (Jumādā
al-Awwal 14, 1273), Egypt’s High State Council (Majlis al-Aḥkām) received the case file
pertaining to the death by strangulation of a woman named Faṭṭūma, by her husband,
Izmirli ‘Alī Agha, a tailor, in Cairo’s Darb al-Aṣfar near Khān al-Khalilī. 250 The Council
having received Faṭṭūma’s
sister’s testimony among others, as well as, a detailed judicial report (i‘lām sharʻī)
concluded the following: “Even though the means of killing (māddat al-āatl) has not
been proven according to the tradition (sharʻan) against the aforementioned killerhusband, through the investigations (al-taḥqiqāt al-siyāsīya) that took place in the police
station (al-ḍabṭīya), it became apparent that the wife’s death, nevertheless, took place by
the act of an actor and that person was her husband” (taẓahhara illā bi-fiʻl fāʻil wa
alladhī faʻala bihā huwa zawjuha). 251 Here, inquiry into the underlying cause of human
tragedy revealed for the prosecution the husband’s predatory intent upon his wife,
eliminating the possibility that her death was an accident. Thus, the murderer’s mind—
now read by the modern administrative state—was gleaned for guilt, subtly shifting the
contours of criminal intent.
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Forging an Actor
From burning granaries to flaming kitchens, the search for guilty characters across
nineteenth-century Egypt did more than reveal human ill will within the course of tragic
events. It also began to institute a new definition of an intentional criminal actor. The
traditional definition of such an actor as one who performed a crime by her free will, not
as one “swept by the wind from place to place,” continued to guide adjudication within
khedival Egypt. 252 During the nineteenth century, however, this definition of criminal
agency took on newer significance. Police agents interrogated many criminal suspects
and witnesses from different walks of life in urban and rural settings (as discussed further
in Chapter Four). They recorded their answers to questions that sought to discern whether
someone had reason to cause harm—injury or death—to another of the state’s subjects, in
the less apparent instances of malice. In the first instance, the finding of culpability began
to move away from the direct performance of an act to its underlying motive. In a number
of cases including the investigation of Jamīla’s death, the determination of culpability
began to take into consideration the traditional act requirements of a crime, but also the
reasons (asbāb, pl., sing., sabab) for it. Along this new trend of criminal agency, new
intentional crimes, including fraudulent and inchoate ones, increasingly came to be
prosecuted. By the time Egypt’s 1883 criminal code shed new light on it, a modern
administrative state already had before it a changing notion of criminal intent and defined
new offenses subsumed under it.
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Identifying a motive to commit harm became a khedival preoccupation, and in a
number of cases, it came to approximate, if not to stand in for, a guilty character more
than criminal intent. For example, on January 18, 1863 (Rajab 27, 1279), five years
before Jamila’s tragic kitchen accident, another investigation of a burn victim took place
in another Cairene police station. This time, it was an elderly woman named al-Sayyida
‘Alafīya “around seventy years, lacking her eyesight, and with burns on her face, her
fingers, her chest, and her toes.” 253 The severe burns on her body first brought to the
attention of authorities by a younger man named ‘Amr Agha Aḥmad, an engineer
employed by Adham Pasha. 254 After being examined and sent to a khedival hospital (alisbitālīyāt), police agents stepped in to investigate the cause or “reasons” (asbāb) of her
death. 255 They asked ‘Amr Agha what he knew to have happened. He informed them that
he was sleeping on the top floor of the house when he heard the old woman’s screams in
the early hours of the morning (fī waqt al-fajr) coming from the courtyard (al-ḥush) on
the first floor. Finding the woman’s clothes to have caught on fire (al-nār fī hudūmiha),
he rushed to extinguish her (wa fī waqtiha ṣāra aṭfa’ahā). 256 When “asked for the
reasons” (sa’alaha ‘an asbāb), “if there was anyone sleeping next to her who would harm
her” (in kāna na’im maʻaha shakhṣ ḍarīr), the elderly woman replied that she had woken
up in the early morning to put on the fire to keep warm, it subsequently caught hold of
her clothes (fa walaʻat al-nār fī al-thawb); she did not accuse anyone. 257 Quelling
suspicions of concealed malice, the woman’s testimony led the police to conclude the
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following regarding her injury: “There are no motives for anyone in this matter, and there
is no reason to doubt the woman’s testimony, and she does not accuse [lay a claim upon]
anyone.” 258 It was not any specific intent to harm that was sought for, but rather, it was
whether there was any motive to do so. Nevertheless, through this subtle-yet-crucial shift
from intent to motive, the khedival state’s inquisitorial disposition to unmask malice
allowed for the forging of criminal actors—even those who did not fit the traditional
image.
Khedival sensitivity to criminal design did more than mold new criminal actors; it
also led to more prosecution of acts intended to trick or to defraud. Some of these crimes,
such as counterfeiting, already had a long history in Egypt going back to the Mamlūk
period. 259 At this point, various kinds of forgery were presented as a problem and called
for severe punishment for this intentional crime. This was the case, in 1831, for example,
when the Vice-regal Council ordered the hanging a Coptic scribe named Buṭrus for
“changing an investigative report,” 260 and in 1836, when it sentenced a local agent for his
forgery (tazwīr) to seven years’ imprisonment followed by exile to Anatolia (bilād alrūm). 261 During the nineteenth century, other crimes of fraud and embezzlement entered
the khedival legal landscape through foreign consular courts that applied penal codes or
common law that carried penalties for various intentional crimes or crimes of variegated
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intent. 262 Whether through legal osmosis between these latter jurisdictions and the state
councils or because of a practical concern to prosecute these crimes, mid-nineteenthcentury Ottoman Egypt became a laboratory for the making of specific intent crimes—or
those crimes defined by a culprit’s determined will to commit them. 263
Embezzlement, fraud (abus de confiance), bribery, even fraudulent bankruptcy
were punished under the Napoleonic Penal Code of 1808 as well as under the English
common law applied in Egypt, but they depended on the state’s agents to arrest its
culprits and to prosecute them. 264 This happened in 1881, when the Pasha’s police
forwarded a letter to the French consular court regarding the counterfeiting of coins by
Moses Mizrahi and his brothers in Cairo’s Jewish quarter. 265 They accused the brothers
of falsifying currency in exchange for ten gold Egyptian pounds, but also in order to
cover up their deception, “they gave ten lira as a bribe to the head of the European police
(bashbashī al-urubī) with the intent to make him exchange the false currency with a true
one” (bi-qaṣd tamakkunihi min tabdīl al-‘umla al-maghshūsha bi-‘umla ṣaḥīḥa). 266
Contemplated further by the khedival scrutiny, this intent to cheat (within) summoned
police at the end of the letter to invoke “the continuance of the public order and the
262
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prevention of that which harms the public” (istimrār al-amn al-‘umūmī wa izālat mā
yuḍirru bil-‘āmma). 267 Detecting and suppressing deception in the name of public order,
as it gave rise to new prosecutorial powers, also gave birth to new crimes that honed in on
criminal intent and its deleterious effects on society at large. In effect, by the end of the
century, as more people, businesses, and fraudulent acts by and amongst them, Egypt’s
administration of justice already had an established approach to apprehend them.
It was not only criminal minds that the law came to apprehend, but it was also all
aid or support extended to them—going beyond what the legal tradition had proscribed.
Ottoman sultans going back centuries were on the look-out for conspiracies and
rebellions aimed against their power. 268 But in the nineteenth-century, since Mehmed
Ali’s vanquishing his Mamlūk rivals in 1811 and consolidating his monopoly over
power, he and his heirs—Egypt’s khedives—considered gangs to be a direct threat to
their own power, and the prosperity of Egypt and its industrious peasants. 269 Punishment
of entire villages for not obeying commands, including conscription into his new civilian
army, marked the first half of the nineteenth century. 270 By the end of the century,
khedival decrees had emphasized that all who partook in a forbidden act would be
punished. For example, articulating new hygienic regulations for the burial of animal
carcasses in “every city,” a khedival decree issued on 24 February 1880 stipulated that
“every person who violated this order and who failed to bury an animal that has perished
267
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(nafaqa) in the designated places shall be fined one-hundred qirsh for every time a
violation has occurred.” 271 The stipulation went further: “if the elders of the village
abetted in (tasāhalū mashāyikh al-thumn wa al-bilād), did not prevent, nor report the
violation that has occurred, every one of them shall be fined (yaṣīr tajrīm kull wāḥid
minhum) one-hundred qirsh.” 272 Thus, the state’s watchful eyes on aiding, abetting, and
failing to prevent those acts deemed harmful to the well-being of society charted Egypt’s
legal tradition further towards the criminalization of a defendant’s dangerous mind.
By the third-quarter of the nineteenth century, a criminal mind and its association
with others increasingly entered the law’s purview. Conspiring, participating, provoking,
or soliciting harmful acts called for the immediate arrest (ḍabṭ wa rabṭ) of all involved
criminal actors. 273 As conspiracies continued to attract administrative attention by the
middle of the nineteenth century, they also continued to motivate the judicial search for
culpability. Authorities were not only concerned with the physical act that took place, but
also sought to know what suspects thought individually and jointly before and as they
committed crimes. Thus, in 1852, a police report regarding a conspiracy to steal jewelry
between a brother and sister-in-law aimed to know “first the answer to the question of
how the agreement” between the culprits took place. 274 As this intimate knowledge of
criminal minds defined the nineteenth century, it would prepare the ground for a more
formal doctrine of criminal intent by century’s end.

Kitāb majmūʻāt al-awwāmir al-‘ālīya wa al-lawwā’iḥ al-‘umūmīya al-khāṣa bil-mawwād al-jinā’īya
[Khedival Decrees and General Codes Pertaining to Criminal Matters] (Cairo, 1893). [DK].
272
Id.
273
DWQ 0020-001303. Majlis al-Aḥkām (participation). DWQ 0020-001303. Majlis al-Aḥkām (abetting).
274
CADN 1852/3/Hejib Effendi.
271

108

In this subtle way, even before the prohibition of conspiracy in a new criminal
code, Egypt’s administration of justice had already begun to develop a new concern for
and a language to describe conspiracy. This was the case in 1871 when Cairene police
arrested nine suspects they accused of stealing jewelry and fabric from within the city and
attempting to sell them illegally. 275 Their scandal was brought to the police’s attention by
an Austrian jeweler (sā’igh) named Fernandino who was asked by one of the suspects to
appraise the jewels (tathmīn al-mujawharāt). 276 As the police letter pointed out, the
suspects had gathered in an Iraqi storage space (makhzan ‘irāqi) in the city’s Jewish
quarter, and there “they conspired amongst themselves to commit the theft” (wa bihi
ḥaṣala al-ijāba baynahum bi-ḥusūl al-sariqa). 277 It was not only this new language
highlighting the “meeting of criminal minds” (al-ashkhāṣ ittaḥadū) beyond the tradition’s
treatment of highway robbery that developed the law of conspiracy. Indeed, it was also
the steps the culprits took and in concert as a criminal enterprise that made them culpable.
Thus, it was important to point out the traditional asportation requirement: that “the
carrying of the stolen goods was done by wagons coming from the direction of the
theater” (mashal al-ashyā’ al-masrūqa kāna bi-‘arabiyāt min nāḥiyat al-tiyatro). 278 Also
noteworthy, as the other suspects were committing the theft, is that one of them who was
on the look-out knowingly distracted a “black [Sudanese or Nubian] man [who was
passing by the post office] by asking him to light his cigarette” (hajaza al-rajul al-
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barbarī min ajl an yūliʻa minhu al-sijāra). 279 Before it was articulated in Arabic legal
textbooks by the end of the century, the act of conspiring to carry out a crime already had
a precedent in a khedival administration of justice—even beyond what was prescribed by
the legal tradition.
Reassessing Criminal Negligence
Some awareness of wrongdoing as understood within the legal tradition continued
through the nineteenth century in Egypt. Compurgation cases, as described above, sought
remedies across various local village councils until the latter part of the century. 280 Cases
involving proximate causation also showed an enduring administrative concern for
negligent or reckless acts taken by Egypt’s peasants. 281 On one Friday in March 1873
(Muḥarram 1290), an officer brought into a Cairene station “a person injured with a break
in his thigh” (shakhṣ muṣāb bi-kasr fi fakhdhihi). 282 When asked about the cause (alkayfīya) of his injury, the man explained that while he was walking along the road, a
donkey hit him and galloped away (anna ḥimāra arfāhu wa naṭṭa). 283 The injured man
accused one named Aḥmad Faraj, the owner of the donkey, whom he claimed “was
standing in front of the Sayyida Zaynab mosque without paying attention” when the
accident took place. 284 The case then proceeded to prove that Faraj was the actual owner
of the donkey, as a defendant’s negligence still remained tied to his property rather than
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to his state of mind. 285 Nevertheless, to the extent that these cases showcased a concern
for subjective knowledge of wrongdoing, they established a base upon which an
administration of justice succeeded to construct culpability that assessed a defendant’s
scienter—intent or knowledge of the wrong—beyond the physical acts of her negligence.
Khedival law continued to push the boundaries of culpability further towards a
defendant’s mind by adjusting some of the traditional rules of proximate causation.
Whereas in the tradition, a person was not held liable for an injury that occurred on his
own premises, state agents keen on keeping Egypt in order began to hold defendants
accountable for deformities on property that caused injuries to others. They went even
further in holding community members, both as individuals and in groups, accountable
for failing to respond to these knowable deformities and preventing harm to others. Thus,
where the legal tradition did not hold one accountable for failing to act (an omission),
khedival administration proceeded to do so. For example, in September 1862, Egypt’s
Highest Council learned of a man named Muḥammad Ismāʻīl who had gone shopping for
fertilizer (sibākh) with his wife in a shop in Shubra, a major Cairene neighborhood. 286
While doing so, however, some dirt within the store fell upon him (fā tahayyala ‘alayhī
al-turāb min al-maḥall al-jārī al-akhdh minhu), and so he died (wa tuwuffiya). 287 Quite
important for developing the law of criminal negligence in khedival Egypt, in light of the
facts and verdict of the case, the Council condemned the village elders for being reckless
in keeping the store in such an improper state that caused the man’s death, even if the
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injury occurred within someone else’s private property. 288 In this case, while the
traditional rules to ascertain culpability continued to appear in the legal record (as in the
donkey case above), other rules began to shape the assessment of criminal negligence
before khedival authority. In doing so, these rules began to separate the detection of
liability from any physical properties and based it directly on the assessment of a
defendant’s mind.
Manslaughter also became a pressing problem during the nineteenth century due
at least partly to this khedival sensitivity to negligence. The entire century began to see
unprecedented technological and social changes that brought about a transportation
revolution. 289 By the mid-nineteenth century, trains, steamboats, wagons, and carriages
gave birth to new means by which those living in Egypt travelled more efficiently, but
also by which, a number of them died. 290 Accidents became a costly everyday
phenomenon, and, thus, drew the attention of authorities. 291 Showing greater concern for
the careful operation of these new powerful machines by local subjects, khedival
jurisprudence began to change the traditional treatment of manslaughter. 292 Where the
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tradition did not punish such an act corporally or by imprisonment, the Pasha’s councils
did.
On November 15, 1853 (Safar 13, 1270), for example, a Cairene police station
sent a letter to investigate further “the matter of the wagons belonging to the Royal
Shipyard that were the cause of the killing of the Syrian girl” (amr ‘arabiyāt al-tirsāna
alatti kānat sababan fī qatl al-bint al-shāmīya). 293 The driving suspects were
subsequently jailed for a period of time (ṣarū al-anfār masjunīn). 294 If Ottoman law had
already imprisoned those found guilty of negligent homicide, Egypt’s khedives through
their judicial councils drew out this distinction from the legal tradition across the
nineteenth century.
Erring in addition to conspiring to do wrong also became a central administrative
concern. Mistakes (khaṭa’) had already fit within the legal tradition, yet assessment of
whether a defendant intentionally committed an act depended on the external physical
circumstances (for example, the lack of a weapon). During the nineteenth century,
however, mistakes were more attentively scrutinized. Mehmed Ali’s Qānūn al-Filāḥa
highlighted this concern for negligence when it required the “owner of beasts” to pay a
fine if their animals trespassed accidentally onto another’s property. 295 Additionally, in
1856, Egypt’s Highest Council heard an appeal for a verdict of negligent homicide
against a defendant named Muḥammad Abū Tayū. Initially, Tayū admitted to having
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killed the son of Muḥammad al-Shāʻir “by mistake” (bi-qatl waladihi khata’an), 296 and
he subsequently had to pay installments for the blood money he owed to the victim’s
heirs. Nonetheless, when he decided to recant his confession, the Council did not end the
matter there, but inquired further in order to determine whether in fact the negligent
homicide had taken place. 297 Negligence like criminal intent appeared to become a focal
point of angst within a khedival administration of justice to be stemmed and punished.
From deciphering criminal intent to interpreting criminal negligence, these khedival legal
precedents between 1800 and 1875 culminated into a discernible search in practice for a
defendant’s culpability beyond what the legal tradition had prescribed.
COLONIAL INTROSPECTION
Murdering with Premeditation
In light of these changes in the legal application of criminal intent, a new window
into the mind of the defendant opened by the end of the nineteenth century—first and
foremost to murder. As murder and murder trials pervaded the British Empire, 298 they
also mushroomed in British-occupied Egypt, taking place in new courtrooms with new
protocols (as examined in Chapter Four). Within these trials, weapons continued to be
centerpieces of criminal intent proving a defendant to be guilty of murder and deserving
of the death penalty, even if they were far from being dispositive. 299 Yet also within these
trials, a variegated understanding of criminal intent itself began to define the search for a
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murderer’s guilt and her subsequent punishment. It was not only the traditional
categories of intentional (‘amdan, qaṣdan), semi-intentional (shibh al-‘amd), or mistaken
(khaṭa’an) acts upon which British authorities continued to label culpability. 300 Rather,
this evolution in paradigms of criminal intent also unfolded through a new legal lexicon
that reflected the significant shift towards a judicial introspection into the defendant’s
mind.
The way public and legal colonial authorities in Egypt began to speak and to write
about murder changed to reflect this shift in judicial introspection. By the beginning of
the twentieth century, this new language had already appeared in police reports, judicial
verdicts, legal textbooks, and official letters across a number of newly-erected
institutions.301 Expressive of this new legal terminology was the Ministry of Justice
(niẓārat al-ḥaqqānīya) housing the new Public Prosecutor who represented society (as
discussed in Chapter One). 302 In the first decade of the twentieth century, the local
administration of justice (al-idāra al-qaḍā’īya lil-ḥukm al-ahlī) forwarded to the head of
the Executive Cabinet (ra’īs dīwān ‘arabī wa afranjī khidīwī) for his approval numerous
final death-penalty verdicts decided in the newly-established Court of Appeals
(maḥkamat al-naqḍ wa al-ibrām). 303 The letters followed a specific formula: after
identifying the defendant and the victim, the murder (or attempted murder), the means by
which it occurred (firing shots or strangulation), and the verdict (death penalty or
hanging); they officially stamped the convicted murderer’s mind with the phrase “intent
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with premeditation” (qatala ‘amdan maʻa sabq al-iṣrār). 304 While the first part of the
phrase used the traditional word for criminal intent (‘amd), the latter part of the phrase
“with premeditation” (maʻa sabq al-iṣrār) had not before been used to refer to intentional
homicide. Derived from the Arabic verb “to antecede” (s-b-q), this novel legal phrase
showcased the priorities of a modern administrative state: to inquire into the defendant’s
subjective state of mind prior to the commission of a crime, untethering it from the
commission of the act itself.
In doing so, an early-twentieth-century administration of justice redrew the
traditional image of the intentional murderer before the law. Whereas the tradition
engraved someone who killed “freely and directly” (mukhtāran lil-qatl mubāshir), a
modern administrative state sketched someone who planned, schemed, connived, and
waited in pursuit of his prey. A wolf or a wolf in sheep’s clothing now became the
stereotypical image of the murderer before the modern law. Moreover, as the Latin
proverb Pelle sub angina latitat mens saepe lupina (“under a sheep’s skin often hides a
wolfish mind”) warned, the new law flew into high alert for killers who fit this
description. Notably, a new word also entered the Arabic legal lexicon to capture this
heightened attentiveness to the murderer’s mind: “lying in wait” (or taraṣṣud, from the
Arabic root, r-ṣ-d, “to keep one’s eyes on”; “to watch”; “to control”). Thus, on August 9,
1909, a criminal court of first instance in the district of Beni Suayif found Muḥammad
Ḥusayn guilty of the murder of Muḥammad ‘Imād and the attempted murder of ‘Abd alKhalīl Yūsuf by firing two shots. 305 The Public Prosecutor’s letter calling for Ḥusayn’s
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death by hanging (bi-iʻdāmihi shanqan) analyzed his criminal mind as follows: “with
premeditation, lying in wait” (maʻa sabq al-iṣrār wa al-taraṣṣud). 306 Therefore, as in
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other murder cases, the khedival state scrutiny now turned inwards to regard the
murderer’s mind, attentively analyzing it prior to the harm that it inflicted on its victims.
To be sure, however, this new legal vocabulary reflecting a judicial introspection
into a malicious mind already had some precedent in practice during the nineteenth
century. Foreign consular courts sitting in Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez had already used a
wider lens to detect a scheming mind intent on harming others. For example, in 1853,
Bouvaret Duvray, a French subject living in Egypt, appeared before a Cairene French
consular court to account for his alleged assault under Articles 309, 310, and 311 of the
French Penal Code. 307 In finding the defendant guilty, the court ruled that the defendant
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inflicted a wound on his victim “with premeditation” (avec prémèditation). 308 The court
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made this assessment of the defendant’s mind after police arrested him and presented to
the consulate the facts of the case. 309 By the middle of the nineteenth century, Egypt’s
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administration of justice, keen on surmising criminal intent through the criminal act itself,
but also in anticipation of it, began to intensively scrutinize the criminal defendant’s
mind.
Beyond the courts, legal textbooks by the turn of the twentieth century articulated
and affirmed the law’s profound new apprehension of criminal intent. Khedival law
professors like Muḥammad Ra’fat wrote and taught to younger lawyers that “intent is a
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term that means the will towards a specific purpose, and criminally, the will towards the
commission of a crime (al-qaṣdu lughatan huwa ittijāhu al-irāda naḥw gharad mā, wa
jinā’īyan ittijāha naḥw irtikāb al-jarīma). 310 Ra’fat published these words in 1892 in his
legal treatise The Pearl on the Elements of Crime (al-Durra al-Yatīma fī Arkān alJarīma). 311 Five years later, in his 1897 study on suicide, Émile Durkheim fundamentally
questioned this objective reading of intent. The French sociologist reflected
skeptically: 312
Intent is too intimate a thing to be more than approximately interpreted by
another. It even escapes self-observation. How often we mistake the true reasons
for our acts! We constantly explain acts due to petty feelings or blind routine by
generous passions or lofty considerations.
While Durkheim may have protested a judicial introspection that attempted to analyze a
defendant’s mind, by the early twentieth century this introspection had become a fait
accompli. The law had now stepped back from the criminal act itself, widening the lens
by which it was able to read the defendant’s subjective state of mind. In doing so, it
transcended the scope of criminal intent within the legal tradition claiming a more
objective understanding of the mind of a criminal as it approached and committed a
criminal act.
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Attempting
This fundamental shift in approach became apparent in a new paradigm of judicial
introspection encapsulated in the crime of attempt. While the legal tradition focused on
punishing completed acts, modern criminal law found as problematic and worthy of
punishment those acts that were attempted, but not completed. It did so because it viewed
the latter as stemming from the same root problem: a depraved, impenitent mind. While
the earlier nineteenth century had already begun to exhibit this conspicuous shift in the
understanding of criminal intent and negligence, Egypt’s emerging administrative judicial
councils had not treated nor punished attempted illegal acts, leaving such intervention to
local watchmen (ghafīrs) and elders (mashāyikh) in villages across Egypt. By century’s
end, nevertheless, a new word for attempt, al-shurūʻ, entered the Arabic legal lexicon.
Notably, a certain judicial introspection into the defendant’s mind for criminal
intent came to define the crime of attempt. Khedival law professors began to write about
and to teach the crime as it appeared in Article 8 of the Egypt’s new Penal Code of
1883—a year after the British occupied Egypt. 313 In doing so, they placed criminal intent
as the central element of this new crime. In his 1892 The Unmattched Pearls on the
Elements of Crime, Ra’fat wrote the following to Egyptian readers who came to digest
the crime of attempt for the first time: 314
One is not to be punished for attempt unless three conditions are met. First, there
must be specific criminal intent (al-qaṣd al-jinā’ī al-muʻayyan). Second, there
must be steps taken towards the commission of the crime (al-bad’ fī al-ʻamal).
Muḥammad Ra’fat, Al-durra al-yatīma fī arqān al-jarīma [The Unmatched Pearl on the Elements of
Crime](Cairo: Būlāq, 1892).
314
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Third, there must be the absence of an external force outside the will of the actor
in putting a stop to the commission of the crime (‘adam irtikāb al-jarīma biquwwatin khārijatan ‘an irādati al-fāʻil).
Ra’fat explained the third element further: “If the culprit stops the crime by his own will,
there shall be no punishment for him because the aim of punishment is the benefit of
society (al-hay’a al-ijtimāʻīya) and abiding by the principles of justice. There is then no
good reason to punish.” 315 Here, he used the modern logic, already articulated by Jeremy
Bentham in The Principles of Morals and Legislation, 316 that one’s own conscience
would stop a crime if “people knew that they would not be punished” for doing so. 317
Society would be saved from harm incited by the law, leading individuals through their
alacrity and diligence to listen to and to act according to their consciences.
Yet, this absence of fear in saving society from attempted harm held its theoretical
limits, raising questions about the different purpose of the modern law in light of the
tradition. While killing oneself was considered wrong, it was never punished like
homicide was within the legal tradition. 318 By the end of the nineteenth century, however,
the act of killing oneself entered penal codes carried across the British and French
Empires. 319 Muḥammad Ra’fat explained this distinction between the modern law and his
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own legal tradition in his 1896 book The Principles of the Law (Uṣūl al-Qawānīn). 320 He
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wrote:
Ethics prohibited the killing of oneself, but the law did not. The idea of killing
oneself and the desire to commit it before beginning the act is prohibited by ethics
(‘ilm al-akhlāq), but it is not prohibited by the law. Killing oneself is punishable
only if one begins the act, according to Article 8 of the Penal Code. Even though
it is not written down in the law, it is necessary to prohibit killing oneself because
it is a disease that is built on contempt in the eyes of people, the restriction of the
soul, the falling into dangerous diseases, the weakness of the mind, and
psychological illness, that all go back to the person, and it is necessary to prohibit
attempted suicide in order to protect the rights of other people.
The suicidal individual and his psychology entered scientific and law journals in
Paris in the early nineteenth-century as a source of numerous social problems; these
issues needed to be stemmed, if not entirely eliminated. 321 A weak individual and psyche
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was the source of society’s woes. It was, nevertheless, this logic undergirding this
tortured portrait of the suicidal criminal that Émile Durkheim deconstructed a year later
in 1897 in his study Le Suicide. 322 In doing so, the French sociologist reversed the
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aggrieved arrow between the suicidal individual and society: it was not the pained
individual taking steps to end her life who harmed society; but rather, it was the inflicted
society in which she was raised that pushed her towards the taking of her own life.
Muḥammad Ra’fat, Uṣūl al-Qawānīn [The Principles of the Law] (Bibliotheca Alexandrina, Cairo,
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In spite of Durkheim’s insights, attempted suicides became prosecuted, as they
became a prevalent social problem during the interwar period, courts often ordered
“inquests of the body” to determine whether a person’s alienation led him or her to take
his or her own life. For instance, in 1915, Thomas Smith, a British subject, “hanged
himself on board,” while in 1917, a middle-aged British woman was determined through
an inquest of her body to have killed herself by throwing herself out of the window of her
Alexandria apartment. 323 Through detailed coroner reports, 324 attempted acts of suicide
and homicide continued to provide causes of death, but they also provided a spotlight on
the mind of the culprit: whether they acted accidentally or intentionally was crucial.
Showcasing an individual’s mental state, suicide (as well as homicide) also entered native
police logs by the 1920s as a violation of Articles 45, 46, and 197 of the 1883 Penal
Code. 325 In the margin of the log requesting against whom the crime was committed,
suicide remarkably became a crime against the newly-established office of the Public
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Prosecutor (al-niyāba), as this office came to represent society and its transformed rights
and obligations. 326 As Ra’fat articulated them, the deleterious effects imagined within the
law to be inflicted by a suicidal person on her society had now become a substantive
concern.
Beyond the established crime of suicide, attempt continued to mark prosecution
and to configure early twentieth-century polictical history in Egypt. Attempted homicides
(shurūʻ qatl) went beyond society to reach, as their targets, high-ranking Egyptian and
British officials. These attempted assassinations would come to stain Egypt’s modern
political history, 327 as made apparent in the 1919 Conspiracy Trial in which “Egypt
Student—Hassenein Ali—had been tried by a Military Court of attempting to kill Prime
Minister Nessim Pasha by throwing a bomb at him, he was found guilty and sentenced to
death and duly executed.” 328 In addition to attempted murder, attempted theft (shurūʻ
sariqa) recurred frequently before executive and judicial authorities. 329 Moreover, adding
to other attempted crimes, activities such as “attempt to give poisonous substances”
(shurūʻ fī taʻātī mawādd sāmm), reveal an increasing level of illegal activity within turnof-the-century Egyptian society, the new kinds of methods available to cause harm, and
the need for the law and an administration of justice to address these problems. By 1918,
720 attempted murders were prosecuted, and in 1919, the number climbed to 1,293. 330 In
1918, the number of thefts “attempted with violence” was 118, and the year after, it rose
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to 272. 331 By the 1920s, attempted crimes opened a window into the forbidden desires
and aims of the individual and the collective living in turn-of-the-century Egyptian
society. Still, they offered more: they revealed how an early twentieth-century
administration of justice used the criminal law as a tool to solve problems perceived to
injure society by a harmful mind.
The crime of attempt raised deeper philosophical questions about the role of the
criminal law as a tool to mold society. In 1894, Murād Faraj published Explanation of
Attempt in Egyptian Law (Kitāb al-majmūʻ fī sharḥ al-shurūʻ de la tentative ‘alā alqānūn al-miṣrī al-ahlī). In it, the appellate lawyer pointed out the three stages that
comprised the crime of attempt: resolving (taṣmīm), preparing (ta’ahhub), and acting (al‘amal). 332 The first stage consisting of making the decision to commit the crime existed
entirely in the mind; the second stage of preparing for the crime took place “both
internally and externally” to the mind, while the third stage consisted of taking outwards
steps towards the completion of the crime itself. While the first two stages touched upon
the interiority of the defendant’s mind, their order could be reversed (for a person could
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gather the tools of the crime before he decided to commit it). 333 Yet, as Faraj pointed out,
the law did not criminalize someone for simply thinking of carrying out a crime, for
doing so would invade the human consciousness even if ethics forbade the impulse to do
wrong. 334 He, thus, posed the question to his late nineteenth-century audience: “Is it the
role of law to punish evil?” (lakin hal lil-sharʻ al-basharī an yuqāṣiṣa ‘alā al-sharr aladabī). 335 This theoretical question would not only define the limits of the crime of
attempt, but it would also stand for the transformed limits of the criminal law as a modern
tool for commanding the good and forbidding the wrong.
Harming Society
A considerable part of this transformation of the criminal law relied on
understanding what new kinds of harms, including suicide, existed in society, and what
steps this society took in order to protect itself from such perceived harm. For one,
collective violence became a serious problem for British authorities who began to erect
ad hoc “Committees on Brigandage” by the end of the twentieth century to deal with
what they perceived to be an endemic problem of violence. 336 Nevertheless, underlying
this new social sensitivity to new crimes were also new social sciences of social
psychology and criminal anthropology developing across academic journals in London,
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Paris, and Cairo across the entire century. 337 In these journals, various topics including
insanity, 338 suicide, 339 alcoholism, 340 mental alienation, 341 and the distinctions between
them were debated and discussed in light of the criminal law and its capacities.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the criminal law was expected to provide
immediate solutions to some of these perceived social ills. Not the least of these problems
was forgery of documents (tazwīr) in an increasingly bureaucratic state—a crime that
came to be punished during the first half of the nineteenth century. Various khedival
penal codes criminalized forgery until the 1870s, when Muḥammad Makka wrote
Explanation of the Criminal Law: Private Section: Crimes of Forgery (sharḥ qānūn al‘uqūbāt / al-qism al-khāṣṣ / jarā’im al-tazwīr) in 1876. 342 Almost twenty years later, in
1895, Aḥmad Fatḥī Zaghlūl, the brother of the nationalist leader Saʻd Zaghlūl, published
Forgery in Documents (Risālat al-tazwīr fil-awrāq). 343 By the 1920s, the problem
persisted, as Al-Ahrām published several articles in 1921 exposing a rampant problem of
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“forgery in receipts” (tazwīr al-istimārāt). 344 Councils now sought fraudulent intent
beyond the criteria for criminal intent within the legal tradition.
In addition to forgery, embezzlement and fraud cases also mushroomed under
British control, shifting culpability further inwards towards the defendant’s knowledge of
wrong. During the first half of the nineteenth century, these fraudulent cases
predominantly involved ordinary civilian subjects (foreign and locals) living in Egypt.
These cases as they appeared in foreign consular courts, including French and British,
already punished defendants for exhibiting malice. Numerous verdicts found defendants
guilty who “fraudulently and feloniously did embezzle,” 345 who “feloniously and
unlawfully [did] steal,” 346 as they also found guilty those who “unlawfully and
maliciously did wound.” 347 By the end of the nineteenth century, these cases included the
disciplining of soldiers and military personnel. In 1886, for example, Muḥammad Shākir
was charged with three counts of embezzlement and found guilty on all of them before a
District Court Marshall (D. C. M). 348 His punishment was: to be demoted in rank, given
six months in prison, and dismissed. 349 Alongside Shākir, Sayyid Aḥmad was charged
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and found guilty for “making a false accusation against an officer knowing such an
accusation to be false.” 350 His punishment was: five-months’ imprisonment. 351
A year later, in 1887, Yūnus Yūnus, a solider reaching the rank of Nafar,
appeared before D. C. M. accused of “making a false accusation against an officer
knowing such an accusation to be false.” 352 Here, the defendant stood out through a new
legal expression: “knowing that his accusation was false” (maʻa annahu yaʻrafu anna
tilka al-tuhma bāṭila). 353 The verb “to know” (yaʻrafu)—while it was not an element in
evaluating the traditional crime of false accusation of fornication (qadhf)—now became
an essential component in evaluating the criminal intent.
A higher standard for criminal negligence began to guide adjudication. Molded
through cases against soldiers and local peasants disciplined for not obeying orders and
protocols, this standard stood in contrast to the treatment of negligence during the middle
of the nineteenth century. In the latter period, when no signs of human action existed—as
when no one was present in the kitchen during Jamīla’s burning that caused her death, a
khedival administration found no person responsible. Nevertheless, an evolving sense of
justice had begun to turn failure to act (an omission) into a prosecutable offense. For
example, this developing standard of criminal negligence in both judicial practice and
thinking appeared in 1886 when Saʻīd ‘Ayd, a jāwīsh in the Cairo City Police, was found
guilty of “negligently allowing a prisoner committed to his charge to escape.” 354 It was
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also applied to Muḥammad Mashal for “leaving his post without permission,” 355 and to
‘Abd al-‘Ᾱl ‘Asharī for his “neglect of duty.” 356 At this time, a different word for neglect
(ihmāl) in contrast to the traditional word used for negligence (taqṣīr) came into use by
the khedival state. However, this new standard applied not only to individuals, but also to
entire villages who did not receive their required vaccinations.
Along with this new standard of negligence, criminal intent also came to be
recalibrated with its own purpose. As we have seen, intending to kill came to be analyzed
in a different way before the law, but it was more than just killing. In 1887, ‘Alī
Sulayman, another jāwīsh in the Cairo City Police was charged with and given 30 lashes
for “wilfully [sic] releasing without proper authority a prisoner committed to his
charge.” 357 That same year, another soldier was charged for “disobeying in such a
manner as to show willful defiance of authority.” 358 Punishments for intentionally
misbehaving were harsher than those for negligently doing so or failing to act. 359 In all
circumstances, it was amidst this milieu of variegated intent that Egypt’s modern criminal
law was born.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the search for culpability that defined the earlier nineteenth century
becomes an intrinsic part of the story of the birth of Egypt’s modern criminal law. This
search could be seen as a progressive project to end pain and suffering as in Jamīla’s case
that opened this chapter. Still more pragmatically, this quest was also part of a modern
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khedival administrative state’s desire to uncover malice. Surely, this search for
culpability became refined and more incisively looked into the inner corners of criminal
defendants’ minds under colonial rule by the end of the nineteenth century with new
crimes, new terms, and theories that tried to make sense of crime, criminal behavior, and
criminal psyches.
Nevertheless, it is also important to understand these legal shifts in the substantive
criminal law as part of a layered continuum of historical change that took place across the
entire nineteenth century. The conceptual changes in the definitions of agency and
criminal responsibility within the law certainly impacted the way the criminal defendant
was seen before authorities. Yet, these conceptual changes in agency and its relationship
to punishment did not occur in a historical vacuum, but rather were tethered to the
historical practices across the nineteenth century that shaped and defined the criminal
defendant within modern Egypt.
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Chapter Three
Asserting Proof before the State
“Mark it for a sign, mark it!”
“There be no sign of it—we have examined her body.”
– Arthur Miller, The Crucible
HOMICIDE IN A BROTHEL (1877)
On Wednesday, May 30, 1877 (Jumādā al-Awwal 17, 1294), two local detectives
from Cairo’s Police Headquarters submitted an investigative report regarding the
mysterious death of one Girgis Buṭrus. Two days before the report, around 4 o’clock in
the morning, Girgis—a middle-aged, married Christian man—left his home overlooking
Clot Bey Street in Darb al-Junayna, a neighborhood in Cairo’s elite Azbakīya district. He
looked like he was going somewhere because based on the information the police later
gathered, he was wearing a cloak over his traditional garb, a black head covering, a gold
watch, as well as two diamond rings. He was also carrying five Egyptian pounds in his
pocket, suggesting that this was no poor man. When Girgis did not come back home later
that day, Girgis’s son prompted by a man named Ḥanna al-Qibs, nervously went to look
for his father and found him in the nearby brothel (karakhāna) located next to the local
grocer. Walking into the brothel, Girgis’s son encountered a chaotic scene: he found his
father slouched over, apparently alive but not speaking, while several women in the
brothel kept hitting him on his face. Then, he and Hanna placed his father on a donkey
and took him to where they believed they should take him: the local police station. There,
the half-conscious man was examined by state-appointed medical doctors before he was
sent to his home. At home, he continued in this confused state until he died later that
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evening, and was buried by the local elders the next morning. Nonetheless, Girgis’s death
did not end administrative suspicions. Throughout the period of 1840 to 1880, a khedival
state through its agents became increasingly uncomfortable with natural causes as an
explanation for calamity. Accordingly, they set out to uncover the cause of death in this
case, through a detailed criminal investigation, including a case file presented before
khedival judicial authority.
The police report on Girgis Buṭrus’s mysterious death marked an important shift
in “the assertion of truth” (al-wuqūf ‘alā al-haqā’iq) in nineteenth-century Egypt. The
case’s findings, gleaned from a study of criminal records, a medical exam, and hearsay
evidence—all of which were inadmissible, circumstantial evidence within Egypt’s legal
tradition—were now documented as valid signs of guilt and presented by state police to
the state’s judicial council. Embodying what Cornelia Vismann identified as “the
formation of the three major entities on which the law is based: truth, state, and
subject,” 360 this criminal case file thereby offered its judicial observer a new way to think
about and to prove guilt before the khedival administrative state. Even so, within the case
file offered before a judicial body that formed part of the khedival administrative state
was a historic reconfiguration of these three entities—truth, state, and subject.
This chapter tells the story of why and how these three entities of truth, state, and
subject evolved in modern Egypt. Beginning in the nineteenth century, a khedival state
and its bureaucracy deployed a range of forensic tools upon its subjects in order to
uncover the truth (facts) of crime in Egypt and to establish order and stability in the
Ottoman province on behalf of its khedival rulers. By so doing, the khedival state
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practiced various forms of both documentary and circumstantial evidence that stood in
contrast to the traditional methods of proof within Egypt’s legal tradition (in which
previously held doubt had traditionally restrained judicial assertions of a defendant’s
guilt). Indeed, as this chapter argues, these emergent historical practices from criminal
records to forensic medicine to forensic photography entrenched a modern forensic
regime that made possible the acceptance of a modern law on criminal evidence by the
end of the nineteenth century. It was during this time, as this chapter aims to explain, that
a fundamental shift had taken place in both practice and theory wherein the concept of
doubt (shubha) that had traditionally protected the accused’s innocence changed through
a state policy of maintaining public order and stability into a practice of resemblance
(tashbīh) through which a portrait of the criminal defendant emerged within the
investigation of crime.

To make this argument, this chapter contends that a fundamental shift took place
during the nineteenth century, in which criminal evidence became the priority of the
state. The first part—“In the Act”—will describe the traditional method of proving guilt
within Ottoman Egypt. Performed through confession by the accused or by way of
eyewitnesses who swore before the judge, this main method of proving guilt required the
eye-witnessing of the defendant in the act (talabbus) of committing the crime. While
police still relied on this as the primary way of proving guilt through the twentieth
century, its traditional form would be relaxed by the khedival state in asserting a
defendant’s guilt. Establishing guilt came to depend on matters many steps removed from
the act in question through the identification of a “resemblance” (or tashbīh) with
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defendants’ criminal pasts, therefore, relying on character evidence at a remove from the
crime in question. The traditional method would also see further theoretical refinement
by the end of the nineteenth century, by redefining the portrayal of a defendant “in the
act” of committing a crime.
Subsequently, the second part—“Through the Body”—will examine how further
innovation from the traditional method of proving guilt had already taken place in Egypt
from the 1820s onward through the application of new forensic tools and their underlying
theories as applied by a growing khedival bureaucracy. These instruments readily
showcased signs of subjects’ minds and bodies as admissible evidence of guilt before the
state in its search for truth about crime. Thus, elementary forms of ballistic analysis, in
addition to forensic medicine had been deployed by a khedival administrative state to
trace and prove defendants’ guilt. These methods of deducing evidentiary facts would see
further recalibration in Egypt’s laboratories by World War I as Ottoman Egypt became
entrenched within the British Empire. The third and final part—“By the Model”—will
investigate more forensic methods—including fingerprinting and photography—which
arrived into Egypt during the nineteenth century and, such as with forensic medicine,
entered the khedival state’s toolkit in order to prove criminal defendants’ guilt before the
state. Scientists, physicians, lawyers, and policymakers at the behest of this state under
British Occupation, also debated, discussed, published on, and utilized these tools in light
of their underlying social theories. By modelling the criminal defendant, these methods
also molded and redefined the admissibility of evidence proffered to prove guilt before
the state, and they contributed to changing the understanding of truth, state, and subject
within modern Egypt.
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IN THE ACT
Before the Judge
Prior to the nineteenth century, proving guilt in Ottoman Egypt was quite notably
not carried out on behalf of the state. Rather, as in other pre-modern judicial settings,
individual plaintiffs brought forth evidence against the accused before the judge in his
court. 361 However, the search for blame would gradually change throughout the khedival
administrative state over the course of the nineteenth century. Yet even through this
noticeable shift, “evidence” (or bayyina, in Arabic) still conformed to its etymological
roots, pointing to the “outward signs” conspicuous to the eye (prior to any inferences that
would later occur to the mind) of an observer and directly linking the accused to the
commission of the act in question. 362 In other words, a faithful person (assumed to be an
adult male Muslim) had to bear witness to the accused having been “in the act” of a
completed wrong in order to establish their guilt before the law. 363 Accordingly, as they
continued to factor crucially in various pre-modern and modern judicial settings, 364 eye
witnesses (or shuhūd) functioned as the main engine of Islamic courtrooms in Egypt for
centuries because what they professed to see with their own eyes (their eyewitness
361
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testimony, or shahāda) provided the basic grounds upon which the Islamic judge (qāḍī)
could establish a verdict (ḥukm) over a criminal defendant. 365 Presiding over this
testimony, the judge, who in theory had to account for his verdicts, invoked an exacting
standard for admitting evidence presented by the plaintiff against the accused in an
adversarial courtroom.
Islamic jurisprudence historically protected criminal defendants (al-muddaʻā
‘alayhim, pl.; al-muddaʻā ‘alayhi, sing.) from erroneous or doubtful prosecution. 366
Classical Islamic jurists (fuqahā’) across the main schools of Islamic law throughout the
early centuries of Islam penned and transmitted strict rules for proving guilt all the way to
the nineteenth century. 367 Writing in the early nineteenth century, the most famous lateOttoman jurist Ibn ‘Ābidīn fit this mold, insisting by clear example on these strict rules in
his exhaustive legal treatise, Radd al-Muḥtār ‘alā al-durr al-Mukhtār (The Reference for
the Perplexed: On the Precious Pearl). 368 In the subsection he titled “the means by
which a judge should arrive at a verdict” (ṭarīq al-qāḍī ilā al-ḥukm), the Ḥanafī jurist
explained that the method of proof “differed according to the individual upon which the
verdict fell” (yakhtalifu bi-ḥasb ikhtilāf al-maḥkūm ‘alayhi). 369
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The tradition required unequivocal proof of a defendant’s guilt. In the absence of
these oaths and confessions (all oral, in-court testimony), Islamic jurists insisted on the
“circumstantial evidence that follows the scope of the decided matter” (al-qarā’inu alwāḍiḥatu allātī taṣīru al-amr fī ḥayyiz al-maqtuʻi bihī). 370 To explain exactly what this
method of proof entailed, Ibn ‘Abidīn gave the textbook example. He sketched an
image: 371
Consider a person who appeared from inside a house, holding a knife in his hand,
and he is stained in blood (wa huwa mutalawwith bil-dam). Rushing out of the
house (sarīʻun al-haraka), he created fear so that people immediately went inside
the house to see what had happened, and they found in it a slain person at that
exact time (fa wajadū fīhā insānan madhbūḥan bi-dhālika al-waqt). No one was
seen inside the house except the person who had just left (wa lam yūjad aḥad
ghayra dhālika al-khāriji).
Thus, for Ibn ‘Ābidīn and the Islamic legal tradition, there remained the far-off
possibilities (iḥtimāl baʻīd) that someone else killed the victim and remained hidden
inside the house (literally, “erected a barrier” tasawwara al-ḥā’iṭa) or that the victim may
have “killed himself” (dhabaḥa nafsahu). 372 These latter, less conspicuous hypotheticals
to which the observer’s attention may have averted (lā yaltafit ilayhi), nevertheless,
persisted to cast doubt as to whether the man who was caught “red-handed” just before
the witnesses went into the house actually committed the murder—“if proof (to the
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contrary) was not established” (idh lam yansha’ ‘an dalīl). 373 Based on this exacting
logic, then, the only proof that the person exiting the house was the actual killer (in the
absence of his confessing the crime) could only be if the witnesses actually saw him
complete the homicide before their very eyes using the deadly weapon (āla jāriḥa) he had
in his hand.
Presumably, these eyewitnesses to the murder could be mistaken or lying as to
what they perceived, which would then destroy the exact certainty sought for by the
Islamic judge (qāḍī). However, in theory, at least, classical jurists felt confident that the
judge could evaluate the veracity of eyewitnesses guided by his own discretion and the
specific doctrinal rules that would suggest to him whether these eyewitnesses—ideally to
be good-standing Muslim men—appeared honest (or rather, faithful) before the qāḍī’s
court. 374 In this vein, jurists across the different schools of Islamic law over the centuries
calibrated an elaborate body of rules regarding eyewitness testimony: by whom and when
it could be proffered, how much of it was required, and against which wrongs it could
substantiate. 375 Nevertheless, this exacting judicial inquiry for certainty in identifying the
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criminal defendant to the actual crime (not just near the crime scene), thus, made the
burden of proof for criminal prosecution exceptionally high.
As Ibn ‘Ābidīn’s textbook example made clear, this Islamic legal doctrine of
admissible criminal evidence required in vivo eye-witnessing that linked the criminal
defendant directly to the crime in question, eschewing any attenuated links between the
criminal defendant and the crime in question. Thus, circumstantial evidence leveled
against the accused would be entirely inadmissible in the qāḍī’s court. This doctrine of
eyewitness testimony subsequently had a lasting impact not only on what was considered
to be prosecutable acts within the legal community. It also impacted what it meant to bear
witness to a crime or injustice within the Muslim community at large. Members of the
community had to have seen the crime transpire before their very own eyes (and often
performed in a certain way) for evidence to be admissible against the defendant.
Thus, if an inquisitorial mode that defined Islamic criminal adjudication prior to
the nineteenth century, it was not exhibited by way of an exacting judicial introspection
of the accused’s mind (or heart) for a presumed guilt. Rather, this mode revealed an
exacting judicial evaluation of testimonial evidence that plaintiffs offered against the
defendants. While an Islamic judge traditionally only received such testimony admitted

homicide (qatl) or assault (jarḥ), the number of required eyewitnesses (and thus, the standard of reasonable
doubt) also depended on the type of punishment to be exacted from the criminal defendant: qiṣāṣ or qawād
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The causes of action for exacting these separate punishments (jaza’a) depended also on the mental state of
the defendant when she supposedly committed the illicit act in question (as explored further in Chapter
Two). For example, a cause of action for revenge (or talion) required the plaintiff to show that the
defendant carried out the illicit act intentionally. That the defendant committed the act in question with
intent (bi-‘amd, or bi-qaṣd) required more eyewitnesses than the proof for committing the act semiintentionally or recklessly (bi-shibh ‘amd), or even mistakenly (khaṭa’). Thus, intent also affected the
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by plaintiffs to prove defendants’ guilt, he guided the admission of inculpatory evidence
according to a rigorous evidentiary standard. 376 According to that legal standard, the socalled “appearances” (ẓāhir) had to be connected to the proposition of guilt in order to
allow the shift from the defendant’s presumed innocence into a proven culpability. 377
Thus, circumstantial evidence (qarā’in) surrounded by testimony offered against the
accused was vigorously tested for its veracity after being spoken in court. Such an
account had to be “clear” (wādiḥa), 378 establishing a direct (i.e., not attenuated or
circumstantial) link between the identity and means of the perpetrator and the accused.
Indeed, as the Islamic legal maxim professed, “evidence rests on the prosecution, while
the oath rests with the defendant” (al-bayyina ‘alā al-muddaʻī, wa-al-yamīn ‘alā almuddaʻā ‘alayhi). 379 According to the theory underlying this maxim, the search into the
defendant’s mind saw its limits within the judge’s determination of the probative value of
the prosecutorial evidence presented in his courtroom.
Therefore, within this adversarial setting, both prior to and well into nineteenthcentury Ottoman Egypt, competing voices rose high and above one another in an effort to
prove guilt and innocence. Plaintiffs had to bring forth witnesses who swore to have seen
the accused commit wrongs; simultaneously, defendants who stood trial had to confront
this testimony and their adversaries. Some defendants felt compelled to confess their
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blame before the judge. Following the legal tradition, however, a defendant’s confession
(iqrār) had to be offered volitionally (without any coercion or duress), and the judge had
to ensure this condition before admitting the confession as conclusive evidence of the
defendant’s guilt. 380 In the absence of confessions or eyewitness testimony, nevertheless,
plaintiffs compelled defendants to swear to their innocence in court, in God’s name (that
is, to deny the accusation made against them by the prosecution, as will be discussed
further the next chapter). 381 Indeed, an entrenched relationship between plaintiffs and
defendants, and more specifically between evidence (testimony and confessions) and
oaths (formulaic verbal expressions) already defined criminal procedure prior to the
nineteenth century.
The khedival administrative state did not undo this adversarial relationship, but
rather, it reoriented it to itself and for its own goals. The hearing of evidence and oaths
by plaintiffs, witnesses, and defendants that traditionally took place before the Islamic
judge in his courtroom became replicated before administrative state councils established
in the 1840s. It was not, however, carried out and repeated over several stages of a
criminal adjudicative process that echoed from local police stations all the way to Egypt’s
Highest State Council. 382 How the “apparent” innocence of the defendant entrenched
within the legal tradition, fared along the way of these newly-imposed stages of criminal
procedure across the nineteenth century will be the subject of the next chapter. For now,
however, the newly-accepted modes, methods, and materials of proof discussed in this
380
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chapter, which were infused into and carefully scrutinized along these new stages of
criminal adjudication, became of crucial significance for proving a criminal defendant’s
guilt. Without a doubt, this new evidentiary toolkit significantly transformed the content
of criminal case files and the grounds upon which guilt and innocence could be deduced
before old and newly-erected judicial councils across the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Similarly, these new methods contributed to the transformation of the law of
criminal evidence in modern Egypt.
A further remarkable shift in nineteenth-century criminal adjudication was how
evidence in its expanded, bureaucratized form now related to traditional formulas leveled
at the accused. The new forms of admissible evidence exhibited a certain confidence on
the part of the judge. Grounded in science and deductive reasoning, such confidence
demonstrated a shift in how a priori (“from the earlier”) evidence that appealed to the
human mind prior to being perceived by the human eye (a posteriori, or “from the later,”
evidence) now factored into and redefined criminal adjudication itself. 383 Whereas
evidence in its traditional spoken formulaic form used to be checked by other in-court
affirmations and denials made in God’s name and evaluated by the judge, 384 this process
underwent a noticeable reversal during the nineteenth century. In this reversal, the
administrative state scrutinized, tested, or substantiated these ancient spoken assertions
proffered by defendants in light of new rationalized forms of evidence produced in and
383
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out of court on behalf of, and for a more skeptical and inquisitorial legal system, justice.
Accordingly, it was not only the rules of admissible evidence that were transformed;
more fundamentally, the meaning of evidence itself, or what was evident, changed within
the applied law in nineteenth-century Egypt.
Out of the Act
Nonetheless, eyewitness testimony while still relied upon was no longer the only
means to prove guilt. Relaxing Islamic law’s doctrine of criminal evidence, the Pasha’s
agents began to rely on the defendants’ previous criminal acts (that is, their criminal
records) as a means to assess whether or not the accused likely, not inconvertibly as
required by the tradition, committed the crime in question. The word that police agents
used time and again to speak of this type of criminal evidence during the nineteenth
century was sawābiq (or “prior acts,” which constituted a “criminal record,” from the
Arabic root s-b-q, meaning “to precede,” or “antecede”). Relying on criminal
defendants’ past illicit acts far removed in time and place from the acts they sought to
investigate, the Pasha’s police agents, nevertheless, spoke confidently about their probing
of a criminal defendant’s “criminal record of theft” (sawābiq fī al-sariqa), 385 as well as
“criminal record of homicide” (sawābiq fī mawādd qatl). 386 What premodern and early
modern jurists had viewed as attenuated links entirely inadmissible against the accused,
the Pasha’s police agents who searched for “criminal records” and the councils who read
and admitted these records saw rather as reliable evidence that factored into their
evaluation and adjudication of criminal defendants’ guilt or innocence. Consideration of a
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defendant’s disposition to commit the crime in question, based on how they behaved in
the past, became admissible evidence.
Across the nineteenth century, numerous cases in the Egypt’s National Archives
and other historical archives illustrated the growing reliance on criminal records as valid
proof of guilt. For example, on 20 Jumādā al-Awwal 1267 (March 23, 1851), the recently
erected High State Council (Majlis al-Aḥkām)—the highest court in Egypt—heard a
petition regarding the murder case of Ḥusayn Ḥadīdī after an investigation into his
murder was prompted by the head of police in Suhāj (nāẓir qism suhāj) in Upper Egypt
(mudīrīyat qiblī). 387 By way of the investigation, the head of police required the four
surrounding districts (nawāḥī) to find the killer (alzamahum bi-ẓuhūr al-fāʻil). 388 One
Faraj Abū al-Naṣr was subsequently accused and jailed. However, upon “clarification of
his criminal record” (īḍāḥ sawābiqihi), “it could not be proven that he was the killer nor
that he had a criminal record, and thus, he was released” (fā lā kān yathbutu ‘alayhi lā alqatl wa lā al-sawābiq wa ufriju ‘anhu). 389
By the following decade with the establishment of Egypt’s first telegraph lines
and railroads, 390 the search into criminal defendants’ criminal pasts had become a
requisite step for prosecution. On 5 Ṣafar 1281 (July 10, 1864), the Supreme State
Council heard a petition from three defendants found guilty of the murder of ‘Āṭīya
Muḥammad Zafzūq by a lower state council in the district of Giza. 391 The petition named
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three defendants: Muṣṭafā ‘Aṭā’, Khalīl ‘Aṭā’, and Sālim Sulaymān. In deciding the
defendants’ guilt in the murder of ‘Āṭīya, the Supreme State Council first took into
consideration “an investigation into their criminal record of homicide as well as theft”
(yujrā taḥqīq sawābiqihim fī mawādd al-qatl wa al-masrūqāt). Through this
investigation, the Council condemned Khalīl ‘Aṭā’ and Muṣṭafā ‘Aṭā’ for stealing from
Aḥmad Pāshā Ṭāhir almost sixteen years before in 1848. The ‘Aṭā’s’ last conviction
appeared before the High Justice Council (al-Jamʻīya al-Ḥaqqānīya), the judicial body
that the Supreme State Council replaced that same year. While found guilty of theft again
four years later in the district of Gharbīya, the latter defendants, nevertheless, escaped
punishment. Meanwhile, their co-conspirator in the murder, Sālim Sulaymān, had a farfrom-perfect past: he had pleaded guilty with others in the murder of ‘Alī al-Sawī in 1267
(1850). 392 Evidence suggested that the two other accused were also involved in this
earlier murder. 393 By the 1860s, through well-kept police and court records, criminal
defendants who appeared before judicial councils had to answer for their checkered pasts.
The practice continued into the 1870s. In 1873, escorting Auguste Martres, the
hotel bellboy accused of stealing clothes, the prefecture of police made it clear in his
letter to the French consulate: a) that their protected subject, residing in Cairo, had a
criminal record of theft (annahu lahu sawābiq fī al-sariqa), b) that the consulate had been
made aware of this, and c) that Martres intended again to sell several stolen articles of
clothing. 394 Similarly, in 1875, the Chief of Police of Giza sent ‘Alī ‘Abd al-Karīm and
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‘Abd al-Qādir Muḥammad to a local council because of gambling and fighting. 395 Upon
an investigation of both men’s criminal records (wa bil-taḥrīr ‘an sawābiqihim), it
became clear that one of the accused, ‘Abd al-Qādir, had two previous criminal
convictions (sābiqayn). 396 In one of them, he was accused of stealing a donkey from one
Ḥamad and was subsequently arrested for it; and in another, he had taken a traditional
cloak (‘abāya) and not paid for it, which lead to this arrest and release only upon
providing a surety. In forwarding this case to the state council (majlis), the Chief of
Police intimated how a defendant’s past criminal record mattered to his decision to
prosecute: “it is required to prosecute these two men on account of their gambling
because of what results from it…especially in light of the criminal record of one of the
accused.” 397 Thus, by 1875, the Pasha’s agents in initiating prosecution instinctually
looked for criminal defendants’ disposition to commit present wrongs based on their past
conduct.
However, this administrative inquisition was as much shaped by a forwardlooking scientific approach to predicting human behavior as it was by a retrospective
analysis of defendants’ criminal pasts. During the 1880s, an avalanche of ideas on
understanding and modelling human behavior poured into Cairene scientific circles and
journals. These new anthropological models not only began to reshape older standards of
understanding human behavior and its causes; 398 they also, by extension, influenced the
investigation of crime (“bad behavior”) and how investigations would be conducted. As
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a periodical article published in al-Muqtaṭaf in 1891 shed light, “Investigation into
Criminal Investigation” (al-taḥqīq fī al-taḥqīq), 399 thus, ensued to redefine the methods
and assumptions in predicting whether a person committed a certain crime. It was no
longer necessary to see with one’s eyes a person “in the act” of committing a crime, but
rather by studying that person’s story, authorities could now configure disposition to
commit that crime. Thus, proof of crime was now untethered from the precise time and
space of its commission—from being “in the act”—to extend to a criminal defendant’s
general disposition “out(side) of the act.”
By 1895, a new Criminal Records Department (qism al-sawābiq) had been
erected under British directives, and a new form written to solidify this administration’s
preoccupation with defendants’ criminal pasts. The bureaucratic form was referred to as a
“Resemblance Form” 400 (waraqat tashbīh, from the Arabic root sh-b-h, meaning “to look
like,” but also, “to be in doubt,” the same root for shubha, or the concept of doubt in
Islamic law). 401 On the right hand side of this form, the following typed “Notice”
(tanbīh) appeared: 402
All of the distinctive evidence (al-bayyināt al-mumayyaza al-mubayyana) against
the accused should be noted on the left-hand side of this form. It should include
all felonies and misdemeanors of theft (al-sariqāt), attempted theft (al-shurūʻ fī
al-sariqa), fraud (al-khiyāna), extortion (al-naṣb), and participation (al-ishtirāk).
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All other types of crimes committed by the accused should be indicated on the
right-hand side of this form.
This particular form aside, the type of evidentiary proof solicited diverged only slightly
from the type of evidence already collected and relied on for prosecution earlier in the
century. Acts now prosecutable within a khedival legal system under British Occupation,
including suicide and attempt (shurūʻ) (discussed in the last chapter), stained a criminal
defendant’s criminal record. 403
Even so, a defendant’s past prosecutions and convictions for theft, participation,
or extortion in other unrelated matters, had already been the subject of inquiry. 404 This
“resemblance” form strongly suggests how a nineteenth-century bureaucracy, motivated
by efficiency at the cusp of the twentieth century, had brazenly transformed the concept
of doubt (shubha), seen as inculpatory evidence, which had historically protected the
criminal defendant, into a practice of resemblance (or tashbīh). The form, and other
forensic tools discussed below that the captured (fingerprinting and photoraphs),
transformed criminal defendants, their physical attributes, and their past into inculpatory
suspicion and admissible evidence to prove present crimes.
In the Act, Redefined
Eyewitness testimony by this khedival state, in order to curb crime, continued to
change. By the end of the nineteenth century, law had preserved, but also refined, the
basic form of this long-standing method of proof. It did so by acknowledging eyewitness
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testimony as traditionally understood within the Islamic legal tradition as admissible
incriminating evidence when police caught defendants in the act of committing a crime.
Entering Egypt’s 1883 Criminal Procedure Code (Qānūn Taḥqīq al-Jināyāt) as talabbus,
the modern adaptation of this policing practice, nevertheless, as a new Criminal
Procedure Law articulated it, and as late nineteenth-century legal textbooks explained,
continued to raise a number of important questions. For example, did police agents or
other witnesses, as the Islamic legal tradition required, have to see the entire crime
transpire before their very eyes in order to prove a criminal defendant’s guilt? Rather, by
contrast, was the discernment of steps towards a crime’s completion sufficient to prove
culpability? What police agents could see and could not see became a contested site of
legal analysis by the end of the nineteenth century.
In his 1892 legal treatise The Unmatched Pearl on the Elements of Crime (Aldurra al-yatīma fī arkān al-jarīma), Muhammad Ra’fat attempted to explain the practice
of talabbus, teasing out the nuances of this modern judicial method of proving crime.
Before laying out the distinctions in talabbus, the law professor, almost rhetorically
trying to fit his understanding of the method of proof within the traditional paradigm,
emphasized “that there is no reason for this distinction because all crimes are either
carried out in plain sight of their being committed (mutalabbisan bihā) or those that are
not committed out of plain view of their being committed (ghayr mutalabbisan bihā).” 405

Muḥammad Ra’fat, Al-durra al-yatīma fī arqān al-jarīma [The Unmatched Pearls on the Elements of
Crime](Cairo: Būlāq, 1892). What Ra’fat attempts to make clear here is the distinction between evidence
that is seen directly, conforming to the threshold of acceptable evidence within the legal tradition (shahāda,
talabbus), and new kinds of evidence that is not directly seen, but is removed from the commission of the
crime in question (talabbus hukman). Here, we see the displacement of the site of analysis of admissible
criminal evidence shift even further away from the commission of the crime, and towards an imagined
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Nevertheless, quite differently from Ibn ‘Ābidīn’s paradigm of admissible judicial
methods of proof earlier in the century, Ra’fat explained two different meanings of
talabbus. The simple meaning of talabbus, as Ibn ‘Ābidīn had described it in his
example, was seeing a crime committed by the defendant in plain view. 406 Still, there was
also for Ra’fat and a later generation of lawyers, another—more nuanced—meaning of
talabbus that took place “after the commission of a crime, through evidence.” 407 He
explained this latter meaning further: 408
For the latter is considered proximate talabbus (bi-wajh al-taqrīb), for it is also
considered that the perpetrator was seen to have committed a crime in flagrante
delicto if after a short period of the commission of the crime, the perpetrator is
located shortly thereafter, or a public outcry follows the perpetrator, or the
perpetrator is discovered during this time carrying the tools, weapons,
gratification, papers, or other effects that lead to the conclusion that the
perpetrator committed the crime or participated in its commission. And so this
section of the law began with “and if it is also considered” in order to make it
clear to us that that which is written in the law (codified) after this section is
outside the meaning of talabbus unless it is judged to be so (talabbusan ḥukman).
At least two points are worth discussion with respect to the conceptual changes that took
place in the nineteenth century in the understanding and application of eyewitness
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testimony, or “clear circumstantial evidence” of proving crime. 409 First, whereas for Ibn
‘Ābidīn, such “clear circumstantial evidence” strictly eschewed inferential conclusions of
guilt derived proximately (e.g., seeing the “red-handed” suspect holding the murder
weapon), Ra’fat tended towards a more rational, practical approach to interpreting the
law. By doing so, he expanded the purview of the judicial gaze for proof beyond the
exact moment of the commission of the crime in question to include events and facts
immediately close to it. Thus, whereas according to Ibn ‘Ābidīn, “public outcry”—rage
expressed from the public’s learning the material facts of a crime—could not be factored
in the sharīʻa’s definition of talabbus, Ra’fat absorbed these signals into the legal
methods of proving guilt extant within the law. Second, this conceptual shift appeared to
be mirrored also in greater discretion afforded to judges to read the connection to a
defendant’s culpability into the offered criminal evidence—what Ra’fat creatively termed
talabbusan ḥukman. While Ibn ‘Ābidīn and the Islamic legal tradition unequivocally
delimited criminal prosecution when faced with doubt of a criminal defendant’s guilt—
however improbable innocence might be—by the late nineteenth century, a certain
acceptance of or comfort with doubt, redefined the shape and function of admissible
criminal evidence against the accused.
This subtle redefinition of the meaning of testimony to incriminating evidence
came to be codified in the law itself. The Criminal Procedure Law first compelled anyone
who had witnessed a crime to report it to public authority, but more potently, public
agents (i.e., the police) were now armed “in case of in flagrante delicto or all the
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circumstances that approximate in flagrante delicto, to arrest a suspect and bring him
before judicial authority without the need for an arrest warrant.” 410 And thus, even
though the protection of criminal defendants’ rights was now enshrined before the law by
virtue of the general requirement of judicial warrants before police arrests or searches
could be made, the traditional standard for proving criminal defendants’ guilt had now
become reconfigured within the law. Public agents faced with suspected crimes that
would disturb the public (or economic) order—whether theft, scam, bankruptcy,
assaulting a police officer, rebellion, trafficking in women and children, or use of
narcotics 411—could make immediate arrests, constrained by a less exacting standard of
proof.
THROUGH THE BODY
Betrayed by the Weapon
Embodying this gradual transformation into a fully-fledged inquisitorial legal
process, infused with criminal doubt beyond the study of criminal records and other
circumstantial evidence was first and foremost khedival administration’s scrutiny of
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human bodies in order to trace crime. Modern medicine with its increasingly
physiological understanding of death and its causes, as taught in the modern medical
schools like that established at the behest of the Pasha in 1827, became a powerful
impetus to “solv[ing] crime.” 412 This key, found within numerous criminal case files
presented before judicial bodies, also guided the adjudication over criminal defendants’
guilt within a khedival bureaucracy. Accordingly, newly-educated medical professionals
employed in the court system began to serve the elevated purpose of investigating the
causes—including the drama and actors—of suspected crime. 413 As the nineteenthcentury wore on, this important purpose that medical knowledge and expertise now
served seemed to reflexively support its patronage by Egypt’s khedival rulers.
Assessment of criminal defendants’ guilt or innocence at an early stage of the
legal process could now be traced discretely, through distinct marks left on the human
body by weapons. While some deadly weapons had already been deemed dispositive of
criminal intent within the Islamic legal tradition (as discussed in Chapter Two), 414
weapons had not been sites of analysis that generated inculpatory evidence. Nevertheless,
by the nineteenth century, officials began to use the studied marks on weapons to
corroborate medical and other eyewitness testimony identifying the type of murder
weapon used and by whom in the commission of suspected crime, and to determine
whether that weapon was used purposefully or accidentally. Later efforts followed to
connect that identified criminal weapon to a criminal suspect or suspects. Thus, these
412
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weapon effects found on victims’ bodies became quite powerful in piecing together
criminal plots and constellating the fate of defendants.
As early as the 1830s, the state increasingly began to study material objects to
deduce the guilt or innocence of criminal defendants. For example, in one case, the
Pasha’s Vice-regal Council relied on “proof provided by the deceased before his death
that a bullet discharged from the shotgun (bunduqīya)” belonging to the defendant,
Aḥmad Saʻd, did, in fact, “wound the deceased accidentally, if not intentionally.” 415 In
similar ways, khedival authority persisted to decode other material criminal objects. For
instance, in 1844, police agents analyzed the knife that Muḥammad Makāwī appeared to
use to attack his uncle’s startled wife at night when she tried to stand in between him and
her daughter. 416 “The aforementioned killer,” the court record described, “had held in his
hand a knife, and he repeatedly stabbed his uncle’s wife with it so that the knife tore open
the woman’s stomach, making contact with her repeatedly and horizontally, until the
woman fell screaming, as the perpetrator escaped.” 417 As the court record noted, local
watchmen “arrived to find the woman on the brink of death” (wajadū al-ḥurma ‘alā qayd
al-ḥayāt). 418 While they did not physically see the husband stab his wife, as Ibn ‘Ābidīn’s
example foretold, they nevertheless made the rational leap that the woman’s apprehended
death had been caused by the defendant’s imagined stabbing.
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In this powerful way, weapons now appeared on the stage of criminal justice, and,
increasingly so, to the background of the violence of domestic relations. In 1848, for
example, Egypt’s Highest Council at the time (al-Jamʻīya al-Ḥaqqānīya) reviewed the
evidence surrounding another reported gruesome murder of a woman. 419 The victim in
this case was the wife of one Muḥammad Ghaffār, who “was accused of killing his
wife…by hitting her on her head with a knife, and subsequently escaped the crime scene
(bi-ḍarbiha bi-sikkīn fī ra’siha, wa farra hāriban). 420 Immediately after hearing of this
murder, the village elders (al-mashāyikh), along with the Pasha’s local governor (nāẓir
al-thumn), rushed towards “the place where the woman was killed and discovered her in
a state of having been stabbed with a knife (kashafū ‘alayha wujūdaha maḍrūbatan bilsikkīna), as it was reported to them, and drenched in her own blood (wa damuha
ghāmirun ‘alayha).” 421 It was not enough to claim that the woman had been killed by the
accused using a deadly weapon; instead, as the court record clearly exhibited, the state’s
agents now aimed to know more. Precisely how had the victim been killed? 422 Thus, the
forensic spotlight shined brightly on the slain woman’s tortured body, placed before the
state as both the subject and the object of criminal investigation. Moreover, the knife,
which was now judiciously imagined in the absence of eyewitnesses to be the deadly
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weapon that brought about the wife’s ill fate, was offered before government authorities
as incriminating evidence admissible against the accused. Thus, to the scrutiny of judicial
state councils throughout the nineteenth century, weapons on their own—something that
had never been accepted within the legal tradition—now increasingly appeared as
incriminating circumstantial evidence against the accused within criminal investigations.
In the majority of these earlier nineteenth-century cases, authorities often
suspected the identities of victims and perpetrators of violent crime. This occurred
because the victims themselves were generally known within their wider communities:
when (and if) their bodies were discovered, members of the wider community, including
responsible elders or vigilant watchmen who knew them or those family members who
actually witnessed the crime, could identify them. 423 Accordingly, in subsequent
investigations, the khedival bureaucracy could rely on the communal identification of
victims in conjunction with an analysis of common weapons, including knives, shotguns,
and the wooden stick (or nabbūt), in order to corroborate eyewitness testimony or other
traditional methods of proof for the commission of a crime (such as confession). 424
Thereby fitting within the established legal tradition, such prospective analysis of deadly
weapons did not generally stand alone as dispositive evidence for the occurrence of a
crime. 425 Instead, nineteenth-century weapon analysis, like later ballistic analysis in the
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twentieth century, primarily served to affirm or to correct truthful or false eyewitness
testimony or other intimations of the identity of victims and their suspected aggressors. 426
Nevertheless, cases emerged in which authorities used forensic evidence of the
effects of weapons on victims’ bodies to speak more assertively to the occurrence of
unnatural acts. In the end, this protracted lineage of cases applying forensic medicine
both reshaped the body of the khedival state’s jurisprudence itself across the nineteenth
century, and also defined a new mode of thinking about admissible evidence and methods
of obtaining truth. 427 The latter would eventually absorb other forms and methods of
obtaining evidence made available during the last decades of the nineteenth century and
the first two decades of the twentieth century.
Paralleling this mode of judicial inquiry, by the 1870s and forward, a budding
scientific community began to take ownership in the production of scientific knowledge
disseminated by studying different types of weapons and their underlying mechanics.
From its outset, the Arab world’s most popular scientific journal at the time, al-Muqtaṭaf,
published annually in Cairo, presented to its Arabic-speaking readers an avalanche of
426

Sydney Smith, Mostly Murder, 117. In addition to his thorough description of ballistic analysis that
shaped the outcome of the famous Sirdar assassination case in Egypt, Sydney Smith also described in his
memoirs other important cases where weapon analysis guided criminal investigations. In one murder case,
Bedouins “found the footprints of a man,” tracing it to the murdered body, “where there were marks on the
ground made by some one [sic] kneeling down,” which led to the discovery of “an empty .303 rifle
cartridge.” Subjecting this cartridge to further analysis, Smith “from the marks of the firing-pin and its
position, the marks of the bolt on the cooper cap, and certain other marks on the cylindrical surface, it was
easy to indicate the particular rifle from which the fatal shot had been fired. I reported accordingly; and the
rifle I had identified as the crime weapon was found to belong to the soldier whose footprints had been
identified by the Bedouin trackers.The soldier was arrested, and, as usual [emphasis added], several other
persons who had been withholding information now began to talk” (117).While Smith claimed a general
untrustworthiness of the witnesses he encountered in Egypt and how his forensic work corrected it, a
tradition of proffered testimony and serious consequences of perjury seems to betray a different story.
Nevertheless, the introduction of non-human elements (i.e., the murder weapon itself) as speaking on
behalf of or against offered testimony certainly shaped the outcome of criminal investigations.
427
See Colin Imber, Ebu’s-Suʿud: The Islamic Legal Tradition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).
See Tal Golan, Laws of Men and Laws of Nature: The History of Scientific Expert Testimony in England
and America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).

157

information on newly-invented weapons as well as the history of already existing ones. 428
In its 1877-1878 volume, for example, the journal answered a pointed question asking
“where and when were the gun (midfaʻ), the shotgun (al-bunduqīya), and gunpowder (albārūd) invented?” 429 By offering a reply as well as publishing several other articles in
this volume on “gunpowder and its effects,” the journal’s editors showcased a voracious
appetite for scientific learning as well as a strong inclination to acknowledge the East’s
contributions to the production of this scientific knowledge. They pointed out, for
example, that in 1850, a Monsieur Barky in front of the French Scientific Society claimed
that “both the gun and the shotgun were already in use in China about 618 B.C.” 430 As
for gunpowder, they acknowledged that there was disagreement (ikhtilāf) as to who
invented it, pointing out one theory that it was originally discovered in India and arrived
in Europe at the hands of the Arabs. 431
As such, standing by to monitor the synthesis of an entrenched khedival forensics
scheme, medical and scientific experts, both foreign and local, comprised a publiclyminded scientific community. As Islamic experts had previously served in sharīʻa courts
to apply their knowledge of science to particular cases, 432 by the 1870s, a burgeoning
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circle of scientists, physicians, and experts dedicated themselves to apply the avalanche
of new science to society, especially to solve problems of crime. The most successful
group in doing this over the span of half of a century was the Cairo Scientific Society
(1898-1951). 433 By the early twentieth century, the Society, established in 1898 for “the
Promotion of Science in Egypt,” met regularly in Qaṣr al-‘Aynī School of Medicine and
took copious minutes on an array of topics ranging from the microscopic study of the
blood and the skin of the chameleon 434 to “some notes on hashish.” 435 The Society’s
conversations eventually filled the volumes of the Cairo Scientific Journal, published
continuously from the 1890s to the middle of the twentieth century. 436
Significantly, leading the Society in its earlier years was also the famous British
chemist Alfred Lucas whose laboratory analysis of ancient pharaonic mummies across
the Nile Valley earned him the title “The Sherlock Holmes of Egypt.” 437 Even so, Lucas
and the Society he led did not constrain their scientific lessons to the past. On January 29,
1914, for example, for its 138th meeting, the Society congregated in Qaṣr al-‘Aynī’s
School of Medicine at 4:30 p.m. to listen to Lucas “read a paper,” illustrated under the
light emanating from trending “magic lantern slides,” on “the use of [the] scientific
method in the elucidation of problems, especially problems in crime.” 438 Indeed, a
socially-minded expert scientific community sprang forth to solve a number of social
problems facing Egypt, not the least of which was crime.
433
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It was only a matter of time before the state adopted this socially-relevant
scientific knowledge for its own aims and applied it within its existing forensics schemas.
As Lucas and Egypt’s scientists continued to probe the nature of objects in Qaṣr al‘Aynī’s laboratories, local authorities would hand them other suspicious objects to test
for marks that could further incriminate or exonerate criminal suspects. Suggesting a
circumspect marriage between science and the law, Lucas subsequently read another
paper at the Society’s 170th meeting on November 8, 1917, entitled “The Chemical
Examination of Firearms and Projectiles as a Means of Obtaining Evidence in Criminal
Cases.” 439 Thus, following a trend of studying weapons that had already existed in
khedival Egypt, before the end of the First World War, Egypt’s scientific community
continued to apply its expert gaze to the pursuit of justice.
Within this milieu of normative scientific inquiry, at the dawn of the twentieth
century, forensic analysis sharpened claims of guilt or innocence made by official
authority. While weapons, such as bullets fired from guns, made contact with bodies of
victims and the clothes they wore, as Sydney Smith put it, “there is nothing medical
about the identification of firearms from an examination of bullets and cartridgecases.” 440 Nevertheless, this particular identification became part of the responsibilities of
the medical expert who was “accustomed to dealing with bullets in relation to wounds,
and because there was no one else to undertake it.” 441 This microscopic inspection of
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victims’ bodies, but also of the weapons used to injure them, was subsequently delegated
to the state’s forensic analysts. 442

Marked by Truth
Illuminating marks on the body as evidence went beyond those left by weapons.
By the time Sydney Smith arrived in Egypt during the First World War to run what he
called “the finest medico-legal installations in the world,” 443 an effective forensic legal
regime had already been established and was in operation across nineteenth-century
khedival Egypt. Within this regime, a new cadre of medical professionals (ḥakīms)
assigned to various police stations across the country regularly performed inquests on the
victims’ bodies and provided written reports affirming what they perceived to be the
identity (sex, age, and other physical descriptions or deformations) of the victim as well
as the surmised causes of death or injury. These written medical reports eventually
became a necessary initial step in police investigations, presented before judicial
councils. 444 Documentary evidence produced within these forensic reports would
subsequently become controlling and controlled within the framework of criminal
adjudication that took place within state councils. 445 The traditional drama surrounding
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eyewitness testimony presented orally, slowly and methodically gave way to this more
systematized, bureaucratized documentary evidence and its analysis.
Accordingly, case files piled up and increasingly contained written inquests
illuminating bodily marks as centerpieces of evidence in criminal cases. Relied on to
uncover the truth underlying death or injury and subsequently to guide khedival
administrators’ determination of criminal defendants’ guilt or innocence, these inquests
would shape criminal adjudication from its earliest stages. Khedival administrators from
early on began to differentiate several stages of criminal adjudication before arriving at a
final verdict. The first stage of this increasingly inquisitorial legal process included an
administrative physician’s examination of the victim’s body, and in some instances, also
the body of the accused. 446 As the cases below aim to shed light, these forensic reports
traveled near and far in the criminal adjudication process across nineteenth-century
khedival Egypt.
Refracted through the eyes of the khedival state’s physicians, marks left on the
body were often allowed to speak for themselves. Presented before khedival authority,
this kind of forensic analysis became evidently admissible, for example, when Egypt’s
High State Council duly heard the fertilizer case that pertained to Muḥammad Ismaāʻīl on
6 Rabīʻ al-Awwal 1279 (September 1, 1862). In this case already visited in the last
chapter, a lower state council that first heard the case subsequently sent (arsala), as
required by law, to the High Council the entire case file (awrāq), including the original
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medical forensic report, along with its preliminary verdict (qarār ḍimn al-ifāda lilḥukm). 447
It was in opening this case file then that the physician affiliated with the local
police station made an inquest on the laboring man’s body (wa lada al-kashf ‘alayhī bimaʻrifat ḥakīm al-qism), to confirm the cause of death. In addition to evaluating the
man’s age to be “around thirty five,” the state physician read “from the signs on his
body” (min al-‘alāmāt allati bi-jismihi) that the cause of the man’s death was in fact,
what was initially reported: the dirt in the store that tragically fell upon him. 448 While the
signs that led to that evaluation were unclear, the forensic report entered the case file
presented before the High State Council, with the physician’s confidence. In accordance
with these signs as well as the testimony of the deceased’s wife, the Council confirmed
the lower council’s verdict that the man’s death was indeed an accident, not caused by a
criminal actor (bi-dūna fiʻl fāʻil). By the time of Ismāʻīl Pasha’s reign, forensic medical
experts and the reports they penned became an intrinsic part of the administrative state’s
search for criminal intent, as they also contributed to establishing a new evidentiary
standard in nineteenth-century Egypt.
In uncovering the actual causes of death, khedival bureaucracy, thus, further
developed the substantive criminal law. For example, further guided by the findings of
the forensic officer, the Council in the case above condemned the village elders for
recklessly keeping the store in such an improper state that eventually caused the man’s
death. Their condemnation was quite emphatic, and formative for the development of
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khedival jurisprudence on criminal negligence (as discussed in Chapter Two). 449 Thus,
within the case file, the medical forensic report by the mid-nineteenth century
significantly contributed to the determination of the actual cause of death that fell on one
of the state’s subjects and cost society at large. In this sense, the signs studied on
subjects’ bodies encapsulated more than the drive of a modern state to discern; the
forensic reports also helped the courts to order society, by controlling subjects that
harbored criminal intent or negligence. By flagging the latter, these marks also prodded a
substantive change in the corpus of khedival law itself.
Consequently, the inspection of injured and deceased bodies quickly became an
official preoccupation. This became evident in 1865 when the naked corpse of one
identified as Ḥammād ‘Alī from Kafr al-Ḥayawān was pulled out of a lake by the
villagers using a rope tied around his neck. 450 The discovered body was immediately
taken to the local police station (al-mudīrīya) in the Nile Delta region of Sharqīya, where
it was inspected by the local physician. The medical professional issued his report
deducing the deceased’s cause of death in the presence of the prefecture of police (nāẓir
al-qism). 451 By reading “the traces left on the victim’s corpse” (al-āthār allati wujidat
bihi), the physician concluded the cause of death came about due to his being struck by a
rock (anna maqtūlan bihā li-nash’at min ḍarb tasawwāhu ilayhi bi-tūb). 452 His report
subsequently sent a shock wave throughout the police investigation turning a suspicious
eye on two of the eyewitnesses who testified that they had last seen the deceased alive
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when he removed his clothes to take a bath in the lake, descending into it and
subsequently drowning (nazala al-tirʻa li-yastaḥāma bihā fa ghariqa fīha). 453
Given the apparent discrepancy between this proffered testimony and the state’s
forensic report, a police agent named Ḥasan Agha went to the home of one of the now
accused witnesses to investigate the matter further. Once there, he found on the floor
stains of blood that dripped all the way along the road to the lake (wajada fīhi min aldamā’ wa fīhi man bil-tarīq al-maḥmūla bil-tirʻa). All of this evidence, including the
medical forensic report, entered the homicide case file that was presented for review
before Egypt’s High Council. With the khedival gaze fixed on the conclusions of the
forensic report, the truth behind the death of Ḥammād ‘Alī was to be determined not only
by the testimony of the living, but also by the marks upon the bodies of the dead.
By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, as the coroner’s report formed a
central piece within the khedival criminal case file, the bodily signs it pointed to had
become more precise. Decoded by the medically-trained mind of a forensic officer (bimaʻrifat ḥakīm al-qism), these signs came to be included in a written report referred to in
Arabic as a “judicial notice” (iʻlām sharʻī). 454 This assertive medical report would come
to serve as a significant signpost within the often jagged road of a criminal investigation,
guiding the judge through the oral testimony presented before the court.
This was indeed the case in 1874 when Egypt’s High Council confronted the oral
testimony of local villagers from Girga (Upper Egypt) who accused ‘Alī ‘Abd al-Mutaʻāl
of intentionally striking a young man named Diyāb al-Shīmī on his head with a stick
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(nabbūt), and causing his immediate death. 455 The deceased’s parents “who sat in a
nearby corner” testified before the Council that “they had seen their son’s hitting” by the
accused. 456 The village elders also testified that they heard it. The latter testimony,
however, would not suffice to prove intentional homicide according to the sharīʻa’s strict
rules of evidence, especially after the defendant confessed that he only mistakenly (not
intentionally) caused the young man’s death.
While both sides passionately presented their arguments before the Council,
however, this adversarial testimony did not stand alone unfiltered by the Council in its
search for truth and its ultimate finding of a guilty verdict. Rather, this oral testimony was
now screened through “a medical examination of the deceased’s corpse” (bil-kashf ‘alā
juththat al-maqtūl bi-maʻrifati ḥakīm al-qism). Delegated to examine the victim’s body
shortly after his death, the state-appointed physician estimated the young man to have
been “around twenty-two years of age” and “discovered upon his body an injury on the
left side of the head whose width and length is about four centimeters [qarārīt].”457 After
precisely measuring the size of the head injury, the forensic officer then concluded with
some certainty that “the intensity of the injury had caused a concussion to the brain and
was a plausible cause of the victim’s death” (wa min shiddati al-iṣāba ḥaṣala irtijājan fī
al-mukhkh wa kān dhālika sababan li-wafātihi ḥayatahu). 458 When it appeared before the
Council, however, the brain injury unequivocally became “the sole cause of the victim’s
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death” (wa kān sababan li-faqd ḥayatihi wa lā ghayrahu). 459 It became clear at this point
that the scope of legal possibilities before the Pasha’s administrative state councils was
now constrained by new evidentiary forms.
This khedival inspection of marked corpses in order to solve crime was animated
by a greater air of confidence. Recognizing certain causes that led to blood discoloration
or to skeletal deformations after death, medical experts began to display this confidence
of their knowledge of corpses. This knowledge subsequently enlivened criminal
investigations. 460 Applying properties of postmortem blood discoloration (hypostasis or
lividity), for example, coroners confidently approximated the deceased’s time of death.
As he noted in his own autobiography, Sydney Smith professed: “Normally the colour [of
post-mortem blood] is at first bluish-pink, afterwards purplish; but in poisoning by
carbon monoxide it is pink, by prussic acid light red, by certain other poisons chocolatecoloured, and in death from burning or cold it may be distinctly red.” 461 Smith would
teach these properties of blood and blood circulation as a professor of forensic medicine
to young medical students in Qaṣr al-‘Aynī School of Medicine in the 1920s. But new
ideas regarding the fundamental properties of blood before and after death—even if
without any scientific merit—had already been in circulation within the Cairene scientific
community since the days of Clot Bey in the early nineteenth century. 462
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Persisting across the Ottoman Empire’s medical schools, 463 these new ideas
would also appear in print distributed within the Arab world’s scientific literary
community since the first issues of al-Muqtaṭaf. 464 In 1877, for example, the editors of
this leading scientific journal published an article entitled “The Discovery of Blood
Circulation” (Iktishāf Dawrat al-Dam) in which they debated whether it was Harvey or
Andreas Vesalius, the Flemish anatomist at the University of Padua, who first discovered
the properties of blood circulation a century earlier. 465 Basic components of the body,
not least of which was human blood, now suffused crime scenes with indicators gleaned
for truth in criminal investigations.
Within this world of new scientific inquiry, deformities left on human remains
long after death became the official key to solve crime mystery before the birth of a new
nation. Marks of violence traced by the state’s agents, however, extended to men and
women’s bodies upon which the state’s own forensic measures left indelible marks. As
confirmed by Sydney Smith, medical experts examined women’s bodies through
“virginity tests” in order to validate or deny accusations of rape or sexual violence. 466
Under British Occupation, where a woman and her body came to symbolize the fledgling
nation, 467 medical experts performed these forensic tests often infused with social and
political meaning under the auspices of a hands-on khedival state, in order to identify
victims (when it was unknown in increasingly unfamiliar urban settings), the cause of
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death (whether accidental or intentional), and profiles of perpetrators (if, in fact, one was
detected). 468 This part-scientific, part-detective, part-socio-political work often entailed a
certain amount of guesswork, but was carried out, and verified, with confidence. 469
Additionally, as truth came to be approximated under the official stamp of forensic
experts, the likelihood of doubt that traditionally impinged on judicial authority could
now be set aside in the name of achieving a reconfigured justice in a reimagined Egyptian
society and nation.
Evaluated for a Guilty Heart
It was a similar assertive confidence to order society that guided the birth of
forensic psychology and its adaptation across the nineteenth century. During the 1800s,
scientific journals particularly in Paris, confronted the hard questions that psychology
posed to lawmakers in achieving criminal justice. 470 One crucial and refined question that
arose with the modern excavation of the inner corners of the human mind was how a
criminal justice system should assign moral responsibility to those who appeared to lack
some mental capacity to appreciate the consequences of their actions.
As French physician Jean Étienne-Jean Georget assertively began his 1826
treatise Discussion Médico-Légale sur La Folie ou Aliénation Mentale, “Ce sujet touche
aux intérêts le plus élevés de la sociéte, la morale et la justice; aux intérês le plus chers
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de l’homme, la vie des citoyens et l’honneur des familles; on ne saurait trop s’en
occupier.” 471 In exploring the liminal space between insanity (la folie) and other forms of
mental disturbance (l’alienation mentale), the French physician was forthright in asking
how the criminal and civil law should treat the mentally ill, but nevertheless exhibited
signs of partial insanity (“la folie partielle ou monomanic”): “Does partial or monomanic
madness destroy the criminality of an action, and take away all responsibility from the
person who committed it?,” he quite forcefully asked. 472 By attempting to answer this
question, a cadre of psychologists began to apply forensic psychology to shed light on
normative-legal questions at the heart of the criminal law. 473 Yet the answers they
provided did not always sit well with lawmakers—the architects of criminal justice. For,
as Georget poignantly put it: “questions que quelques physiologistes on résolues d’une
manière aussi défavorable à l’accusation, qu’injuriese à la morale et alarmante pour la
société.” 474 As such, it became clear that the ability of science to cast doubt on the
lucidity of the human mind would subsequently dull the sharp edge of the criminal law
deployed by the state as a tool to order society.
Nevertheless, it was these gray zones within criminal defendants’ minds that
psychologists working in nineteenth-century Egypt elucidated before judicial authority.
This was the case in December 1843 when police under Mehmed Ali’s rule arrested and
forwarded to a French consular court one of its subjects, Christoph Zambelli, whom they
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accused of killing another foreigner named “Boyagini” by hitting him with a sharp
weapon (khashīr) in a local Cairene pub (khammāra). 475 Pleading not guilty to intentional
homicide before his judges, Zambelli claimed that he did not possess the requisite state of
mind to intentionally kill his victim. Thereafter, two physicians from Cairo’s Civil
Hospital, Dr. Cugini and another, evaluated the defendant’s mind.
In affirming Dr. Cugini’s earlier evaluation, the latter physician presented the
following report as admissible evidence against the accused: “We [Dr. Cugini and I] have
effectively found the illness to be a state of delirium...which the immoderate use of
alcohol exacerbates; therefore, we believe that as much as Mr. Zambelli does not find
himself in a permanent state of mental alienation, he was able to exacerbate his
monomania by way of the immoderate use of alcohol.” 476 Relying on the same medical
categories articulated almost two decades earlier by Georget in Paris, the Cairene
physicians now applied them to their case. Thus, in this case, even if Zambelli was not
deemed capable of intentionally killing his victim, he was, nevertheless, found guilty of
manslaughter—for recklessly worsening his own state of mind through “the immoderate
use of alcohol,” eventually leading him to take the life of another person. 477 And here, as
with numerous other cases adjudicated in Egypt and other jurisdictions during the
nineteenth century, 478 forensic experts whose reports appeared before judicial authority
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contributed to the reshaping of the law of negligence through their participation in the
state’s vigilant search for culpable hearts (as discussed in Chapter Two).
This search into the seemingly perturbed mind would become more regimented
and take on new dimensions by the end of the nineteenth century. As their counterparts
did in France, 479 for example, magistrates sitting on newly-erected Ḥisbīya courts would
evaluate the prodigality of subjects in ruling over their interdiction as part of their
expanded jurisdiction over questions of legal guardianship that had been taken away from
sharīʻa courts. 480 This was the case in 1884, for example, when Ḥisbīya court judges in
Cairo decided to interdict Princess ‘Ayn al-Ḥayāt on account of her overspending (“la
prodigalité de la Princesse Ain-el-Kayat, prodigalité qui a determine en 1884
l’interdiction de la Princesse”). 481 Apparently, the mark of a dangerous mind also
included its “unreasonable” life choices, as the scales of justice had already been erected
in the mind of the legal subject who appeared before the court, as such scales had
similarly been erected within the legal tradition. 482 Moreover, where the court measured
the eventual outcome of these scales, a legal determination came to represent a projected
reality that would determine further legal outcomes. 483 Furthermore, as social Darwinian
thought influenced legal theory, certain socio-legal circles (known as the French School
of Criminology) preached that different social environments inculcated either good or
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bad habits in otherwise autonomous persons subsequently conditioned, if not
predisposed, to commit crime. 484 Accordingly, it was also believed that a more repressive
law could serve as a sharp-edged tool capable of stemming such bad habits in poorly
conditioned individuals and be the panacea to rid society of harmful behavior. 485
Encumbered within this new milieu of social psychology, a criminal defendant’s
mind was subsequently evaluated for signs that indicated a disposition to commit further
crime. Numerous articles published between 1880 and 1900 tackled head on this nexus
between human psychology and crime. For example, alcoholism, its causes, and its
effects on society vis-à-vis the human mind and body came to be a central focus. 486 In
1879, al-Muqtaṭaf published an article analyzing the condition of alcoholism and “the
psychology of the alcoholic,” 487 and in 1881, it subsequently announced that
“Alcoholism Causes Rage and the Perpetration of Crime” [al-sakr musabbib lil-ṣarʻ wa
irtikāb al-jarā’im].488 In 1889, the journal highlighted the link between “Alcoholism and
Crimes” [al-sakr wa al-jarā’im], 489 and published several articles between 1889 and 1894
probing “Insanity’s Causes” [asbāb al-junūn].490 In 1905, the journal looked at the
worrisome phenomenon of “The Spread of Insanity” [intishār al-junūn],491 and in 1911,
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it uncovered the fraught relationship between “Alcoholism and Suicide” [al-sakr wa alintiḥār].492
Nonetheless, much more than the effects of alcoholism on a disturbed criminal
mind came under the forensic microscope. Insanity began to be a focus of forensic
medicine in itself. 493 For example, in 1886, al-Muqtaṭaf examined the relationship
between “Insanity and Crimes” [al-junūn wa al-jarā’im], 494 but throughout the first two
decades of its circulation continuously revisited the various occult signs on the human
body believed at the time to be uniquely correlative with an unusual, even genius, mind.
In 1889, the journal questioned the relationship between “insanity and hair loss” [ma
‘alāqat al-junūn bi-wuqūʻ al-shaʻr], 495 and in 1897, the relationship between “insanity
and the thumb” [al-junūn wa al-ibhām].496 In several other instances, it also attempted to
draw for its audience the stereotypical portrait of the “insane genius,” as in separate
articles published between 1887 and 1900 entitled “Insanity and Intelligence” [al-junūn
wa al-zakā’], 497 which later prefaced links drawn between “crime and intelligence” [aljarīma wa al-‘abqarīya]. 498 In this sense, the physical body came to stand for the human
soul as the latter became a window into crime and its causes.
This branded relationship between insanity and crime, nevertheless, would
redefine the khedival administration of justice in significant ways by the beginning of the
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twentieth century. By 1895, “the care of the insane in Egypt was first placed in British
hands,” as insane asylum administered under a new “Lunacy Department” housed as
many as 440 patients costing the administration £8,000 per annum to treat them. 499
During the First World War at the beginning of which Egypt officially became a British
protectorate, a heightened official concern for those deemed to be insane arose because
“[p]sychologically, the disturbance caused by the war was a deep and widely extended
one, affecting in various degrees all classes of the population.” 500
It was during the War that pellagra, as British sources highlighted, manifested to be the
main cause behind insanity in Egypt. 501 A degenerative mental disease caused by a
nutritional defect, pellagra had also been recently studied by the famous Italian
criminologist Cesare Lombroso and Joseph Goldenberger in relation to criminals within
Italian asylums. 502 Accordingly, by the end of the war, the number of patients admitted
into asylums had risen to 2,075 and the number of “lunacy staff [rose] from 73 [in 1895]
to 582 persons,” costing the administration in 1919 alone £106,000, more than ten-fold
the number it had spent in 1895. 503
However, this drastic rise in mental evaluation was strongly correlated to the aims
of criminal justice: a separate Lunacy Division was created apart from the Ministry of
Public Health; in 1914, this new ministry was housed within the Ministry of the Interior,
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now effectively under British control. 504 British administrators feared that, housed with
those branded as “lunatics,” actual criminals presented a real danger to law and order.
Thus, as the British High Commissioner’s 1920 Annual Report summarized, “During this
period [from 1895-1920] nearly 20,000 lunatics have been treated in the Asylum. 1600
criminals have been examined and reported on to the Tribunals.” 505 As investigated
within numerous case files in the twentieth century, 506 this fine line between insanity and
criminality continued to be magnified for suspected guilt. Egypt’s administration of
justice now scrutinized the criminal defendant’s heart.

BY THE MODEL
Profiled by Words
By the mid-nineteenth century, the khedival state reconfigured the high threshold
for criminal doubt latent within Islamic law to accommodate piecemeal criminal
investigations before khedival authority. According to the traditional jurisprudence, a
theoretical a priori description of the criminal defendant (including hair or eye color,
height, and other distinctive features of the body) was too attenuated for the authorities to
impute criminal guilt. As in Ibn ‘Ābidīn’s textbook example, it was not enough for
eyewitnesses to relay to the court slight physical features of the accused as they caught
glimpses of them near crime scenes. Rather, a posteriori identification of a defendant in
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the act of committing a crime was established as the de jure method of establishing
criminal culpability. 507 Even so, police did not always identify those who had committed
a crime and bring them into custody solely through eyewitness accounts; thus, they had to
rely on other methods to trace suspects from the signs left behind at crime scenes.
Accordingly, when British investigators arrived on the scene at the end of the
nineteenth century, they relied on indispensable local villagers and Bedouins in order to
seek out criminal suspects in Egypt, taking advantage of the expanded form of
inculpatory evidence established by a khedival administrative state. This was precisely
the case in October 1888 when Samuel Evans, the British Inspector of the Egyptian Coast
Guard, relied on the local Bedouin shaykh and other local villagers along the way to
apprehend a camel caravan of suspected salt smugglers in the Western Desert near
Alexandria. 508 Riding on horseback far off in the distance, Evans and his men “observed
a series of dark objects near the south edge of the lake at a point where there is a
considerable quantity of salt.” 509 When they asked a Bedouin shaykh who “accompanied
the party” what he thought was going on in the distance, he informed them that “these
were smugglers.” 510 Following the informant’s lead to follow the suspected caravan,
Bedouins living in tents in the neighborhood also “assured [Evans] that an immense
contraband in salt is carried on at that point.” 511 It became clear at this juncture that the
distance between the observer and the actual site (and actors) of crime became tractably
calculated as if to diminish such distance and the doubt of criminality historically laden
507

Ron Shaham, The Expert Witness in Islamic Courts: Medicine and Crafts in the Service of the Law
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010).
508
Oxford GB165-0038. Ronald Broadhurst Collection. 5 October 1888. Letter.
509
Oxford GB165-0038. Ronald Broadhurst Collection. 5 October 1888. Letter.
510
Oxford GB165-0038. Ronald Broadhurst Collection. 5 October 1888. Letter.
511
Oxford GB165-0038. Ronald Broadhurst Collection. 5 October 1888. Letter.

177

upon it. As Sydney Smith remarked, “Expert trackers developed an extremely fine sense
by which they seemed to visualize an individual from his tracks. They could without
difficulty spot the tracks of different persons they knew, and could tell whether a person
or animal was running or walking whether loaded or free, and so on.” 512 What seemed to
a foreign untrained eye as a vast, undecipherable desert appeared to the local accustomed
eye as a familiar, traceable terrain.
Judicial calculation of admissible criminal evidence went beyond considerations
of the footprints of crime. As early as the 1830s, police records and letters sent to foreign
consulates during the nineteenth century laid out profile sketches of victims, criminal
defendants, and the crime scene traced from the depositions of eyewitnesses, village
elders, and local watchmen, as well as from the forensic reports provided by medical
experts. 513 Basic physical descriptive markers beginning in the 1840s filled case files that
appeared before the state’s judicial councils, including “man” (rajul), “woman” (ḥurma),
“Arab” (‘arab), “foreigner” (ajnabī), “elite” (āghā), “worker/peasant” (fallāḥ or fāʻil in
Ottoman), “non-Muslim” (dhimmī) amongst others. 514 These categories, as much as they
tended to dull individual personalities, still contained certain visual and normative
expectations, and therefore, still colored the various characters and the complicated plots
presented before judicial authority.
Social hierarchy did not need to be spelled out in police stations and police
records: Ottoman and foreign elites persisted in looking down (often physically from

512

Smith, 116.
Ehud R. Toledano, State and Society in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990).
514
Id.
513

178

their horses) upon local peasants, men self-asserted themselves more than women, and
the rich and “respectable” enjoyed more protection against accusations than poorer
subjects. 515 These obstacles to a categorical justice, as we will see later in Chapter Five,
did not tether judicial inquiry and prevent prosecution of the socially privileged across
the nineteenth century. Jean Printz, the Frenchman (“foreigner,” al-ajnabī) we
encountered in Chapter One who assaulted a local peasant girl while on his donkey in
1831, is a case in this point, for the khedive did not gloss over the consequences of his
actions. Still, we must emphasize that the words used to cast the various characters in the
judicial record carried both social meaning and legal significance.
Between 1875 and 1900, however, profile sketches found in the judicial record
became more refined in their close examinations of the scenes and characters of
suspected crime. By the 1860s, case summaries referred to the investigation of “the
physical characteristics” of criminal suspects. For instance, in 1866, administrators noted
in a felony murder case that village elders (shuyūkh) “did not inquire into the physical
characteristics of the accused robbers” (lam yuḥaqqiqū fī ṣifāt al-luṣūṣ). 516 This idea of
“physical characteristics” (ṣifāt al-luṣūṣ) or attributes of a crime scene had not prior been
part of the traditional evidentiary scheme of proving the accused’s guilt, but they now
entered the judicial purview. In 1877, a local police station in the Cairene district of
Azbakiya sent several detectives (mukhbirīn) “to investigate a local grocery store” (lilkashf ‘ala al-dukkān)—the scene of a recently reported theft (sariqa) by one accused
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Greek named Yeni Drustu. 517 There, one of the detectives Ḥassan Ᾱghā conducted a
search of the premises and thoroughly modeled the suspected crime scene as follows: “it
appeared that the store’s door was constructed (murakkab) of five shelves (durraf), and
carried with them new iron latches (tarabīs jadīd min al-iʻtilā’). 518 Creating serious initial
doubt before his superiors as to whether a burglary had taken place, the detective also
brought attention to the fact that “on one of the latches was placed an iron padlock
(kalawun ḥadīd) that remained intact (salīm). Finding no signs [emphasis added] of
breaking and entering (lam wajada ishāra wa la kasr wa la khilāfa), he entered the
store...” 519 It, thus, became clear by the last quarter of the nineteenth century that the
state’s agents—removed in time from a suspected crime—could still confidently
contemplate “signs” of the latter in order to reconstruct past criminal acts in order to
identify guilty suspects.
As signposts within criminal investigations, these physical signifiers pointed to
both people and places implicated in crime and turned their subjects into objects of
judicial inquiry. In 1886, for example, a portrait of Ambroise Bertin, one of the
defendants arrested in the attempted burglary case that opened this chapter, was
contained in his criminal case file, composed of simple adjectives used to mark him in his
Passport (N˚346), issued by “Consulat de France au Caire.” 520 The official document
listed his physical features in order to identify him. Twenty-five years, it marked his age;
165 cm in height; hair, eyes, and beard: all auburn (“chatains”); nose: regular
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(“ordinaire”); mouth: small (“moyenne”); chin: round (“rond”); and face: oval
(“ovale”). 521
By the end of the nineteenth century, the platforms for modelling people living in
or passing through Egypt became passports and identification cards. 522 By the 1890s, a
new “Egyptian Government” passport would similarly catch verbal snapshots. In this
passport, a delineated box labeled “Signalement” appeared soliciting the same physical
characteristics flagged on Bertin’s French document. 523 The khedival passport, however,
also described its subjects in their government’s official tongue: Ottoman. And, thus, in
an adjacent box labeled “Qualities of the Person Carrying this Permit” (evsaf-i hamal
tezkere), it listed: age (sin); height (boy); eyes (göz); nose (burun); eyebrows (kaş); as
well as “special marks” (alamet mahsus dur). 524 While vaguely qualifying the suspected
subject, these physiognomic markers cursively noted by a bureaucrat on official
documentation nevertheless continued to direct police investigations and appeared within
case files into the twentieth century.
Signaling the body of suspected criminals now became a part of routine
investigative police work. Telegraphs sent by police in one locale to another held within
them physical descriptions of those suspected of various crimes. 525 In 1888, for example,
a Montpelier tribunal forwarded to its sister court in Alexandria a warrant for the arrest
(mandat d’arrêt) of one French citizen born Antonin Pierre Macary, but who went by
521
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(dit) Antonin Pierre Muret. Muret had been accused and prosecuted in France for theft
and attempted murder (“incuplé de vol et de tentative d’assassinat”), but he was
“believed to have sought refuge in Alexandria in the home of one of his aunts, the woman
Marguerite Macary” (“croyait refugié à Alexandrie chez une de ses tantes la femme
Marguerite Macary”). 526 Sent out to look for this Frenchman within Egypt’s teeming
European community, the detectives followed a list of discrete words that approximated
Muret on his arrest warrant. In this “Signalement Important,” Montpelier police directed
their counterparts in Egypt to suspect a twenty-six year old man (“26 ans ½”) with
distinct blonde hair (“cheveux blonds clarisemés”) and bald temples (“Tempes
dégarnies”); a light-brown, curly mustache (“Moustache chatain-clair frisée”); broad
shoulders (“Épaules fortes”); shiny, brown eyes (“Yeux noirs et brillants”); a long,
tapered nose (“Nez long effilé”) with dilated nostrils (“Narines dilatées”); an elongated,
skinny face (“Visage maigre, allongé”); and a fair complexion (“Teint blond”). He was
also last identified wearing “a small gray soft felt hat with a dark-colored ribbon” (“coiffé
en dernier lieu d’un petit chapeau en feutre mou gris, avec ruban couleur foncée”).
Indeed, criminal defendants like Macary continued to be depicted, if not caricatured,
perceived in the judicial record through official utterances.
Guilty Hands
By the end of the nineteenth century, even more invasive modeling techniques
used to trace and to detect criminals came within the grasp of the Pasha’s administration.
To the East, in colonial India (Bengal) before 1878, fingerprints pointed towards “the
identification of natives” using a technique claimed by Sir William Herschel while
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employed by the Indian Civil Service. 527 By 1880, this embryonic “exact science” of
studying the “writing upon the skin” caught “the notice of authorities” when British
physician Henry Faulds, working in Japan at the time, suggested in a Nature article “the
utility of finger-impressions in criminal work.” 528 Extolling the new method of
identification, British detective and forensic photographer Oliver Cromwell subsequently
penned Finger-Print Photography (1907) in which he asserted the superior accuracy of
the “British Fingerprinting System” over the contemporaneous technique of the
anthropometric photography (mugshot) system first designed by the controversial French
detective Alphonse Bertillon in the 1880s. 529 Proponents of fingerprinting at this time
pointed to the “outer covering of the skin,” and how it was “thrown into ridges or folds,
with whorls and curves of a very characteristic arrangement.” 530 Based on this
observation, they subsequently concluded: “The bodies of all human beings in every part
are made similarly, but in hardly any case are two identical. From this, it must follow
that a case or imprint or negative of any part must be characteristic for the individual
body that shews it.” 531 Still, even while acknowledging a common “vital energy”
distinctly impressed on this physical differentiation, some of the earliest proponents of
fingerprinting following a path already charted by cultural anthropology, 532 concluded
that “no doubt, as between the Negro and the Caucasian, or between the Caucasian and
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the Malay, the differences of finger-prints, if subtle, would still be characteristic and
identifying.” 533 Accordingly, the state transposed racial theories onto the earliest models
of fingerprinting, calibrating it further as a tool of human identification. According to the
theory at least, a distinct person’s hand in committing a crime could be accurately
modeled, traced, and offered as evidence of guilt before judicial authority.
Doubts over finger-printing’s accuracy existed from the beginning, yet they
hardly hindered its deployment. The method’s earliest champions, notably comprised of
physicians, detectives, and photographers within the Royal Photographic Society of Great
Britain, acknowledged that human fingerprints could closely resemble one another,
casting doubt on identification of a particular criminal. Nevertheless they confidently
asserted that “already it has been proved that the chances are against the duplication in
the human race of a single finger chart.” 534 Brushing aside these doubts concerning
finger-printing, they pointed rather to the benefits that “finger-prints and thumb-prints,
being so very apt to be left by the criminal as marks on the things he has been touching,
form one of the readiest means of proving where he has been.” 535 The Royal
Photographic Society further allayed fears of the miscarriage of justice, fears which
traditionally moved Islamic jurists in their articulation of proof, by “further endeavoring
to restrict the application of the science within the bounds of laws and certainties.” 536 For
example, in his defense of “dermatographs” in criminal investigations, George Gibson,
one RPS member, reminded his readers: “None are more anxious than the sleuth hounds
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of the law to prevent this valuable servant becoming a Frankenstein.” 537 The state’s
sleuths, while aware of the uncertainties hidden within this experimental method of
identification, would grasp the opportunity to have at their disposal another useful tool to
detect criminals and to order society.
Yet, even before this powerful crime detection tool reached the hands of khedival
police to help them further survey and order British-controlled Egypt, Cairo’s scientific
community was already working to measure, and develop the reliable methods of
modelling, the human body. In the same 1878 issue exploring Harvey’s model of human
blood circulation, al-Muqtaṭaf’s prodigious editors also published separate articles on
“Human Hair” (shaʻr al-insān) 538 and another on “The Number of Hairs on the Head”
(‘adad shaʻr al-ra’s). 539 In that same issue, another article “A Breakthrough Light for
Photography” (nūr shadīd lil-taṣwīr) shed light on the most recent advances made in the
revolutionary method of capturing real life, including images of human life, on metal, and
later, on paper. 540
In general, as they did with the telegraph and the telephone, 541 Cairo’s scientists
imbibed the most up-to-date chemical and material advances made to the camera during
the nineteenth century. 542 And because photography was imagined at this time as the
archetype of new scientific techniques of human modelling including fingerprinting (first
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referred to as “fingerprint photography” and later as “evidence photography”), 543 its
mastery seemed to imbue experts with an elevated confidence in the capacities to
accurately measure and model the human body. Moreover, as forgery continued to be
seen as a serious problem into the twentieth century, as several editions of Ahmad Fatḥī
Zaghlūl’s 1895 treatise Forgery of Documents [Risālat al-tazwīr fī al-awrāq] circulated
in Cairo, 544 the scientifically-minded readers sprang to investigate the relationship
between photography and genuine identification. In an 1886 article on “The Art of
Embellishment and Photography” (fann al-tazwīq wa al-taṣwīr), 545 and later, an article on
“New Photography and Uncovering Deception” (al-taṣwīr al-jadīd wa kashf al-ghashsh),
researchers queried these distinctions in the advancement of photography as a method of
deciphering the real from the false, an important distinction that paralleled the state’s
drive to uncover the hidden or underlying causes of crime. 546 In this sense, the science
behind fingerprinting had already left an impression even before the method came to
stain criminal defendants’ rap sheets.
With the establishment of the Criminal Records Department in 1895, a new rap
sheet appeared and sought to measure criminal defendants’ bodies and to take their
fingerprints in police stations. By then, a bilingual Arabic-French form began to
document these minute measurements of the defendant’s body. Referred to as “La Fiche”
(“Sheet”), the form presented a detailed human geography of criminal defendants subject
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to criminal investigations. 547 First, stained in black ink, all of the defendant’s digits on
the right hand (al-yad al-yamīn, “Main droite”), followed by all the digits of the left hand
(al-yad al-shamāl, “Main gauche”) appeared imprinted at the head of the form.
Underneath these general impressions, the unique granularities of criminal defendants’
individual digits of the right hand followed by the left hand also appeared separately
stained and referred to by their formal nomenclature: the thumb (al-ibhām, “Pouce”); the
index finger (al-sabāba, “Index”); the long/middle finger (al-wusṭā; “Médius”); the ring
finger (al-binṣir, “Annulaire”); and finally, the small finger (al-khinṣir; “Auriculaire”). 548
In the same vein of the worded physical descriptions in the last decades of the nineteenth
century, the form also documented measurements of the defendant’s body—including the
head (both length and width), left foot, left arm, and overall height. 549 Thus, applying
recent anthropometric standards and theories undergirding the new forensic method of
fingerprinting, khedival police could now uncover the tell-tale marks left by criminal
hands.
The reliance of police on medico-legal expertise, including the forensics of
fingerprinting, to make their case against criminal defendants became only more
entrenched during the first quarter of the twentieth century. Prior to independence in
1922, while a medico-legal regime may not have “worked hand in glove with the
police” 550 and disproved several criminal accusations made by the police, it nevertheless
also worked to affirm the prosecution and guilt of a newly detectable pool of criminal
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defendants. In 1920, for example, police asked medical experts to confirm a judicial
nexus between “epidermal skin” found in a suspect’s home and the discovered bodies of
a murdered couple. Examining the received skin, Egypt’s burgeoning medico-legal
experts sent back an affirmative response with photographic proof to the newlyestablished Fingerprint Department in the Ministry of Public Security: “the ridge patterns
and details appeared [emphasis added] identical […], and the identity was confirmed.” 551
While still relying on other investigative methods, a new powerful method of proving
guilt became deployable and admissible within the evidentiary toolkit of a khedival
administration of justice keen on affirming defendants’ guilt.
In the Light of Truth
Photography not only paved fingerprinting’s way into the khedival forensic
toolkit; it was also the medium of one of the most groundbreaking tools of criminal
identification available in the early 1900s. Indeed, in addition to the technological
advances made in cameras, the second half of the nineteenth century also witnessed a
mushrooming of theories about crime, criminal behavior, as well as the criminal. 552 One
of the most significant of these theories was that of the the Italian School of Positivist
Criminology, led by the Italian physician and criminologist Cesare Lombroso (18351909). 553 Drawing from Social Darwinian thought, degenerative theory, and
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physiognomy, Lombroso preached that criminal behavior was just an expression of
atavistic human traits inherited, not acquired, by the so-called “the born criminal.” 554
Putting aside questions regarding its scientific claims, 555 Lombroso’s model had a
resounding effect on debates on law and society in the late 1800s, forcing hard questions
upon the traditional view of moral responsibility and criminal punishment. 556 As French
sociologist Henry Clément put it in 1890, “the positivist school [of criminology]
claims… that crime is a kind of secretion, a product of the brain and that, according to
such or such confirmation of the human organism, one is fatally led to commit or, to put
it better, to produce acts of this or that nature.” 557 He then reflected: “With respect to this
task, the first question that concerns us is the responsibility of the guilty agent.” 558 If
criminologists viewed criminals as natural organisms, and their acts as pre-determined by
nature, then why did it punish them at all?
Lombroso’s impressions of the individual within society would immediately
reverberate within Egypt’s scientific and legal circles. 559 This burgeoning community
began to absorb Darwin’s theory of evolution and grappled with the various implications
it would have for society as a whole. 560 On January 5, 1911, for example, two years after
Lombroso’s death, the Cairo Scientific Society listened to British Egyptologist and
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pathologist Dr. A. R. Ferguson present a paper on “Heredity.” 561 Ferguson, who served as
Professor of Pathology and Bacteriology at “the Egyptian Government School of
Medicine” in Cairo, had also specialized in tracing human disease in ancient Egypt, and
had also co-authored a note in that same year in the Journal of Pathology and
Bacteriology on a skin disease he claimed to have uncovered in a twentieth-century
B.C.E. royal mummy. 562 In this case, he was also keen to trace the genealogy of disease
within a modern population; for example, he co-authored another study in 1909 on a form
of hepatic cirrhosis, which he observed to be “endemic in Egypt” and different from “the
ordinary European variety.” 563 Within this new milieu of evolutionary thinking, Ferguson
seemed to share the Society’s serious concern for the inheritance of these diseases across
generations and their expression within modern Egypt. 564 Despite the extraordinary
breadth of Egypt’s past and its numerous diverse ancestors, the dead bodies of these
ancestors bore out the claims of these forensic measures.
The excavation for criminal minds would continue. On March 27, 1913, the
Society gathered again on Thursday in downtown Cairo to hear Greek Judge Mégalos
Caloyanni lay out his theory of crime in a paper entitled “Heredity in Criminology.” 565
An advisor to the recently established Native Court of Appeal, Caloyanni would publish a
study ten years later on the tattoos he searched for and inspected on the bodies of
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convicted criminals—“more than 3,000 criminals, both males and females.” 566 Within
this research, he followed in the footsteps of French anthropologists and criminologists,
including Alexandre Laccassagne who had published a similar medico-legal study on
tattoos in 1881 followed by his treatise Archives d’anthropologie criminelle in 1898. 567
As Anne Clément observed, Caloyanni began his investigation, in the same vein as his
French counterparts, with the goal of “analyzing the semiotics of the criminals’ tattoos, in
deciphering the secret language of these marks, by both making the prisoners’ silent
bodies ‘speak’ and interrogating the subjects themselves with the shrewdness and
circumspection that characterize a police inquiry.” 568 However, while Caloyanni may
have been too sophisticated to accept that a neat line might connect Egypt’s ancient past
to its present, 569 the bullet-point summary of the lecture he gave in 1913 conveyed a
sense of urgency to search the looking glass of the past in order to solve the crimes of the
present. Through the looking glass of the past, the criminal defendant’s “defectiveness”
would be modeled through “the theory of heredity” and its “causes,” all for purpose of
“social defence” and “protection of the young against the principal causes of heredity.” 570
Thus, a new cadre of socio-legal professionals sensed that Egypt’s past diseases, as
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embodied in its criminals, could plague its present unless all the available tools were used
to detect and eradicate such vicissitudes.
Evolutionary ideas not only changed perspectives and set new agendas for crime
prevention, but they also undergirded new policing methods of criminal identification.
The most revolutionary and practical method for the identification of criminal suspects in
the nineteenth century was the photograph, which slowly entered case files as early as the
1860s. Police could usually extract valuable testimony from eyewitnesses by refreshing
their memories: they would flash before them a photograph of a certain suspect. Of
course, the seasoned criminals found ways to change their appearances or their names so
as to avoid detection, while other suspects just looked different on paper than in real life.
Whatever changes the camera’s interacting with light may have produced in depicting
individuals did not, however, prevent police from using the new medium to search for
and to identify criminal suspects. In the eyes of the state, the benefits of photography, like
those of fingerprinting, outweighed the possibility of incorrect identification. 571
Still, it was this doubt of correct identification that led the French police chief
Alphonse Bertillon in the 1880s to devise an entire anthropometric system of modelling
criminal defendants before judicial authority in order to correctly identify them. 572 At the
core of the Bertillonage system was “the judicial photograph” (la photographie
judiciare), or the “mugshot,” which measured criminal defendants’ facial features—both
frontal and lateral—directly on their photographs and admitted these photographs as
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evidence of their correct identification. 573 As Bertillon put in his manifesto on the method
that he invented, La Photographie Judiciaire (1890): “The goal becomes unique and
therefore easy to analyze: to produce the most similar image possible. We will narrow
down the subject more closely by saying: to produce the image that is the easiest to
recognize, the easiest to identify with the original.” 574 From this perspective, the “judicial
photograph” admitted into evidence against the accused, akin to the fingerprint, was not
meant to eliminate all doubt in criminal identification; rather, it was designed as an
approximated model that yet retained a certain measured distance from the original crime
and its perpetrator.
Even with this certain distance, by the 1880s, khedival police began to circulate
photographs of criminal suspects. Naturally, photographs and photographers had colored
Egyptian society for quite some time, not much after they came about in Europe. 575 An
interesting case appeared before Cairo’s French consular court in 1871, in which French
photographer Désiré Ernie was thrown out of a local grocery store after being accused by
local residents of forcibly entering it and taking pictures of them without their
permission. 576 Yet, slowly photographs of defendants, not plaintiffs, along with their
physical descriptions entered their criminal case files as defendants themselves
increasingly became objects of criminal investigations.
Taking another snapshot of the influence of photographs within the khedival
forensic toolbox, in 1887, three photographs of Luivi Stavo, one of the three criminal
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defendants who resided in Egypt and was suspected in a theft case, were pinned to other
paper documents in the case file presented before French consular court in Cairo. 577 Luivi
Stavo’s photograph became an important piece of evidence in the local police’s
investigation of him and the other suspects; this is evident from a report penned by the
Head of the Secret Egyptian Police. Providing the consulate information it had requested
on three defedants, the police chief pointed out that Luivi Stavo’s “real name” (le vrai
nom) was Stavro Telefanopoulo, and he was able to deduce this “because this is the name
with which he signed all of his contracts and a large number of people have noticed that
the person in the attached photograph is identical with Stavro Telefanopolous.” 578 Any
doubt that the person in the photograph was not the actually suspect was hardly
articulated in the police report; rather, a certain confidence in the resemblance between
the perceived model and the truth of the suspect’s identity had already seemed to define
the judicial inquiry before state authority.
By the 1890s, criminal defendants’ photographs entered criminal case files,
admissible inculpatory evidence. As Bertillon was devising his anthropometric scheme,
khedival police were already tracing and identifying suspects using professionally-taken
photographs. As such, in 1891, the case file of Louis Duffour, who was incarcerated in
Cairene Mixed Jurisdictional Prison, included a passionate plea by the defendant for his
innocence, along with a separate file entitled “Photographies du Prévenu” (“The
Accused’s Photographs”). 579 Within this file, included in a smaller envelope sealed in
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red ink, were eleven professionally-taken photographs of Louis. The photographs, all in
black and white, on thick cardboard-box material, depicted the defendant wearing a black
coat, shirt, and tie; in some photographs, he wore a brimmed hat, and in others he did not.
On the back of each photograph, decorative flowers bordered the typed letters that
revealed where the defendant was originally photographed: “A. Gilbert, Photographe,
Caire, Égypte, Esbèkieh.” 580 It became clear then that Louis who had lived his life in
Egypt and was now imprisoned by a khedival administrative state now pleaded for his
freedom, not just through his words, but now also in the light of the camera that captured
him before state authority.
Portraits continued to impress state authority. As photography continued to
flourish, 581 there was indeed some judicial backlash against the taking of photographs—
of all sorts. As Ottoman Judge Nabhānī censured the practice in his short 1906 Treatise
Warning Against Photography and the Taking of Photographs, human portrayal in the
light of the camera, although already extant, also engendered some vehement
resentment—not only as a method of acquiring evidence, but more generally, as a social
medium. 582 Yet, notwithstanding this resistance, the study and practice of anthropometric
modeling tools persisted, as exemplified on April 13, 1911 at a Cairo Scientific Society
meeting where the famous British surveyor J. I. Craig presented his paper entitled “An
Anthropometrical Survey of Egypt.” 583 Fitting the mold of the colonial expert, 584 the
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British surveyor would later tabulate his authoritative “The Census of Egypt,” 585
subsequently influencing younger students of anthropology. 586 The following year, in
1918, the mugshot—emblematic of another “investigative modality”—was taken of
Yusuf al-Balaq wearing his ṭarbūsh in Cairo and admitted by khedival police as evidence
of his guilt. 587 Two years later, realistic drawings of Egypt’s most infamous serial killers,
the sisters Rāya and Sakīna, traced their faces into the annals of history in modern Egypt.
And, thus, on the eve of the birth of an Egyptian nation, criminal defendants could
already be found in the state’s attentive album of crime.
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Chapter Four
Reconfiguring the Presumption of Innocence
“Then there is a prodigious guilt in the country.
Are you afraid to be questioned here?”
– Arthur Miller, The Crucible
CONTRABAND IN A CAFÉ (1899)
On Saturday, April 15, 1899, at around 2 o’clock in the afternoon, ‘Awād alSuqārī, the onbashī on duty, while making his regular rounds in Cairo’s Darb al-Aḥmar,
smelled “ḥashīsh coming out of ‘Alī Qāsim’s café.” As coffeehouses filled Cairo’s
streets by the end of the nineteenth century, police had flagged ‘Alī Qāsim’s
establishment on prior occasions as “a café notorious for the smoking of hashish.” When
he walked into the café, al-Suqārī confronted the café’s waiter, Aḥmad Lūlū, and its
patrons, “sons of Arabs,” (awlād ‘arab), who were in the middle of burning and smoking
ḥashīsh (jūzat ḥashīsh)—a pastime throughout nineteenth-century Egypt that began to be
punished harshly beginning in the 1860s and even more so under British Occupation in
the 1880s. Responding to al-Suqārī’s attempt to seize the contraband, the café’s
customers, along with Ahmad Lūlū, “gathered around him” (tajamharū ‘alayhi), twisted
his arm, and locked him inside the café, closing its doors. Hearing the commotion coming
out of ‘Alī Qāsim’s café, passersby and the neighbors alerted a soldier (‘askarī) on duty
who with their help managed to break into the café and rescue his superior. Upon his
escape from the café, al-Suqārī, as he would later testify, found one of the café’s drawers
open due to the struggles that ensued. In it, he saw contraband, which he seized and
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admitted into evidence at the police station along with Qāsim, Lūlū, and others present in
the café for questioning. 588
Q (S): Did not the onbashi ‘Awad al-Suqārī seize a piece of hashish from you?
[hal lam yuḍbat minka qiṭʻat ḥashīsh ‘Awad al-Suqārī?]
A (J): No. I did not possess ḥashīsh.
[lā’a, ana lam ‘andī ḥashīsh].
Q (S): Were you not burning hashish for your customers today in your café?
[hal lam kunt jārī ḥarq al-ḥashīsh al-yawm bil-qahwa lil-zabāyin?]
A (J): No, this did not happen.
[inna dhālika lam yaḥsul.]
Q (S): Were two pieces of ḥashīsh not previously seized from your café on two prior
occasions and two charges were filed against you?
[hal lamā ḍubiṭa minka sābiqan bi-qiṭʻatayn bil-qahwa wa ‘umila dhālika
maḥḍarayn?]
A (J): In my right, two charges were made against me, and in only one of them was I
charged when one of the witnesses changed his testimony before the court.
[‘umila fī ḥaqqī maḥḍarayn wa ḥukima ‘alayya fī aḥadihim wa dhālika bi-asbāb
al-shāhid alladhī ghayyara aqwalahū amam al-maḥkama.]
Q (S): What was the reason that obliged the onbāshī ‘Awad al-Suqārī to enter your café
and to search within it?
[ma al-sabab alladhī yūjib al-onbāshī ‘Awad al-Suqārī li-dakhl al-qahwa
tuʻalliqukum wa yabḥath fīha?]
588

CADN 1899/5/Ali.

198

A (J): He said ‘I do not know’.
[qāla lam aʻlam.]

The testimony was recorded and read to the defendant, and as he was unable to
read nor write, he affirmed it by stamping.
[kutibat ‘alayhi aqwaluh wa aqarra ‘alayha wa lam yaʻraf al-qirā’a wa al-kitāba
wa khatama]
Established in the 1840s within newly-constructed police stations, the
interrogation, as part of a larger criminal investigation (taḥqīq), made the defendant and
society as a whole in nineteenth-century Egypt more transparent to the eyes of the
khedival state and its agents. The interrogation would transform the earlier, intriguing
methods of acquiring evidence by agents of the Ottoman state into an established fixed
form—one that continued to become more incisive, and by the time of British
Occupation, would acquire its depositional form (sīn wa jīm). What distinguished
nineteenth-century interrogation methods, compared to prior methods of truth finding
within criminal adjudication in Egypt, was not its coercion, but rather, its exacting search
for the truth—a search that made the defendant—her mind, actions, and motives—within
society, more transparent before the eyes of the state than it had been before. By
deploying new legal practices, the state’s police agents, in addition to arresting and
searching the accused, interrogated them, recorded their answers to specific questions
that elicited plot, intentions, and motive, and affirmed their testimony through their own
signatures. These discrete, yet critical transformations from the search for guilt or
innocence within the legal tradition, as it further bureaucratized the administrative state,
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simultaneously flattened and presented the defendant onto a transcript to be read before
and by the state’s administrators. Where the defendant’s alleged actions had been
assessed before the Muslim judge, they now came to be probed in light of their presumed
personalities and past criminal records scrutinized by the administrative state and defined
by its priorities of maintaining public order. The defendant now stood as the object of the
state’s analysis—a state tooled with the forensic tools of forensic medicine, photography,
and fingerprinting discussed in the previous chapter. Ironically, it was this khedival state
that Western-trained eyes like Buccianti imagined as disordered, unscrupulous, even if it
had already exhibited the foundations of power, control, and justice. Nonetheless,
khedival scrutiny would take on a more incisive form—the deposition—under British
Occupation by the last decades of the nineteenth century, as we will see below, and
through this legal instrument, scrutinized the defendant more closely to decipher the
details of the crime.
Through the establishment of the interrogation, as other novel legal instruments,
including identification cards and passports, the identities of Ottoman and foreign
subjects living in Egypt became visible and documented in police letters, application
forms, police logs, but in most detail, within interrogation transcripts that filled the
historical record during the 19th century. By becoming the center stage of the criminal
investigation, the interrogation, from its earlier narrative form under khedival siyāsa to its
depositional form in the era of British Occupation (1882-1914), would come to be written
down in the name of a scientific search for truth, in the same mode that came to define
the writing of history itself in khedival Egypt: a forward-looking, consistent, progressive
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march towards a particular end. 589 In a similar way, the testimony, including confessions
(iqrār) of the accused, eventually adopted this fixed form from a procedure traditionally
performed before the judge in sharīʻa court into an act compelled by the state by its
agents in a more exacting search for truth. Planned, specific, and by written record, the
interrogation made it possible for the khedival state “to read” defendants and society off
of the written transcript.
While the interrogation and its surveillance of subjects became part of the
administration of justice, this chapter argues that this powerful tool, and later, the
courtroom that embodied it, became an extension of the inner works of the khedival
police station (ḍabṭīya), and not a completely alien institution into the Ottoman-Egyptian
legal landscape by the time of British Occupation. While the deposition would come to
define the interrogation within khedival police stations by the time of British Occupation,
the basic form of the interrogation—standing distinctly from within the legal tradition—
was already established within khedival Egypt. Distinguished from the traditional forms
of presenting the defendant before the judge, the establishment of police stations
beginning in the 1840s, changed the mode by which the modern administrative state
incited, listened to, and recorded the information it received in order to prosecute
defendants. Seen accordingly, the transformation of a legal practice of the confession
(iqrār) exemplified by a verbal confession transformed into a written bureaucratized
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report (taqrīr) made before and presented before the state is the transformation that this
chapter aims to chart.

To make this argument, this chapter follows in three sections. The first section
(“Confronting Sharīʻa”) describes the protocols of confrontation between the defendant
and the judge within the legal tradition, namely how defendants traditionally appeared
before the judge but also before the governor, how they orally performed confession, and
how they sat down to receive verdicts within the qāḍī’s court. It is upon these traditional
manner and mannerisms, where discipline and posturing already defined the defendant
that the khedival state intervened in order to shape modern Egypt, and in doing so,
reconfigured the restraints through which the accused appeared and the restraints against
which the accused resisted. Viewed in this light, the second section (“Confronting
Siyāsa”) explores these stages of constraints prior to the interrogation that preceded the
institution of the interrogation established by the khedival administrative state within
newly-established police stations where the social dramas that colored nineteenth-century
life unfolded and within which the defendant stood in both speech and manner differently
than from within the legal tradition. The third section (“Colonial Confrontations”) looks
more closely at defendants’ confrontations with authority in nineteenth-century Egypt
before the formal interrogation: how defendants resisted the state’s compulsion, its
reconfiguration of their bodies and their minds; how the state pushed them into newlyestablished courtrooms, and made them stand before it; and how they were now escorted
into newly-established courtrooms, made to stand and endured cross-examinations that
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placed them in conspicuously different position than they had been scrutinized within the
Islamic legal tradition.
CONFRONTING SHARĪʻA
Questioning Innocence
When the defendant traditionally appeared before the qāḍī, the tradition cloaked
him with certain protections. Such protections within the fiqh allowed him to speak his
own truth. They set a high standard—too high a standard, in fact—as we witnessed in the
previous chapter, regarding evidentiary proof. Where doubt existed as to whether he had
committed the crime in question, the tradition presumed his innocence. Less acquiescent,
the modern state doubted him and immersed him into a scaffolding enveloped in doubt, a
scaffolding that would become the interrogation—a intense back and forth between the
state and the defendant—in a search for truth that seemed too elusive to obtain the truth
of crime.
While the majority of the confrontation before the qāḍī’s court took place
between plaintiffs and defendants, judges still intervened, exhibiting their skepticism.
Yet, there, the questioning exhibited by the qāḍī—compared to the skepticism we will
see exhibited in the nineteenth-century interrogation within police stations—stemmed
from a drive to clarify questions of doctrine, and it was configured less by a drive to
collect facts, whether such facts were relevant or irrelevant to the disposition of legal
questions (who the defendant was, where they lived, how they lived, what they did for
work, the plot and motives to commit crime). Rather, the factual questions underlying
the qāḍī’s court pertained mainly to resolving questions of legal doctrine. For example,
was an injurious weapon (āla jāriḥa) used to qualify for murder, did the theft in question
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take place in the removal of property from a safe place, did the highway robbery take
place on the open road, or were there sufficient eyewitnesses to meet the doctrinal
threshold to hold a defendant guilty? Judges exhibited skepticism, but the scrutiny they
exhibited would pale in comparison to the probing that would take place during the
nineteenth century.
The result of this quasi-interrogation before the qāḍī, if we can call it this,
manifested itself in some instances in written form, called the hüccet. Rudolph Peters
described this Ottoman legal instrument: 590
In practice this meant the following. If a crime was brought to the notice of the
qāḍī, he would investigate the case. If he found that there was sufficient evidence
against a suspect to impose punishment on the strength of the Shariʻa, he would
register the depositions of the witnesses or the confession of the accused and his
judgment that the person deserved to be punished, e.g. for manslaughter or
defamation. Such sentences would conclude with a statement to the effect that the
case is now brought to the attention of the executive for taking the necessary
measures. A document (iʻlām) containing the judgment would then be handed
over to the executive officials to whom the execution of such sentences was
entrusted. If, on the other hand, the qāḍī was of the opinion that the evidence in
the case was not sufficient for a Sharīʻa sentence, but might result in the
imposition of a siyāsa penalty, he would draw up a document (hüccet) containing
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the relevant statements and, without sentencing, hand the case over to the
executive authorities.
It is here that the hüccet may also be seen to resemble the interrogation as it would
eventually take form in police stations during the nineteenth century. However, the
hüccet, and “the relevant statements” made by eye-witnesses recorded within it, does not
appear to approach the īp incisions the interrogation made on the defendant and his
fate. 591 Such incisions struck consistently, repeatedly—answer after question, question
after answer—in order to make the accused divulge truth relevant for the adjudication of
the crime in question. 592 Here, however, it appeared that whatever truth existed in the
hüccet was limited in its scope, 593 and it compelled the defendant to confess to the state
whether she was guilty of the crime, not to prove before the state the entirety of the crime
in question.
Peters described a case that sheds light on the scope of the interrogation as
contained within Ottoman legal practice. The case involved the sexual assault of a young
man by four men in May 1713. As the young man claimed: 594
On the night of the thirteenth day of Rebiʻ ülahir, I left my house to check on our
horse in the village of Balınedik. On the way, the defendants – who are currently
present in the court and the stepbrother of the aforementioned Ibrahim, Ahmed,
who is currently absent – caught me in the vicinity of the village of Aynaç. They
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beat me up, and each and every one of them raped me. I demand that the
defendants be interrogated and what is required according to the holy law be
executed.
The case unfolded: “When questioned, [the accused] all confessed that they went after
and caught the plaintiff at the time and the place that he mentioned. Subsequently,
Mustafa acknowledged that he was the first to rape the plaintiff. Then Hasan, Ibrahım and
Ahmed all confirmed that they too had raped him. Afterwards all four of them stated
three times in the noble court that the other Ahmed, who was absent at the time of the
legal proceeding, also had raped the plaintiff.” 595 Here, Peters points us to the
interrogation, or at least what semblance it may have taken prior to the nineteenth
century. 596 But upon closer examination of what the hüccet presented, the defendants in
this case appear to have been urged to confess—not interrogated—as to whether they
committed the crime in question. Rather, they simply admitted to committing the crime.
What transpired was not a state inquiry into the exact details: no ages, no occupations, no
exact details of what transpired took place, was either collected or presented in the state’s
record of how the accused committed the crime in question. The state compelled the
confession through a series of questions, extracted consistently, incisively as to whether
the defendant committed the crime or not—a series of questions that brought about the
accused’s confession. 597 This begs the larger question as to what extent the Ottoman state
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was also fixated on establishing criminal facts. 598 Or rather, was collecting detailed
criminal facts rather a modern state preoccupation?
As the above case indicated, a certain presumption of innocence appeared to cloak
the defendant before the qāḍī’s court. How protective was this presumption of innocence
before the qāḍī in the historical archives still remains to be discovered; however,
beginning in the nineteenth century as we will see below, this presumption began to shift
gradually towards a presumption of guilt through the institutions that constituted Egypt’s
administrative state and before which defendants now appeared. Not only
bureaucratically, but also physically, this cloak of innocence began to be removed slowly,
affecting the fates of defendants who now stood before the state’s increasing adjudicating
councils. Moreover, as the nineteenth century wore on, the traditional presumption of
innocence began to be treated differently before the khedival state through more incisive
legal instruments, such as the deposition and the cross-examination, which continued to
doubt and scrutinize the defendant in light of the state’s priorities of establishing order
and stability.
Sworn by God
Through the amalgamation of these discrete rules of evidence, thus, Muslim
jurists over the centuries formulated a doctrine of admissible evidence (or shahāda, from
the Arabic root sh-h-d meaning “to see with one’s own eyes”) for proving crimes beyond
a reasonable doubt against the accused. First, the textual Islamic tradition, as Ibn ‘Ābidīn
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illustrated, required oral in-court testimony (not written evidence such as the diary of the
accused saying that he planned to commit the crime himself). 599 This oral testimony had
to take place in front of the judge with one of the following spoken formulas: “I confess
that…” (uqirru an…) for an admission of guilt by the defendant; or “I testify that…”
(ashhadu an) by witnesses to the crime in question, admissions whose transformations
will be discussed further in the next chapter. 600 Orally-proffered testimony may be
transferred in documentary form, but only if the documentary evidence could itself be
authenticated by its own witnesses in front of the judge receiving the evidence—a
practice referred to, literally, as “eye-witnessing on eye-witnessing” (shahāda ‘alā alshahāda). Within the sharīʻa’s adversarial system of criminal adjudication (where a
plaintiff had to bring forth and prove a claim against a defendant), if this orality
requirement was not met, the judge would also be required to rule on a verdict. He would
rule for the plaintiff if the defendant refused to take an oath of innocence (nukūl). And he
would have to rule for the defendant in the absence of valid eyewitness testimony
presented before his court, damning the accused. Therefore, because of this in-court
orality requirement, the doctrine of evidence within Islamic law strictly prohibited
documentary evidence (if it was not authenticated by its own eyewitnesses) presented
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against the accused, as well as hearsay evidence, in general, such as dying declarations
made by homicide victims.
An oral performance took place before the qāḍī, and it was through this oral
performance that the confession generally took place. While such orality continued to
play an important role in oaths, which continued to be performed in the qāḍī’s court,
including the practice of compurgation (qasāma), this orality would gradually shift
towards a written practice in which the defendant along with other witnesses signed their
names after the police recorded their interrogations verbatim or nearly verbatim in the
case file. This transformation from an oral performance of the confession as idealized
within the legal tradition, 601 and in the context of the qāḍī’s court to a practice of
interrogating witnesses, subsequently brought about a new mode of analysis of the
utterances made by the defendant. The defendant’s utterances through their analysis of
the written text now became admissible into evidence throughout the nineteenth century,
whereas previously the simple oral act of a confession was both necessary and sufficient
to bring about the required analysis before the court.
Traditionally, the orality of the confession within the legal tradition belonged
within and to the local culture and community. As Lawrence Rosen and Leslie Peirce
have already shed light within local communities in Morocco and in Syria, the local
community persisted to play a critical role in molding the confession in sharīʻa courts; 602
the confession, and the entire adjudicative process for that matter, was fixed into the local
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culture, animated by its local communities and the characters, their reputations, their
criminal records, and their stories prior to the nineteenth century, as they continued to
play a defining role during the nineteenth century. It is here within the local communities,
as we saw in Chapter One, that the so-called agency of Egypt’s subjects became both
audible and visible onto the state’s record. For Egypt’s local subjects did not shy away
from being heard even if their voices became increasingly deafened by the state’s
questions—questions that aimed to keep the voices of the oppressed low, to keep them in
fear of the question before they could provide its answer, and at the same time, to insist
on an answer. Nevertheless, the accused still confronted the state, raised their voices and
made the state hear them and see their petitions, and, as we will encounter below, also see
their signature, as the signature came to represent the individual within society, shifting
the legal landscape onto a written platform that the khedival state efficiently designed for
its own adjudication of crime.
In addition to this important transformation in the textuality of confessions, the
most important shift occurred in that the confession, whereas in the tradition it had been
directed towards the qāḍī in his court, by the end of the nineteenth century, it became
unequivocally directed towards the state and its agents. In this sense, the confession
became another tool in the state’s toolbox of classifying and categorizing the defendant,
making him an object of the state’s scrutinizing gaze. The voluntariness of the
confession, as textually preserved, at least, had to be placed aside for the purpose of
meeting the state’s priority of achieving public order; and where the defendant’s
reluctance to confess to crime prevailed, the khedival state’s agents, as we will see,
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confronted the defendant with sets of questions that were aimed to piece together the plot
of crime, if not also to compel the defendant to confess his or her guilt.
Seated Adversely
In observing the qāḍī’s court, we see a considerable difference from what would
come to transpire in the nineteenth-century courtroom. This shift was physical as much as
it was figurative, as posture became a nineteenth-century preoccupation of the state as it
had already been in the tradition. Whereas posture mattered in the tradition in prayer and
rituals, it became a preoccupation also for jurists in relation to the way the judge would
become seated before the litigants. Normally, this took place in the qādi’s house or in the
mosque where litigants appeared to what was previously known as a qādi’s court.
Outside of the qāḍī’s court, defendants also appeared before the Sultan, and there they
appeared standing or rather under the adjudicator. In this sense, the move from being
seated to standing was not entirely unknown; however, the protocols of the courtroom
that would come to take place in the nineteenth century would move this transformation
to a different space and procedure. Posture, as we will see, in a Foucauldian sense,
became determinative of how the defendant came to see and be seen before the judge, but
how she came to be seen before the law itself.
Ottoman legal records suggest in subtle ways the manner by which the defendant
appeared before the court. As in the case discussed above, defendants would be
questioned by the adjudicator regarding the truth of the crimes they were accused of
committing, and they would respond. The suggestion is that the defendants appeared
standing, coming forward before the adjudicator, although this is not entirely evidenced
from the court records. Even if this were the case, something happened to the posture of
211

the accused during the nineteenth century that appears to have reconfigured their
presumption of innocence. Where they had appeared seated on the same level as the
plaintiff before the judge, their standing within the nineteenth-century theater of justice
was modeled after a French system of justice in which the guilt of the accused was
presumed over their innocence. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the
traditionally-ingrained presumption of innocence would gradually morph, rather, into a
presumption of guilt. The interrogation, as we will see below, became one of the
instruments by which this presumption of guilt continued to be assessed upon defendants,
questioning their innocence, labeling them, quietly changing their disposition as it had
appeared before the qāḍī’s courtroom. This was a layered change. Their questioning in
light of the state’s objective search brought about changes not only in the utterances
spoken by defendants before the state, but they also made configurations in how
defendants appeared before the state in the image of the state’s priorities.
The configuration of defendants before the state, as we explored in Chapter Three,
had already begun to take a new presentation in forensics, but during the nineteenth
century, a physical, not only a representational, shift took place in the presentation of the
defendant before authority. What we begin to see during the nineteenth century is that the
defendant now stood before the law, not before legal tradition as embodied in the qāḍī’s
court, both in configuration as well as disposition, in a newly-constructed courtroom with
booths where defendants stood. This reconfiguration in the physicality of the law,
represents an important shift, from a configuration where the defendant had been seated
adversely across from the plaintiff in an arbitrative style adjudicated before the judge. It
is within this new structure—the courtroom—and the legal dialogues that came to
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animate it—that the defendant’s presumption of innocence also came to be reconfigured
from what it had been idealized within fiqh. This modern shift in posture during the
nineteenth century, another shift that transformed modern law in Egypt, was also
important in reshaping the contours of law in practice.
CONFRONTING SIYĀSA
Constrained Arrests
The method of interrogation in khedival Egypt emerged in the setting of
increasing restraints placed on the accused. It was within newly built police stations
(ḍabṭīyāt) that state power became instituted, but it was within these vessels of power that
the defendant stood to be probed by the state. His name, family name (laqab), place of
origin, occupation, physical characteristics, introduced the state’s narrative—a narrative
that, nevertheless, began in violence. Indeed, the interrogation began with the defendant
first restrained by the state. As Mehmed Ali lost control over Greater Syria in 1839 when
British and Ottoman forces thwarted his imperial ambitions, a fledgling khedival
bureaucracy turned inwards, directing the imperial powers of the state towards local
governance. This new focus included a reorganization of land tenure laws, an increase in
state-monopolized manufacturing, and the proliferation of state councils and police
stations within varied Egypt’s governorates. 603 It was also, quite immediately, achieved
through a deployment of foot patrols (ṭawf) and soldiers (‘asākir) who joined watchmen
(ghafīrs, nāẓirs), local elders (shuyūkh al-ḥāra), spies (baṣṣaṣīn), and market inspectors
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(muḥtasibs). 604 By 1838, almost two decades after the creation of his new army, the wālī
established a new police force (ḍubbāṭ) that pervaded Egypt’s governorates. This new
police force ran police stations (ḍabṭīyāt, or mudīriyāt in the major cities), and whose
police invigorated the state’s search of “every nook and cranny of the social order.” 605 By
the 1870s, khedival police (al-būlīs) through the eyes of Egypt’s subjects, already
represented the Pasha’s power and authority. 606 Primary among the duties of the new
police force was the arrest of those who disrupted the social order, as articulated in
various criminal codes and decrees (first, Qānūn al-Muntakhabāt in the 1830s).
Prior to that point, the summoning of defendants had mainly been a prerogative of
the heirs of the victim, the community, and designated officials. Sent by his superior
(bash rasūl), a messenger (rasūl) brought the accused before the qāḍī’s court, receiving
one or two piasters for doing so and giving half of that to his superior. 607 When infantry
soldiers (janissaries) facilitated the process, they often deployed force to arrest the
accused. 608 After Mehmed Ali reorganized the khiṭaṭ and the existing surveillance
system, defendants came to be arrested by police and brought first to a place called the
caracoal (qaraqūl), where they remained detained and awaited transfer to the police
station or one of the state’s majālis. 609 At other times, soldiers (ḍubbāṭ) escorted the
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accused directly to police stations (dabitkhaneh, ḍabtīya or mudīrīya in the major
cities). 610 In either case, defendants found themselves confronting the state before
criminal adjudication, where they ordinarily confronted the individual plaintiff or the
community that brought them to justice. They now confronted the state at every stage of
the adjudication.
As early as the 1820s, binding had become a state policy in presenting the
accused before authority. Along with slaves removed from their homes and sold in
Ottoman slave markets or forcibly conscripted into the Pasha’s army, fugitive soldiers
who tried to escape the army—if and when they tried to escape—met the state’s
shackles. 611 The phrase ḍabṭ wa rabṭ (“arresting and tying”) entered the historical record
as a policy by which to apprehend criminal suspects. On June 14, 1821 (Ramadan 13,
1236), for example, when Mehmed Ali’s army chased Wahhābī partisans on horseback in
the Najd, and after the killing of “one hundred and eighty culprits (ashqiya),” six
defendants arrived in Egypt restrained (ilā janāb miṣr muqqayyadīn) so that they may be
brought to justice there. 612 The “taking and arresting” (akdh wa ḍabṭ) of criminals would
continue to be used through the 1850s, and this is how defendants arrived at police
stations. 613 In 1846, a café owner and his assistant (huwa wa ṣāhibuhu) were said to have
“verbally abused the sentries” (taṭāwalū ‘alā al-ṭawf) who then arrested them and brought
them to the police station (qarāqūl or caracoal). 614 Here, the state’s siyāsa-based
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approach to apprehension and arrest developed to tie defendants physically to the state
and its objectives of keeping order.
As Mehmed Ali encouraged European immigration and economic investment,
immigration into Egypt grew. The building of the Maḥmudīya Canal brought water and
life to Alexandria and converted the city into a cosmopolitan center where migrants
arrived looking for better living and economic opportunities. During the 1860s, the boom
in cotton during the U.S. Civil War brought migrants from Europe and the Middle East to
Egypt. There, they filled positions from overseers to entrepreneurs, and from lawyers to
judges who heard numerous criminal cases in consular courts in major cities. 615 Along
with an increasing foreign presence throughout Egypt’s governorates, new senses and
sensibilities influenced dress, social mores, as well as different notions of what was
deemed to be ethical or harmful conduct. 616 Whether a person was “dressed like a
European” (lābis ajnabī) or whether they wore the bey’s ṭarbūsh or the peasant’s libda
and zaʻbūt, or whether they carried firearms or not, factored into the state’s evaluation of
a defendant’s guilt or innocence. 617 By the end of the century, police logs and court
records listed stolen items of clothing, suggesting the value of what it meant to look
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foreign. 618 By the end of the century, in addition to dress, demeanor, and language,
accents spoken by defendants also identified their social status, suggesting to authority
whether or not defendants would be disposed to committing crime. 619 In dressing the part
and speaking a foreign language in order to fit within a certain social class, the guilty
could deviously cover themselves with a certain presumption of innocence—given the
associations made with certain external attributes and innocence. This is not to say that
legal authorities were easily fooled with these attempts to disguise, but given that
adjudication began as early on as the police station, and that the verbatim police record
factored into the adjudication within the National Courts system, whatever word, phrase,
impression, or gesture made by defendants and carried with it guilt or innocence before
police, now entered the legal record and carried its own presumptions of guilt or
innocence. 620 Moreover, although a growing middle class began to have access to these
clothes, the local continued to appear before the state dressed in traditional garb, until at
least the 1860s. Nevertheless, by the dawn of a new century, Egypt’s defendants could
become transmogrified before the state, redressed in an increasingly more cosmopolitan
society (see Chapter Five).
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The way the accused stood, that is, their posture, also shaped courts’ perceptions
of their guilt or innocence. As David Yosifon and Peter N. Stearns remarked about
posture in the American context, “Unquestionably, modern posture history provides
another important chapter concerning the roles of discipline in nineteenth-century
life.” 621 As notions of disciplinary posture and discipline within judicial procedure,
referred to as the protocols of the judge, ādāb al-qāḍī, 622 the aim of controlling Egypt
engendered new notions regarding the way soldiers should stand in the army, 623 the way
students should sit in classrooms, 624 or how one should comport oneself in public
spaces. 625 While posture had been a matter of concern for prayer and with regard to how
parties sat down facing the qāḍī in court, posture simultaneously became object of social
scrutiny and opprobrium.
Along with this increased immigration, conflicts between authority and
defendants spawned. Such confrontations became a ubiquitous part of everyday life of
ordinary individuals living in Egypt who confronted their state, as this state increasingly
came to see them, quite physically through criminal records, fingerprints, and eventually
in photographs (“The Resemblance Form”). Yet, through seeking justice from the state
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that criminal defendants wrestled or at least attempted to wrestle away from the state’s
firm grip over them.
(Un)restricted Searches
By mid-century, the khedival state continued to probe. The search was now more
pointed, deliberate, and contained within a particular space and time, aimed to achieve
dominion over Egyptian society, to manipulate it to achieve its own ends. In doing so, the
state, nevertheless, changed the law of searches to allow for greater introspection of
people and inspection of places. Through its agents, the state began to impose frequent
curfews, as well as licenses required to run businesses that bore on public health and
hygiene, businesses that included tanneries, factories, local pubs, brothels, and
coffeehouses. Such scrutiny extended also to animals essential to the functioning of the
administrative state and the civilian army. In this sense, the drive to establish order
entailed seeking out and removing useless actors (and animals), 626 which no longer fit the
aims of efficiency and productivity set by an expanding bureaucracy determined to
achieve them. By the end 1890s, state-appointed veterinarians regularly performed
checks on the government’s official horses, and issued official report devaluating animals
“considered unfit for service.” 627 This happened to a certain nine-year-old Alexandrian
grey horse, standing 14-and-half feet tall, and branded No. 36. Although No. 36 had
served in the Alexandrian police for five years, since he was four, he was diagnosed by
an official veterinarian with “Chronic Rheumatinue,” a degenerative disease causing
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irreversible joint damage in horses, like chronic rheumatoid arthritis does in humans.
Experiencing this disease’s symptoms—including pain, swelling, stiffness, and loss of
physical function in the wrists, knees, and hoofs, No. 36 was fired, marked in his report
card as “unfit for service,” thereby leading the Inspector General to get rid of him
accordingly: “Sale of this horse approved.” Far different from the intimate, symbiotic
relationship between animals and local communities of the 18th century, the case of No.
36—his firing and selling off due to his unfavorable diagnosis—reflected not just a new
approach to the employment of animals for government service.
While the inspection of the marketplace continued to be a priority of the market
inspector (muḥtasib), police agents searched public spaces and meted out punishment
within them more severely than in others. Fueled by the state’s monopolization of
industry during the first half of the century, the inspection of factories became a priority
as maintaining their proper regulation was what affected the yields that the state was able
to reap. 628 Inspections by the muḥtasib until the office’s demise in the 1840s ordinarily
involved what was apparent to the public agent’s eyes and ears through his directly
witnessing within the community. In this sense, searches were allowed, but limited in
their scope, for they did not ordinarily involve a probing search for violations. 629 Given
the right of privacy protected within the tradition, inspections into homes and bodies
continued to be measured by standards found within the tradition. While the Ottoman
governor’s ability to override the legal tradition’s sanctity of the home continued until the
eighteenth century, searches of dwellings, coffeehouses, and bathhouses did not require
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such a close nexus to the occurrence of crime. 630 Rather, public officials, including
soldiers, village elders, and the newly-dressed police officers, regularly rushed into public
and private spaces, after hearing of an injury or a death in a given locale. It was in these
instances that they found both victims and witnesses within the crime scene.
By the 1840s, searches by khedival agents in public spaces for the purpose of
investigating purported crime became more frequent and regular. On March 23, 1840, for
example, British diplomats, representing the recently crowned Queen Victoria, sent a
bold petition to “His Excellency Abbas Pasha” (1813–1854, r. 1849-1854), Mehmed
Ali’s grandson, the governor of Cairo, but who would become the ruler of Egypt after his
grandfather died. Officially translated from English to Ottoman Turkish, the letter
opened dramatically as follows: “About half past four o’clock yesterday, we the
undersigned were in our house when an Arab followed by three others rushed into the
room in which we were seated and begged us to go to the assistance of our servant who
he said was being murdered in an adjoining bath.” Rushing into the nearby bath, the
petitioners found their servant “struggling in the hand [sic] of several men,” and when
they “proceeded to rescue him,” the main assailant ran out of the bath. Following him in
order to “take him into custody,” the petitioners claimed that they nevertheless met
stubborn resistance directly in front of the guard house from soldiers who “commenced a
most barbarous attack” upon some of them: “pushing violently and striking us on the
head and face with their shoe, whilst others presented their bayonets to our breasts.”
Dragging them into the guard house, the petitioners further claimed, that the soldiers
persisted “to strike and insult us” in the “most unnecessary manner [which led to] the
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Janissary [army officer] having to employ force to make them cease.” Ironically, the
soldiers whom the petitioners initially looked to for help in regard to the assault against
their servant were now the defendants in an assault case “communicated to his
Excellency Abbas Pasha for the ends of justice.” Receiving their letter, then, must have
put Abbas Pasha in an embarrassing position, as his own men were now being accused of
such a “barbarous attack” against members of a foreign community living within his
domain. It was then that Abbas responded with his own translated sealed letter to
Queen’s Vice Counsel, Alfred S. Walne, Esq. dated 3 April, but accusing only one
soldier of potential wrongdoing: “I forthwith ordered an Inquiry to be made into the case
at the Dīwān, from which it results that the soldier of the guard houses alluded to, had
really insulted the said two Englishmen and consequently deserves punishment.” 631 It
was expected then that the Pasha would not only investigate the wrongdoing purportedly
committed by his men, but that he held the right to punish them and to hand down justice.
Nevertheless, the policy to scrutinize public spaces, such as factories, businesses,
and places of worship, would meet strong resistance. Even as Egypt’s leading legal and
political thinkers translated and penned new ideas of freedom from power and control in
legal and political treatises, 632 resistance to such a policy took on a symbolic social
meaning. For example, on May 3, 1872 (24 Safar 24, 1289), three defendants walked into
a butcher’s shop in downtown Cairo and assaulted its two butchers, Yūsuf ‘Afīfī and
Darwīsh Muṣṭafā. The defendants, who destroyed the shop’s inventory, were also
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accused of “tearing off the buttons of the policeman’s uniform” (iqtaṣṣū rummānat alqarāqūl) that belonged to Ibrāhīm Jabr, the guard on duty, who stepped in to stop them
when he saw the havoc they had wreaked. 633 Becoming a physical extension of the
khedive himself, the police now asserted a certain presence within this society. Standing
in as symbols of public order, khedival police confidently entered social spaces and
businesses to investigate potential crime by the 1850s. In doing so, they exuded the
state’s power, and thus, any assault on them or on their uniform represented an affront on
the executive’s authority itself. And thus, included within the litany of egregious acts for
which the defendants should be prosecuted, was how the police uniform became a
symbol of public order and authority.
The proliferation of scrutiny in public spaces in search for misconduct,
nevertheless, met resistance and the limits of state power and authority. While a concept
of constitutional freedom from authority came to be articulated in the political treatises of
the Nahda at the end of the 19th century, including works of Rifā‘a Badawī Rāfi‘ alṬahṭawī (1801-73), Khayr al-Dīn al-Tūnisī (1820/30-1890), and Faraḥ Anṭūn (18741922), 634 the cases explained in this chapter portray this persistent resistance by
defendants meanwhile and even previous to when ideas on freedom were penned in
Arabic. The often tense battles between defendants and authority shed light on how the
embryonic concept of freedom from authority was perceived and adopted in khedival
Egypt. Connected together, these cases demonstrate a legal precedent regarding the
state’s relationship to its subjects, and more specifically, how the relationship between
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defendants and legal authority came to be perceived and negotiated during a time in
which new ideas and institutions that buttressed them came to redefine the political and
legal order.
Instantiating this precedent, around 1 o’clock in the morning of July 6, 1879
(Rajab 16, 1296), the Cairene policeman on duty, Sarḥān ‘Abduh, found a man named
Aḥmad ‘Alī standing in front of ‘Ābidīn Mosque, cursing everyone, those in the mosque
as well as passersby (wāqif amām masjid al-shaykh ‘Abduh jārī al-shatīma fī al-khalq
alladhīna bil-masjid wa al-mārrīna bil-ṭarīq). When ‘Abduh tried to stop ‘Alī from what
he was doing, the latter then “directed his curses to the policeman and then assaulted him
on his face with the palm of his hand, causing his tarbush to fall to the ground” (taṭāwala
‘alayhi al-shatīma thumma ḍarabahu kaffahu ‘alā wajhihi wa alqā ṭarbūshahu ‘alā alarḍ). The assault, which occurred in the presence of another of the khedive’s men, took
place within the crowd of passersby. They then gathered around this altercation, leading
to the arrest of the accused ‘Alī in order to bring him to the neighboring police station in
the morning. In the police station, both the accused and the policeman were questioned as
to what had happened earlier in the morning. Rejecting, trying to refute the charges
leveled against him, ‘Alī claimed that he himself was inside the mosque within the
mosque and denied that he had ever assaulted ‘Abduh, the mid-ranking officer (or jāwīsh,
or çavuş in Turkish) on duty. The latter countered by reasserting his story against the
accused: that he had found him around 1 o’clock in the morning in front of the mosque,
cursing everyone in sight and denouncing the police’s authority over him, where he then
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“tried to overpower them physically” (taṭāwala ‘alayhim muṭāwalat jismihi). 635 Indeed,
as public spaces continued to be scrutinized, local subjects resisted such scrutiny—both
verbally and physically—as the number of spaces increased before authority.
The French government continued to extend protections to foreigners and their
homes from investigations of crime. The authorities first had to obtain permission from a
foreign defendants’ consulate; without this permission, evidence acquired would be
inadmissible against them. In 1881, when Tunisia became an official French protectorate,
the French government cloaked its subjects with blanket of protection. In March 1887,
for example, Rihan ben Ahmed, a Tunisian subject, moved to Egypt from the Hejaz,
brought a case in French criminal consular court against three police officers and a
private citizen for a warrantless intrusion of his home in violation of his rights as a
protected French subject. 636 Quite commonly, French subjects brought forth cases against
police for trespass of their homes. 637 The prefecture of police responded in a letter to the
French consulate defending his men’s actions against the plaintiff, Rihan. 638 The letter
began as follows: “It is my duty to present to your Excellency the truth regarding the
history of this person.” 639 Not referring to him by name, and never by title, the head of
police went on to explain how the plaintiff first travelled from the Hejaz to Qena (Upper
Egypt) “where he wished to practice medicine” (arāda istiʻmāl al-ṭibb fīhā). 640 The study
and practice of medicine in Egypt had, since the days of Mehmed Ali, been regulated by
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the state, 641 and this meant he would need to provide proof of proper medical education
and expertise, as was now required by state authorities. As Rihan did not satisfy the
state’s required certification to practice medicine in Egypt, when “the state heard news of
him [pretending to practice medicine], it took the required measures vis-à-vis the French
consulate’s agent to prevent him from partaking in this endeavor.” 642 Unable to make a
living in Qena, Rihan went farther north to Aṣyūt and continued to practice medicine. By
coincidence (bil-ṣudfa), he happened to live next to the village woman doctor (ḥakīmat
al-bandar), as women were by this time also educated in Egypt’s remodeled medical
schools. 643 Fearing competition with her own practice, this unnamed woman doctor along
with her husband, Amīn Effendi, informed the village chief physician (ḥakīm bāshā) of
the plaintiff’s quackery (dajal) in their village. The chief physician then reported on
March 10, 1887, that Tunisian migrant had been engaging in quackery and had been
giving out drugs to cure illness in the village, harming its families.
As Rihan ben Ahmed contre La Police Egyptienne further exemplified, turn-ofthe-century Egyptian bureaucracy continued to depend on local actors and informants. In
charge of monitoring activities for wrongdoing, and also responsible for seeking out and
punishing accused criminals in their familiar communities, local actors, including the
village elders (‘umdahs) reinforced the day-to-day work of a police force. While this new
police force predominated in the urban centers, the entrenched ghafīr system became
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quite material to the functioning of society that British officials preserved it, even in the
face of serious complaints by liberal voices. 644 Knowing the importance of the ghafīr
system in maintaining order and stability, a burgeoning legal intelligentsia, including
Nubar Pasha (1825-1899), successfully stood against British expert opinion to reform that
system. 645 Even while uniformed police agents continued to fill the growing urban
centers of Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez, 646 under the aegis of a restructured Ministry of
the Interior controlled by Lord Cromer, 647 Abbas Hilmi II (r. 1892-1914) continued to
keep Egypt’s traditional surveillance system intact by issuing “Réglement Sur Les
Omdehs et Cheikhs de village, Projet de Décret Sur Les Omdehs et Cheikhs de
village.” 648 This law spelled out their obligations and prerogatives, as well as legitimized
them. It prescribed how village elders would be elected: “The Omdeh must watch over
the maintenance of the public order” (“l’Omdeh doit veiller au maintien de l’ordre
public”). 649 In turn, the Ministry of Justice, which monitored officials’ impropriety,
declared: “The omdehs must be under the surveillance of the Ministry of Justice” (“Les
omdehs tiendrant sous la surveillance du Ministère de Justice”). 650 Thus, a new structure
reorganizing local actors responsible for punishment came into existence, all the while
still maintaining these original actors’ authority within their communities.
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Recorded Interrogations
Before the ḍabṭīya, the accused underwent a rigorous interrogation—questions
and answers (as’ila wā ajwiba)—as part of a comprehensive criminal investigation
(taḥqīq). By 1898, the police stapled a one-page standardized form was required to be
attached to the verbatim handwritten record of the interrogation of suspects and
eyewitnesses involved in the investigated crime, a record that could span as many as
twenty pages in length. Still yet, prior to creation and implementation of this standardized
form, and along with the meticulous record of the ḍabṭīya, the police vigorously
questioned suspects and witnesses, documenting in detail utterances, denials, and
confessions in letters and case summaries penned by professional scribes and sent to state
councils for adjudication. The formulae used in the penned registers evinced a certain
deductive logic: “after the questions and answers of the suspects” (baʻd al-as’ila wa alajwiba) or “and thereby followed the investigation and the interrogation” (wa ṣāra altaḥqīq wa al-as’ila wa al-ajwiba). With the urgent task to resolve inconsistencies, the
state’s agents aimed to present the interrogation as a deductive search for truth.
Prior to this deductive logic, centralization defined the collection and recording of
testimony. By the 1840s, the khedival state created a governmental log referred to as the
jurnāl, which became a central repository of the daily information collected by state
agents. Becoming one of the main sources of facts used for criminal adjudication, the
jurnāl became in this sense a precursor to the daily record of crimes that Al-Ahrām had
begun to publish by the 1920s. Still, while the jurnāl recorded answers to specific
questions asked of defendants and witnesses (as’ila wa ajwiba), it did so through
narrative form akin to the orality that took place before the qāḍī’s court. Through this
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narrative, the record exhibited an inquisitorial mode whereby the exact utterances of the
accused in responding to specific questions asked of them had been written down and
seen by the khedival state’s adjudicative scheme.
By mid-century, the jurnāl became a central repository for collecting and ironing
out inconsistencies in testimony. For example, on September 19, 1847, al-Jamʻīya alḤaqqanīya, the precursor to Egypt’s High Council, received the case file of one man’s
murder. The case file included two journals (jurnalayn) and three documents (thalāthat
awrāq), one of which was the petition of the man’s wife. The petition accused a man
named Aḥmad Sulaymān of assaulting her husband (ḍaraba zawjaha). When the accused
defendant denied the accusation, the villagers gathered to attest in the jurnāl that the
accused was, in fact, the person responsible for the murder. The state sent an agent “for
the reason of resolving the discrepancy between what he said verbally and what was
written down in the jurnāl” (bi-sabab ḥusūl al-mukhālafa mā bayn qawlihi shafahan wa
qawlihi bil-kitābīya fil-jurnāl). 651 The definitive determination of facts now became a
concern of the state.
This novel practice of recording testimony through attached documents (awrāq
marfūqa) in order to summarize petitions (sing. sharḥ), which filled hundreds of
registers, would also lay the groundwork for a fledgling docket system. The docket,
which included petitions, police reports, and summary judgements, resembled the qāḍī’s
dīwān (or sijill), in so far as it carried on the practice of holding an institutional memory
of the khedival state’s new state councils, as the sijill held the institutional memory of the
qāḍī’s court. Like the sijill, the jurnāl also held the names of parties and verdicts of cases
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that continued to be passed down from one qāḍī to another through successive judicial
appointments. 652 The dīwān, as Wael Hallaq noted, was the judge’s private journal—a
recollection of case files, property deeds, marriage certificates, and other legal
instruments that preserved an institutional memory within a given locale. 653 The jurnāl,
however, was something else. It was the state’s journal, its own day-to-day surveillance
of “The Protected One,” utilized through its own expanding bureaucracy and its internal
correspondences, to produce a new basis for criminal adjudication, as much as it also
provided continuity with al-Dīwān al-Khidīwī. At the center of this network was the alDīwān al-Khidīwī, which served as the central nerve of the executive regime, and the
various councils and ministries connected to it. The khedival state had come to model the
correspondences that centered around Dīwān al-Khidīwī, which embodied the importance
of siyāsa and qānūn, on the qāḍī’s dīwān, which recorded and represented the application
of the sharīʻa, in his court.
Within this emerging docket system, professional scribes weaved letters,
petitions, and medical reports into a summarized form and presented them before
adjudicative bodies. This new mode of recording the results of investigative inquiry
occurred primarily in police stations and arrived in the case files presented to various
local state councils, expressing the state’s concern with the readability of its subjects and
their disposition to commit crime. Khedival Egypt’s adjudicative scheme became more
adaptable to an inquisitorial (question-answer) form within police stations and the
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national courts system that would become established by 1883. 654 While this mode
proved successful in the Mixed Court system founded in 1876, hesitation on the part of
Egypt’s legal architects, namely Nubār Pasha, regarding its efficacy within local
adjudication prevented its imposition onto the sharīʻa-based adjudicatory scheme.
In the Mixed Courts, foreign consular courts regularly deposed defendants and
witnesses by mid-century. They did so in a manner by noting defendants’ answers and
silences in response to specific questions as entered into case files that contained within
them examples pointing to the accused’s agency as well as the limits to it in appearing
before authority. This inquisitorial style already being practiced in foreign consular
courts and which police stations adopted by the end of the century was, nevertheless,
more probing, more exact, and more precise (with dates, times, places all recorded),
giving a semblance, at least, of more order and logic than the adversarial, narrative form
that characterized testimony in the qāḍī’s court. Local police stations also contained this
probing new form of analysis of facts to support the khedival state’s search for crime, but
the incision in probing the individual was not as deep. It was tamed by the community, by
the voices of the village elders and local members of the community who affirmed and
denied good reputations, and who all contributed to the making of a narrative that came
to be recorded down before and by the state. By contrast, the defendant now became the
subject of analysis in the consular and the new courts; she became seen in an almost
antiseptic light, scrutinized alone in a light that made her and her past, present, and
emotions the subject and the object of the state and its inquiry. The defendant’s mind
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became an object of this analysis in the new police stations, as much as his body: what
she intended exactly, why and how she acted, and to which purposes she acted. As
explored in previous chapters, these matters as they came to discipline the body also
came to discipline the mind, and they placed the criminal defendant at the center of
public attention, if not scorn, for the sake of protecting society and its interests.
Adoption of the interrogation methods allowed the khedival state to increase
legibility and prove the occurrences of crimes through the statements of subjects
involved. It compelled defendants to answer questions asked of them—whereby both the
questions and the answers were handwritten verbatim in Arabic or summarized by a
scribe in the police station. Doing so allowed for more transparency in the gathering of
information by the state. While information gathered proved important for this purpose of
transparency, such as when numerous letters detailed the dynamic plots of crime, the
information presented by authorities was now admissible and binding against defendants
before the judge, even if the testimony was obtained out of court. 655 Recording testimony,
thus, became a technique by which to survey society, to collect detailed information
about its different subjects: their demographics, their living arrangements, their sources
of income, their mental states, as well as, their disposition to harm or defraud society.
In addition to the interrogation, an even more probing instrument entered the
nineteenth-century criminal adjudicative toolbox: the deposition (sīn wa jīm). Entering
the American legal landscape around the same time, 656 the deposition, much like the
interrogation, produced out-of-court testimony, although performed under oath that
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ultimately became admissible in court. 657 Already established in foreign consular courts
beginning by the 1840s, the deposition, which would become part of the criminal and
civil national court system in 1883, displayed a more meticulous form of control.
Unrecorded in the narrative style that marked the interrogation in the khedival police
records, rather, it was incisively formulaic, inciting the defendant and witnesses to
answer specific questions. Accordingly, the proffered testimony became scripted, meant
to produce and reproduce the details of a case before the trier of fact. It was unlike
anything witnessed in sharīʻa court or even in appearances before the siyāsa’s councils,
where oaths and testimonies had frequently crossed one another, accusing and
exonerating defendants before the qāḍī or the state’s administrators. More calculated,
more controlled, and more chronological, the deposition was designed to produce specific
responses to solicited questions in an environment devoid of interruptions or missed
clues. Produced during a time when time and schedules became a frequent nineteenthcentury preoccupation on trains, telegraphs, telephones, photographs, and printed
forms, 658 the detailed, diachronic deposition entered the khedival technological toolbox
of keeping time: it was the spatial, chronological, and mental occurrence of crime that the
deposition aimed to illicit. In this transactional way, this new legal instrument gave off
an air of greater logic, objectivity, and further transparency, if not also more justice, than
the traditional methods of adjudication traditionally practiced in sharīʻa courts.
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Above all, the deposition, in comparison to the interrogation, not only put on
display defendants’ characters before the state, but it delved deeper, aiming to expose the
their thinking, intentions, and motives for action. By doing so, this new legal instrument
aimed to tease out for adjudication the pertinent elements of the crimes in question—in
both the act as well as the mental states of the accused. 659 Elements of the criminal act—
whether a theft occurred at night or whether the stolen material was removed with stealth
or not—became objects of scrutiny by the state in the deposition. But also, as we saw in
Chapter Two, as khedival law shifted towards a growing introspection of culpability, the
defendant’s intentions also became an object of scrutiny, as did the question of whether
they acted with specific intent (taraṣṣud). 660 In addition to illuminating intent, the
deposition now aimed to extract information about identification, alibi, and motive,
which would be used to suggest, if not to prove, a defendant’s innocence or guilt before
the state.
In a salient way, the deposition resembled the new literary genre of playwriting
for the stage that emerged in Egypt at this time. Plays, which had been a part of literary
culture since ancient Egypt, provided a window onto and critique of social life. 661 During
these years, plays, along with the novel, became part of Egyptian literary culture. 662 One
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of the major themes explored in this new genre was the police interrogation, which stood
for the intrusion of an increasingly bureaucratic state. 663 This intrusion was also
determined through the play and political satire cartoons, similarly to the interrogation,
would be adopted throughout the rest of the century. Line by line, question to response,
as theatre plays entered the stream of the Egyptian consciousness and also the pages of
Al-Ahrām at the beginning of the 20th century, 664 this was also reflected in the actual
police stations and their own real interrogation of defendants and witnesses. A certain
parallelism existed between reality as produced in the interrogation within police stations
and the imagination as constructed in political satire.
COLONIAL CONFRONTATION
(Un)disciplined Forms
Enforcing institutional shifts to solicit detailed information within Egypt also
created a paper revolution that reached maturation during the 1890s. That paper
revolution left a trail of new, typed police crime report forms, criminal record forms,
fingerprinting cards, telegraph cards, medical evaluation cards, registration cards,
consignment cards (carnets de consignation), identification cards (carnets
d’identification), police logs, and departmental letterheads. As Bruno Latour noted in The
Making of the Law, his ethnographic study of the French Conseil d’État, 665 it is this
“material practice” that seemed to shape the transformation of that institution. That
transformation lay in day-to-day bureaucratic practices, for “an essence does not lie in a
663
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definition but in a practice, a situated, material practice that ties a whole range of
heterogeneous phenomena in a certain specific way.” 666 In Egypt, smaller changes to
bureaucratic life allowed the administration to practice the practical constraints placed on
the accused. Some practices also began to make a notable difference in the way that
codified law was understood and how actors and institutions, subjects, and social norms
stood in relation to that law. 667 Ottoman administration kept voluminous and detailed
records; the new forms consisted of a different framework and had a different
disciplinary logic. The records were contained in boxes, with printed letterheads, and
organized in straight-lined universalized forms. The effect of the forms displayed state
authority and power in a subtle, yet calculated manner, more than it had been previously
presented in the pretentions of power contained in Ottoman scrolls with waxed seals,
signatures, and the ornate language of the royal court.
Consider, for example, the new police crime report form that the authorities had
to fill out and attach to their numerous handwritten pages of interrogation of suspects and
witnesses. This was a time in which cheap printing enabled forms in Egypt and in the
Ottoman Empire. 668 Prior to the 1890s, prefectures of police used to handwrite formal
letters using ink wherein they detailed the specific facts of a case (the names, ages,
occupations, and sometimes physical descriptions of the suspects, plaintiffs, and
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eyewitnesses; plot; motive; eyewitness testimony). 669 They would send these detailed
letters to either a local council or to a consulate in order to investigate further and to be
used in the adjudication of the case. Through this continuing older practice of writing
letters, the prefectures of police saluted the judicial body using the centuries-old ornate
formal language of Ottoman administration, 670 and they continued to conclude their
letters by affixing their signature stamps. 671 By contrast, the new forms were sent along
with their investigatory case files to the relevant judicial bodies in order to interrogate
further and to adjudicate the cases in question.
The new forms aimed at uniformity. On top of the right corner of the new
standardized police forms, “Ministry of the Interior” (niẓārat al-dākhilīya) became an
“inspectorate” of the public welfare, and underneath it read, the header “Police
Department” (qism al-ḍabṭ). Underneath the header were two location markers: the first
identifying the city (al-madīna) where the purported crime took place (Miṣr, or Cairo),
and to the left of that was another space to identify the local police station (būlīs qism) in
the city where the police investigated the crime (whether Sayyida Zaynab or alJāmilīya). 672 Below the location, on the fourth line of the form, were two designations
that highlighted a change with respect to the right to punish. The first labeled the “type of
crime” (nawʻ al-qaḍīya) that was in question before authority, as in flagrante delicto (fiʻl
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fāḍiḥ). To the left of this was another space invoking the relevant statutory “articles” in a
new positivistic, codified criminal law (māddat al-qānūn) that grounded the executive’s
authority.
In 1895, the Ministry of Interior standardized the forms and conveyed a complex
administration of justice fueled by a state’s priority for uniformity. The forms further
directed police authorities to indicate basic facts of the case: “the number of suspects”
(‘adad al-muttahamīn); “number of foreigners” (minhum ajānib); “number of local
subjects” (minhum raʻāya); “number of those sent to the Office of the Public Prosecutor”
(‘adad al-mursalīn ilā al-niyāba); “the number sent to the Chief of Police with this case
file” (maʿa hādhā al-maḥdar ilā al-ḥukmdārīya); “the number of those received by their
village elders ” (‘adad alladhīna yusallam ilā mashāyikh ḥāratihim); “the number of
those sent to the consulate” (‘adad alladhīna yusallam ilā al-consulāto); and, “the
number of those who were investigated” (‘adad al-jārī al-baḥth ‘anhum). 673
As discussed in the previous chapter, new tools modeled and predicted criminal
behavior. More typed forms with straight lines came to contain information about
Egypt’s subjects. Such information, included mugshots (la photographie judiciaire), 674
passports (including eye color, hair, height, size of head), 675 fingerprints, telegraphs, 676 as
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well as medical autopsy reports, 677 as discussed in the last chapter. The forms and
techniques of surveillance thereby comprised a comprehensive toolkit to model, identify,
and trace the criminal defendant as subjects of the state. As local ghafīrs continued to
bring forth criminal suspects and were not always successful in their endeavors, these
new scientific tools assisted the khedival state’s prosecutorial agents (la police judiciaire)
in their pursuit of crime. 678
Consider another form created by the Ministry of Interior. By 1905, this īṣāl
(“receipt”) was circulated for the purpose of regulating “old locales” (maḥall qadīm) that
were deemed “disturbing the peace” (muqliq lil-rāḥa), “harmful to health” (muḍirr bilsiḥḥa), or just plain “dangerous” (khaṭar). 679 Soliciting information in both Arabic and
French, the form first requested the name of the authority from which it sought official
approval (“Nom de l’Autorité à la quelle la declaration est présentée”). 680 The form then
required the name of the person asserting the declaration (“Nom du declarant”); a
description of the nature of the place being declared (ṣifat al-maḥall al-muqaddam ‘anhu
al-ikhṭār); its exact location (“lieu de la presentation de la déclaration”); and finally, the
date that the declaration was made (“Fait le ______19___”). 681 At the bottom of the form,
the following typed words in French activated this legal instrument: “This receipt is
delivered in order to attest that the presentation of the declaration is in accordance with
the necessary investigations that were made for that which concerns the
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establishment.” 682 Licenses were issued and revoked for businesses open to the public.
The holder of the “receipt” also held the right to operate a space otherwise deemed
dangerous. 683 And like the new protective rights that filled issued passports and cloaked
formerly-Ottoman, but now French and British subjects, the new forms also shielded
those “old establishments” from a more intrusive administrative state.
Accompanying the new forms was also a strict British policy, building on the
already intrusive introspection configured by the khedival state, that required certain and
accurate completion of all information required by the state. On January 14, 1886, the
British Inspector General issued a General Order with the following formatting
instructions: 684
N°1: The words ‘urgent’, ‘confidential’, or ‘secret and confidential’ entered at the
Left Hand Top corner of letters or envelopes should invariably be written in red
ink, if possible [emphasis added].
On January 23rd, he issued another General Order, adding further rules about the
completion of forms: 685
N°1: Heads of Departments are not empowered to employ any writer, with or
without pay, unless they are authorized to do so by the Inspector General.
N°2: Signatures on official documents must invariably be written in black ink.
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A week later, on January 30th, he issued a departmental General Order declaring the
following: 686
N°1: New No. 6 crime report forms are now issued and all no. 6 reports of crimes
are to be on the forms. Reports of further action are to be made in the form hereto
attached in manuscript on blank paper as action is taken. Every such further
report is to bear in the left hand top corner the same number as the original crime
report and underneath of the further report as in the pattern attached.
Several months later, the Inspector General of police, commented in a General Order on
April 15th: 687
N°1: Attention is called to the careless manner in which names, dates, references,
to orders, etc. are written in committees reports on stores and similar documents
in Arabic. Dates are often omitted and no uniform system is observed. All
provincial committees on stores should be written on form N°61. Columns which
are not required for special cases being left blank. Names and dates should
always be written in “Naskh.”
Officials had kept detailed records for centuries. The British Inspector General’s criticism
seemed to affirm a scrutinizing eye for accuracy, showcasing how legibility became
another concern for the state and its “wholesale transformation of society and the
instruments of statecraft.” 688

DWQ 2001-005882. Dīwān al-Dākhilīya. General Orders (30 January 1886).
DWQ 2001-005882. Dīwān al-Dākhilīya. General Orders (15 April 1886).
688
James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have
Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998): 343.
686
687

241

Cross-examination
In light of the interrogations that took place in police stations from the 1840s
onward, the birth of the courtroom in late-nineteenth-century Egypt and the protocols that
came to animate it may also be viewed as extending from a khedival administrative state
and the institutions that this state established for the sake of ordering Egypt throught this
long century. The architects of Egypt’s modern courtroom constructed it from the already
existing building blocks in which the interrogation in police stations regularly and
methodically took place. Accordingly, the history of the courtroom in modern Egypt may
be seen as part of the greater legal landscape, not an alien fixture built upon it at the
behest of colonial powers. With that said, the courtroom introduced a different schematic
for adjudication. Plaintiffs and defendants did not sit at the same level as the judge, but
rather, literally below him, inasmuch as the judge represented the law and its application
in the particular case, governing the fates of the parties. They stood up to testify before
the judge, cross-examined by lawyers who were also recent additions within Egypt’s
legal system, and those who also stood to represent the codified law before which
defendants now stood. 689 It was before this law that a performance of procedural orality
signaled a major transformation in the way defendants had previously appeared before
the qāḍī’s court.
The courtroom exemplified another shift beyond procedural orality, and it also
reorganized the space that came to define criminal adjudication. By then, under Ismāʻīl’s
reign (r. 1863-1879), the construction of the railroad, the introduction of the telegraph,
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paved streets, street lights, and the opening of opera houses made Cairo appear as the
“Paris along the Nile.” 690 Before architectural changes redefined the social landscape,
police stations had already carved out an important space in this moment in history. It
became a focal point for resolving disputes, shifting that responsibility away from, or at
least sharing it with the qāḍī’s court, until it was placed in the Mixed Courts and National
Courts systems after the mid-1870s.
The relocation of the center stage of criminal adjudication from the police station
to the courtroom raises an important historical question regarding the liberal chapter in
Egypt’s legal history. This liberal chapter, as Albert Hourani noted in his Arabic Thought
in the Liberal Age, certainly came to exist in the realm of political ideas and writings that
moved from Europe to Egypt during the nineteenth century. Yet, also enveloping this
chapter was the practice of law within police stations and new state councils, that did not
belong to Europe. For the police station belonged to the world of Ottoman politics
(siyāsa), where defendants’ rights were hardly recognized, let alone realized, and
practiced insofar as the procedural limits of the sharīʻa constrained state action. 691 The
courtroom, however, was constructed—in theory, at least—in a different world, one that
was made to reflect a liberal theory of defendants’ rights (ḥuqūq) and the court protocols
that vitiated such rights. 692 In this sense, the courtroom with the procedural signs that
eventually marked it—namely the defendant’s right to cross-examination—appeared in
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contrast to a legal tradition where such rights did not exist or existed only in a limited
sense.
The dependence of the newly-established courtroom on the police, thus, provided
a line of continuity between the police station as a khedival establishment and the
courtroom as an establishment of the new liberal order. The reliance of the courtroom on
the police interrogation—out-of-court testimony—marked a shift in the legal tradition,
where the interrogation did not exist in the qāḍī’s court and, if they occurred at all, only
did so, in a limited manner, within the governor’s executive councils (dīwān). 693 The
right to cross-examine testimonial evidence—where the defendant could question the
police and witnesses on their recollections of events, their assumptions, even their
expertise—marked a watershed in court protocols. 694 Where cross-examination may have
had any resemblance in the qāḍī’s court, it was a prerogative of the judge alone, who
could ask questions from witnesses and experts as he saw fit, but even that prerogative
was limited. Thus, a major transformation accompanying the birth of the courtroom was
the investment of the power within the parties—within the plaintiffs and defendants—to
interrogate and to question proffered evidence presented before the court.
At the same, where the right to cross-examination reinforced defendants’ agency
before authority, the often tense battles that ensued between police and the accused in
police stations carried over into the courtroom. Coerced confessions in police stations
were ubiquitous, and while Lord Cromer and British officials professed to put an end to
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torture, the practice persisted, justified on account of its efficacy. 695 In so far as crossexamination served as a check on coerced testimony, its adoption within Egypt’s
courtrooms only partly deterred the methods of coercion employed by the khedival state
to acquire testimony. 696 Coercive methods, at least as made apparent in the case files,
continued to flag a strained relationship between the khedival state and the people at the
dawn of a new century.
In this sense, while the cross-examination showcased a defendant’s agency in the
courtroom, that agency was, nevertheless, still encapsulated within a system
circumscribed by arrests and searches. Constrained, defendants’ limited agency calls into
question the introduction of lawyers to assert defendants’ claims in court as representing
a liberal chapter in Egypt’s legal history. Cross-examination, as an addition into the
khedival legal order, bore some fruit in protecting defendants from false or inaccurate
accusations, reasserting protections afforded to defendants within the sharīʻa that had
been curtailed by siyāsa. 697 When viewed in light of the historical practice of arrests and
interrogation, the liberalism that undergirded the right to cross-examination—the
defendant’s ability to question authority—was limited. It was limited for a number of
reasons, not least of which were the socio-economic barriers that restricted defendants’
access to lawyers to those who could afford them. While ideas of social mobility
persisted, Ottoman-Egyptian society still remained stratified well into the twentieth
century and through the 1919 Revolution and through nominal independence from British
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protectorate rule in 1922. While a growing number of families—Muslim, Christian, and
Jewish—were able to send their sons to study in the Khedival School of Law established
in 1869, 698 instead of receiving a traditional clerical legal education in Al-Azhar, lawyers
educated in a reconstituted khedival legal system would become part of the Egyptian
bourgeoisie, which included leading figures of Egypt’s national independence movement.
These figures included Saʻd Zaghlūl (who attended Al-Azhar before studying law in
Cairo) and Makram Ebeid (who studied law at the University of Oxford from 1905 to
1908), who would eventually play prominent political roles within Egypt’s emerging
parliamentarian government. 699 Still, the social mobility did not translate into a
democratization of the right to counsel, nor by extension to it, of the right to crossexamination. Although defendants were able to have lawyers represent them (except in
the the major political trials), by the turn of the century, they generally stood and spoke
directly for themselves, as they did before khedival councils and sharīʻa courts until these
latter courts’ and councils’ dissolution in the 1880s.
In a limited sense, however, an earlier version of the deposition had already
existed within khedival interrogations (as’ila wa ajwiba). Defendants responded to
questions posed to them in police stations. As we saw in several cases including the
deathbed confession cases below, siyāsa’s interlocutors and adjudicators were conscious
of abiding by the rules of the sharīʻa, even if they molded those rules to meet their
directed purposes of governance. Undoubtedly, this purpose, not the protection of
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defendants’ rights, guided khedival interrogation. Because of this, the right to crossexamination as a fruit of liberal constitutional design became part of the interrogation, in
which protections traditionally afforded defendants within the sharīʻa were curtailed, if
not disregarded, to meet state priorities.
The rise of the interrogation, therefore, heralded the cross-examination and the
emergence of lawyers in nineteenth-century Egypt. Where the latter have been attributed
in the historiography to the birth of Mixed Courts and a National Courts system, 700 their
emergence has not been considered in relation to the history of the interrogation.
Nineteenth-century Egypt contained various tribunals: traditional sharīʻa courts,
executive councils (majālis), foreign consular courts, Mixed Courts, followed by the
National Courts, while consular courts continued to adjudicate crimes committed by
subjects belonging to foreign jurisdictions. From escorting of defendants by patrol into
the courtroom, to their positioning in front of the courtroom, to the manner by which
evidence would be presented and cross-examined by lawyers and prosecutors in court in
front of judges, transformations factored into the socialization of presenting the criminal
defendant, now as standing before the law, not only before the state. 701 From the
traditional manner of sitting down across from the plaintiff next to the judge in sharīʻa
court to the new method of standing in new European-modeled courtrooms, defendants
experienced an actual evolution in the way they came to stand before the court.
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On July 8, 1892, a satellite British criminal court sitting with Her Majesty the
Queen’s full authority in Port Said, one of the new towns along the Suez Canal, heard the
following aggravated assault case of Regina vs. Mohammed Sallah Badr. 702 The
defendant, referred to as Sallah, pleaded not guilty to the charges leveled against him,
after which the swearing in and questioning of witnesses immediately followed. The first
witness called forth by the prosecutor, Michelle Clemente, who stood for the khedival
police, was the victim, Ally Mahomet Aly Malek. According to the latter’s testimony, he
was dining the week before the trial at a diner when he first saw the defendant, with
whom he had previous enmity, in the diner. Following this, the victim claimed that while
he was walking, the defendant subsequently attacked and ambushed him and three other
men who dragged him by his arms, two at each arm. He further claimed that the
defendant held a knife in his hand, and when the victim defended himself by grabbing the
defendant’s throat, the defendant threw his knife to his brother, one of the other
assaulters, and “told him to go away.” After the prosecution presented its case, the lawyer
on behalf of the defendant, a man named in the court record as Manarino, stood up and
began to cross-examine the victim.
Q:

You said that when at the eating house you saw Salleh. Was he alone?

A:

He was alone.

Q:

What time?

A:

About seven or half past. The first time I saw him he was coming from
the European to the Arab quarter. The second time the opposite direction.
…
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Q:

At the time of alleged assault, was it dark or moonlight?

A:

Can’t remember about the moon but there were lights in the street and I
could see. Was attacked about the breadth of this Courtroom from a gas
lamp.

Q:

When you saw the knife in Salleh’s hand was the edge of the blade
inwards or outwards – (Witness holds it inwards).

A:

Inwards.

Q:

How far off was the policeman when first seen by you?

A:

First saw him when closeby.

Q:

From the time of you first calling for the police until they came how much
time elapsed?

A:

Might be ten or 15 minutes. I can’t say how long. Made my first
statement at the hospital.

The silences here were not by the defendant, but rather by the victim. The
defendant’s lawyer manipulated the silences or ambiguities in the victim’s answers to
questions in order to create the reasonable doubt needed to absolve his client from guilt.
The positioning of the knife when the wound was inflicted on the victim’s back, the
amount of light emanating from the moon at the time the wound was inflicted, and the
presence of the nearby police at the time of the assault all became important in this case
in the determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.

Signed Confessions
249

Like spoken words, silences also captured the extent and the limits of defendants’
agency. When defendants endured interrogations, they spoke for and on behalf of
themselves. Identifying themselves by their name, age, profession, and place of origin,
they responded to a number of questions and accusations made by witnesses and village
elders with the state’s local councils. Confronted with questions of their own guilt,
defendants often denied the accusations made against them, even if at times, they
confessed to the crime in question. 703 From the 1820s onward, confessions would change
in both content and form. By the 1890s, confessions came to be recorded and signed by
the defendant—a practice that had not been part of the legal tradition, even if it was
practiced in other legal jurisdictions.
Signed confessions, which became routine instruments for proving defendants
guilty through their own words before the state, identified defendants. It was through
their signed confessions that various subjects—both local and foreign—began to count in
the eyes of the state (in addition to the new identification and immunization cards
produced since the 1820s). An observable need to verify the truth of utterances filtered
the admissibility of confessions within nineteenth-century Egypt. Nevertheless,
admissions began to shed their confessional form in response to a more inquisitorial legal
system. While the probative value of defendants’ confessions had been surmised by the
qāḍī, the state now actively sought to verify all forms of truth—from testimonial
evidence to admissions of guilt offered by defendants. 704 Accordingly, confessions
reflected a new mode of finding guilty characters. Before the state, the confession was
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often followed by the assertion of state agents “in this form” (bi-hādhihi al-ṣūra), to
establish whether or not the confession was accurate or not. 705
The legal precedent regarding the offering and taking of confessions that had been
entrenched throughout the legal tradition would also begin to take on a visibly different
form by the 1880s. Defendants no longer had to profess their guilt before the judge: they
could also be held accountable for admissions they made during the investigative process
in police stations where they were required to sign or initial next to their recorded
confessions. 706 The confession entered the case file and gradually became part of an
adjudicative process at the end of which a verdict was determined.
Deathbed admissions directed toward the accused by a dying victim noted this
suspicion towards utterances of guilt or innocence. On March 23, 1851(Jumādā al-Awwal
20, 1267), for instance, the High Council received the details of a case in Upper Egypt
(Mudīrīyat Qiblī). The case involved the murder of ‘Abd al-‘Ᾱl from the locale of
Khazandarieh. Before his death, the exact cause of which is not specified in the case
summary, the victim “pronounced the names of two suspects as his murderers” (almathūm fī qatlihi min manṭiq al-maqtūl), Muḥammad Ḥamdūn and ‘Alī Sulaymān. After
investigating the case, the village elders (who were themselves related to the victim)
could not find evidence of the perpetrator of the homicide, and as the fiqh rules made
clear: deathbed admissions of guilt in the absence of other evidence were inadmissible as
proof against the accused (min kawn al-sharīʻa lā jawwazat iqrār al-maqtūl). Since no
one was present to witness the complicit act (wa mā lam kānū yaʻtarifū bil-fiʻl), if there
705
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were a specific accusation against a person or persons and no proof exists in support of
this accusation, then the accusation fails (baṭalat daʻwat al-muddaʻī), and the accused is
to be set free. 707 It appeared from this case as well as others that sharīʻa’s protections
still cloaked defendants from false accusation even if such protections underwent serious
changes in law under siyāsa’s administration of justice.
Gradually, signed confessions expressed the state’s search for the underlying
cause of crime, as contained within the state’s evidentiary scheme. Signed by defendants,
the admission or denial offered defendants a means by which to assert themselves, but
also a means by which the confession could later be used to test the accused’s
truthfulness. The state’s concern for ensuring the legibility of the defendant’s admission,
was, thus, born out of a concern for ensuring the defendant’s testimony by eliminating the
possibility that other perpetrators of crime could be guilty of the crime in question.
Signatures thereby turned into mechanisms that evinced a deep administrative concern
for legibility, certainty, and order. While this concern persisted through Ottoman
officialdom where administrators stamped wax seals on decrees and official letters,
eventually, signatures replaced the latter to become a more democratic means of
acquiring their tailored signatures. Even those who could hardly read or write now had
access to the confession—testifying before the state and confirming it on paper. 708 For
even subjects who were illiterate and were not able to read their proffered recorded
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testimony had to affirm their testimony through a stamp (khatm). 709 While achieved
through new forms and practices, standardization of this process achieved through
gradual steps taken together towards formalization within a new state bureaucracy.
Standardized, signed testimony, thus, changed the oral nature of confession into
uniform legal instruments to be utilized by the state in order to prove crime. Whereas the
traditional oral confession before the judge showcased a specific performance before
judicial authority, the confession in police stations now became a written, procedural,
transactional step that took place between subjects and the state in its exacting search for
truth. The signature entered the calculus of the state—a common denominator in criminal
investigations. For instance, on March 14, 1851 (Jumādā al-Awwal 11, 1267), village
elders in Dikkia in Upper Egypt refused to provide their stamp on the daily police log (or
jurnāl, as described above). 710 As the case summary put it succinctly, the village elders
“did not have a case” (lam yakun lahum wajh) against the accused. 711 Now, the signature
or stamp became the traditional emblem of subjects within a criminal investigation.
In pointed ways, this limited search for truth would lead to coerced testimony in
police stations. The attempted abolition of the kurbāj, the whip, in the 1860s was a step
towards reducing coerced testimony. 712 As Harold Tollefson suggested, the reliance on
torture to discipline the accused further shaped interrogations under British control in
spite of arguments that have been made to the contrary, as they were unable to stem the
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practice altogether. 713 Symbolizing authority, the kurbāj also came to stand for the
consolidation of power by an administrative state.
While the kurbāj had been used on the accused in police stations, corporal
discipline had been ingrained within the Ottoman siyāsa regime for centuries. During the
eleventh century, the Abbasid jurist al-Māwardī in his treatise The Laws of Islamic
Governance (al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭānīya) advised that the caliph (Muslim ruler) was able to
extract information from the accused, whereas this was impermissible and punished
should it be performed by a qāḍī in a sharīʻa court. 714 While coerced confessions filled
Ottoman history, systematized coercion took place within a khedival administration of
justice, notably in police stations and caracoals, as a wave of cases of assault on police
officers marked the historical record from the 1880s that followed numerous cases related
to public “outrage” or “menace.” 715 Until the use of the kurbāj was abolished, it
continued to define the main method of forcing Egypt’s subjects—peasants and workers
within police stations, plantations, households, and other sites holding hierarchical
authority—to admit guilt before the state. 716 By the end of the nineteenth century, under
British Occupation, however, a new method had come about, less physically forceful, yet
nevertheless, still compelled on the defendant. And after the interrogation, at the end of
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every testimony, the phrase: “And the testimony was recorded, read, and he signed [by
the defendant]” (kutibat ‘alayhi aqwāluhu wa aqarra ‘alayha wa maḍā). 717 Thus,
entering case files, the deposed defendant testified to particular questions asked by the
khedival administrative state. Instead of the oath, the defendant was now required to sign
his name after his answers were read to him—a feature of a positivistic law that evinced
its own logic: to bind the defendant, not morally, but legally, in writing, to admissions he
pronounced before the state.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the birth of the interrogation reconfigured the criminal defendant
before the state. As exemplified in the case that opened this chapter, the confrontation
between defendants and authority was historically a tense one, as the khedival
administrative state sought to order and control a growing population through new and
adapted investigative techniques that apprehended crime and its actors. From arrest to
searches, defendants now confronted the full force of an emerging administrative state
and its bureaucracy and the new methods that it had designed and instituted. In the
evolution of new kinds of searches, khedival law changed in subtle and not-so-subtle
ways the traditional methods of apprehending the accused across nineteenth-century
Egypt. Coming forth within this setting of heightened surveillance and apprehension, the
interrogation fit within the state’s progressive mode of searching for truth—an inquisitive
mode that would bring about change within the legal tradition. Transforming the way that
testimony and confessions took place in modern Egypt, the interrogation changed what
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was ordinarily an act performed orally before the judge into an instrument to be utilized
by the state. This tool reconfigured not only the way that the criminal defendant stood
before and responded to authority, but it also inculcated the agency against and the limits
of restraint that came to redefine society by the dawn of the twentieth century and the
notions of freedom that had begun to took root within this society. The interrogation
became an everyday occurrence across police stations in nineteenth-century Egypt as
everyday subjects viewed and responded to authority at the dawn of the new century.
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Chapter Five
Seeing Equality
“Hang them high over the town!”
– Arthur Miller, The Crucible
MANSLAUGHTER ON A PIGEON HUNT (1906)
On Wednesday, June 13, 1906, five British military officers went off to hunt for
pigeons in the small village of Dinshaway on the eastern bank of the Nile. The residents
of Dinshaway, like Egypt’s peasants elsewhere, had previously dealt with foreigners on
their soil for centuries. But on that fateful day, did not think they would ignite a society’s
historical struggle for independence and equality for generations to come. Protective of
their pigeons and land, they sought to defend themselves against anyone who would harm
them or threaten their livelihood. Therefore, when the British scouts entered Dinshaway
after a recent village ordinance had forbidden gaming there, a skirmish ensued between
them and the local village residents which lead to the accidental killing of one elderly
woman from an officer’s gun. The woman’s death hardly quieted the affairs but instead
further conflagrated the tensions between the villagers and the foreign officers. In fleeing
the altercation, one of the British soldiers also died from exhaustion and his corpse
remained under the hot summer sun. Since the villagers did not directly cause the
officer’s death, his death was not prosecutable as murder—let alone as first-degree
murder—which would have required premeditation according to Egypt’s new Criminal
Code. 718 Still, angered by what he viewed as an act of insurrection and vigilante justice
by the villagers, Lord Cromer, Egypt’s Controller General at the time (1882-1907) who
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had set out to rule Egypt with an iron fist, 719 called for an ad hoc tribunal composed of
both foreign and Egyptian judges to try Egypt’s villagers as criminal defendants. Finding
Dinshaway’s peasants guilty of first-degree murder, this tribunal ordered twenty-four of
Dinshaway’s peasants to be hanged high over the town. 720 Their unjust executions would
be stitched into Egypt’s national consciousness for generations to come.
While Dinshaway proved to be an important case in Egyptians’ struggle for
justice, it is the main contention of this chapter that this historical struggle began much
earlier in the nineteenth century. Prior to this point, the Circle of Justice symbolized the
traditional struggle of justice within the Ottoman Empire, in which Egypt remained, and
in which every subject had a place under the Sultan and could petition for justice directly
from him. 721 From the 1820s onwards, however, this traditional Ottoman hierarchy
symbolized in the Circle of Justice would gradually unravel—incrementally and through
practice by Egypt’s own subjects before their state—to bring about a durable concept of a
society (al-hay’a al- ijtimāʻīya), in which everyone theoretically at least held the same
position before the law. How did this transformative concept of a society comprised of
equals (mustawūn) become a reality in Egypt by the end of the nineteenth century?
Indeed, it was a matter of thought, as Albert Hourani charted in Arabic Thought in the
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Liberal Age. The translations and ideas that influential thinkers from al-Ṭahṭāwī to ‘Alī
Mubārak brought to nineteenth-century Egypt (at times under the ageis of this khedival
state and at other times, fiercely against it) infused the marketplace of ideas from which
this concept of equality became its most lucrative fruit. By the end of the nineteenth
century, as this chapter acknowledges from the outset, an Egyptian society was born not
only in the legal textbooks but also in new cafés and salons where intellectuals and
writers, both local and foreigner, intermingled in a movement that came to be known as
the Egyptian renaissance (or Nahḍa).
Still, while this intellectual fervor emanating from the Nahḍa compelled a
confrontation with legal tradition, this chapter argues that the concept equality in modern
Egypt—similarl to the concept of public prosecution explored in Chapter One—emerged
through a historical struggle that began much earlier in the nineteenth century. As all
struggles for equality, this one began as a struggle for justice and equity in which Egypt’s
subjects petitioned their state, compelling it to see them and to listen to the injustices they
faced. It is through the efforts of Egypt’s varied subjects in conjunction with the priorities
of a new khedival state and its revamped preoccupation with maintaining order that the
struggle for justice morphed, incrementally, to place defendants on a more equal footing
before the state. It is this transformation from the struggle of justice before the state to
one of equality before the law that this chapter seeks to chart and, in which, we can
properly place Dinshaway in 1906.

To make this argument, this chapter will follow in three sections. The first
section (“Standing within the Tradition”) traces the historically disparate treatment of
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defendants within the juristic tradition—a differentiation that persisted in both theory and
application into the nineteenth century. It does this by looking at one of two areas in
which defendants received different treatment, that is legal standing. The other area
concerned evidentiary requirements, in which three categories of persons, as they did
regarding legal standing, had historically received special scrutiny: non-Muslims,
women, and slaves. Contextualizing the rules of the jurisprudence within debates that
took place during the nineteenth century and which related to these three groups’
historical treatment in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire thereby allows us to trace this
historical struggle for justice as one that evolved under the aegis of both the
administrative state and its subjects during the nineteenth century.
The second section (“On a More Equal Footing before the State”) will confront
the questions of why and how the khedival administrative state erected by Egypt’s rulers
during the first half of the nineteenth century, on its own and through the new state
councils (majālis), subsequently molded the differential rules of legal standing that
pertained to different criminal defendants. This section, then, also intervenes in the
existing literature on whether Mehmed Ali and his emerging state brought about greater
inclusion of minorities and women within nineteenth-century Egypt. 722 This chapter will
shed some light on how, by the early twentieth century, Egypt’s khedival state came to
see its subjects and punish them more equitably, as well as how petitioning contributed to
this important change during the nineteenth century. Egypt’s everyday subjects are often
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missed within postcolonial legal historiography, a literature in which the state came to see
defendants as standing equally before a new codified law and bestowed with equal rights
within this law, rather than having struggled to achieve them.
The third section (“Standing Equally before the Law”) will look in more detail at
the treatment of criminal defendants before the law, beginning with the British
Occupation. It will highlight how equality emerged as a fundamental principle applied
within Egypt’s modern criminal law experienced serious shortcomings of due process of
law. This section also aims to highlight how equality before the law, as enacted within
the institution of the Public Prosecutor, gradually found traction but evolved out of an
enduring demand for equitable justice.
STANDING WITHIN THE TRADITION
During the nineteenth century, criminal defendants sat and stood before the judge
as they received verdicts under the sharīʻa. But in order for them to appear before the
Islamic judge (the qāḍī), they first had to be compared to the victim (or plaintiff) who
brought the case before the judge. In this sense, we can speak of a defendant’s legal
standing (or rather, “seating,” as it traditionally took place) as a requirement for the judge
to be able to hear a case against a given defendant. 723 For legal standing to be established
in homicide and injury cases, Muslim jurists over the centuries required not only that the
plaintiff bring forward an actual grievance against the defendant but more notably, they
had to compare the defendant’s legal status to that of his or her alleged victim. In other
words, whether the defendant was Muslim or non-Muslim, a man or a woman, free or
slave, or whether they were one or several, the comparison to the victim-plaintiff,
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determined whether there was legal standing to prosecute the defendant or to find them
worthy of punishment. 724 The qāḍī’s court thereby received defendants through the
persisting categories of legal standing. However, as a number of Ottoman legal historians
have already shown, these categories as they had been elaborated within jurisprudential
texts for centuries would, nevertheless, come to be treated differently under Ottoman
siyāsa—and even more so under nineteenth-century Egypt’s khedival siyāsa. Since we
covered the last category in Chapter Two with respect to the law of agency and
conspiracy, we will focus here on the first three categories of legal standing. It was
according to these categories of legal standing that plaintiffs and defendants subsequently
molded the ability to be heard and seen before the qāḍī’s court, a court in which legal
standing had previously been made contingent upon the legal categories (or identities) of
the parties who entered it. These categories, as a number of Ottoman legal historians have
already uncovered, carried across the jurisprudential texts for centuries and would,
nevertheless, be treated differently under Ottoman siyāsa and even more so under
nineteenth-century Egypt’s khedival siyāsa.
As a general rule, for corporal punishment to be available as a remedy, a
defendant’s legal status mattered, even if it was not dispositive. This was the case, at least
for the capital punishment for murder (qiṣāṣ). 725 As the twelfth-century jurist Ibn Rushd
put it: “The [general] condition stipulated for the victim by virtue of which qiṣāṣ becomes
obligatory [al-sharṭ alladhī yajib fīhi al-qiṣāṣ fī al-maqtūl], is that he should be at least of
724
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the same status as the murderer [fa huwa an yakūn mukāfā’an li-dam al-qātil].” 726 The
requirement that the accused killer be “equal to or alike” (mukāf’an) to his victim (or
more accurately, the murdered ‘victim’s blood’, dam al-qātil) for equivalent retaliatory
punishment is key to understanding the dual concept of difference between persons that
existed within the sharīʻa, a concept that carried its own terminology and that related to
people including the dhimmī for “non-Muslim,” mar’a and unthā for “woman,” or ‘abd
for “slave”). These legal demarcations would remain in effect until their eventual
abolition by the end of the nineteenth century. Despite their legal disaffectedness, these
categories persisted and carried with them new social and legal significance. 727 Focusing
on the persistence and evolution of this legal hiearchy and the language adopted to
express it may also allow us to chart why and how a concept of equality came about both
in practice and in theory within nineteenth-century Egypt. Such a focus may also allow us
to understand the limits of this evolution and the inertial weight that some of the
applicable categories have had in legal practice.
The Color of the Defendant’s Blood
We begin with the first category within the doctrine of equivalence between
plaintiffs and criminal defendants before the sharīʻa: between Muslims and nonMuslims. The history of relations between non-Muslims within the Ottoman Empire at
large, as elucidated by Heather Sharkey in her study A History of Muslims, Christians,
and Jews in the Middle East is one in which different religious and ethnic communities
lived side-by-side through harmony and tensions for centuries. The history of nineteenth726
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century relations between Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Egypt also affirms Sharkey’s
analysis. One of the aims of this chapter is to explain, in social-historical terms, the
interdependent roles that Egypt’s Muslims and non-Muslims played out in their
relationships to one another as subjects before institutions of the emerging khedival state.
The evolution of these roles was underway even before the dramatic legal reforms that
took place at the end of the nineteenth century. How non-Muslims came to be seen by
their state as they submitted their grievances against Muslims to it throughout the
nineteenth century is an important part of the history of how formal equality was
achieved in Egyptian society by the next century. How the khedival state saw the
traditionally protected population anew contributed to the legal change that affected nonMuslims within the existing legal rules and how these rules were applied to them vis-àvis Muslims.
Since the earliest Muslim communities, Christians and Jews stood out—quite
literally—before the judge and other administrative officials including the market
inspector (muḥtasib). They did so since the tenth-century Pact of Umar supposedly set
their “constitutional rights” and limits within the Islamic community (umma), including
limits on their ability “to display crosses in roads or markets where Muslims circulated,
or to ring church bells loudly; not to ride mounted animals (such as horses); and not to be
bear arms.” 728 For the purposes of this chapter and relevant to how defendants appeared
before the judge, “the Pact included laws about dress and appearance: ‘We shall not seem
to resemble the Muslims by imitating any of their garments,’ and ‘We shall always dress
in the same way wherever we may be, and we shall bind the zunnar [a kind of belt] round
728
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our waists.’” 729 How this legally mandated physical differentiation of non-Muslims
within the Muslim communities was actually and historically applied and how it
subsequently affected their recognition and legal treatment within sharīʻa courts is hard
to definitively determine. 730 However, this historical differentiation remains relevant for
tracing the parity between defendants within nineteenth-century Egypt.
Premodern Muslim jurists disagreed over whether a Muslim defendant should
receive capital punishment (qiṣāṣ) for the murder (intentional killing) of a non-Muslim,
as he would for the murder of a Muslim. Some jurists, namely the Ḥanafīs (the official
school of the Ottoman Empire and of Ottoman Egypt through the twentieth-century),
offered no privileged protection to a Muslim defendant for murdering a non-Muslim
while others, like the Shāfiʻīs, maintained such privileged protections. 731 Still, another
school, the Mālikīs, carved out an exception for a Muslim defendant’s murder of a nonMuslim: capital punishment was only available when he did so treacherously (qatl alghīla). 732 Jurists also disagreed about manslaughter, which ordinarily only called for
pecuniary compensation (diya). Some jurists did not call for capital punishment (a
position that only the Ḥanafīs took) as they saw a non-Muslim’s life, where others as her
fetus, equated to only half of a Muslim’s life; where others preached that a non-Muslim’s
life was only equal to one-third of a Muslim’s life (the Shāfiʻīs). 733 Each school justified
its opinion through its own proof text. Some jurists relied on the Prophet’s saying
(ḥadīth), “The diya of a non-Muslim (kāfir) is half the diya for a Muslim,” while others
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took the more egalitarian position expressed in the Quranic verse: “And if a people come
between whom and them there is a covenant, then the blood-money must be paid unto
them and (also) a believing slave must be set free (kaffāra, or expiation)” (Qur’ān
4:92). 734
One rule upon which “Muslims were in agreement” (ijtamaʻa al-muslimūn),
however, within the jurisprudence was in regards to the equality (kafā’a) of Muslims and
non-Muslims accused of theft. All schools held that the hand of a Muslim defendant was
equal to the hand of a non-Muslim defendant, analogizing from the tradition that “if a
non-Muslim’s property is forbidden to him [Muslim] as a Muslim’s property is
forbidden, then a non-Muslim’s life is equally protected as a Muslim’s life” (wa amma
min ṭarīq al-qiyās, fa innahum iʻtamadū ‘alā ijmā‘ al-muslimīn fī anna yada al-muslim
tuqṭaʻ idhā saraqa min māl al-dhimmī, qālū, fa idha kānat ḥurmat mālihi ka-ḥurmat mal
al-muslim, fā ḥurmat dammihi ka-ḥurmat damihi). 735 Where the juristic logic is less clear
here is why and how, according to juristic consensus or the “collective consciousness”
(ijmāʻ al-muslimīn), a person’s worth was inextricably tied to his or her property.
Observed through a Marxist lens, this relationship between property and persons sheds
light on the distinctions chosen within the juristic tradition, creating a line of inquiry
related to the equality of persons that both theoretically and historically existed between
criminal defendants within the sharīʻa (and, as we shall see, further unfolds in
discussions on the equality of defendants vis-à-vis slaves). Through these various rules,
both egalitarian and hierarchical, a certain framework emerged in which a defendant
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received protections depending on which doctrinal threshold their alleged conduct was
measured against in society.
It was through these hierarchical rules of punishment, which comprised the legal
doctrine within the sharīʻa that some general concept of egalitarianism pervaded Islamic
legal thought. Louise Marlow has traced the origins of this concept to the worldview of
the Arab tribes that inhabited pre-Islamic Arabia. 736 The rules of fiqh did not differentiate
between race or class, and few categories within the fiqh’s differential rules of
punishment captured or effected these latter distinctions. Still, being a non-Muslim, a
woman, or a slave had an enduring effect on the applicable law in local OttomanEgyptian sharīʻa courts until the dissolution of these courts in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century. The Ḥanafī doctrine—the official school of the Ottoman Empire—
made the fewest distinctions between criminal defendants, at least with respect to their
legal status as non-Muslims or slaves. 737 Yet, as already mentioned, criminal matters did
not just appear before the state’s councils, but as a matter of first instance. These criminal
cases concurrently arrived in sharīʻa courts that applied these rules of differential
punishment to criminal defendants who appeared before them. 738 In this sense, we may
point to what Marlow termed as “infringements of this egalitarian ideal” 739 through the
application of Islamic legal doctrine on the local level, even if such infringements co-
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existed with simultaneous modes of hierarchy and egalitarianism as expressed in the rules
of legal standing that pertained to defendants within fiqh rules of jurisprudence.
With these differential rules within the legal tradition, the dominant story of the
birth of the concept of equality (as well as liberty) in nineteenth-century Egypt often
begins with Rafāʻa al-Ṭahṭāwī (d. 1873), an Egyptian Azharite scholar, who studied in
Paris under the auspices of Mehmed Ali and who witnessed France’s 1830 Revolution.
Upon his return to Egypt, he published his account of what he had witnessed in France. 740
As Albert Hourani pointed out, al-Ṭahṭāwī saw Egypt as “part of the Islamic umma, but
she has also been a separate [‘Egyptian’] umma, in ancient and modern times alike …
Although Muslim, she is not exclusively so, for all who live in Egypt are part of the
national community.” 741 Al-Ṭahṭawī, however, still viewed Christians and Jews as
“protected peoples” (ahl al-dhimma; dhimmī, sing.) whose legal status within the sharīʻa
called them to have a “separate, but equal” status, even though he argued for taking the
“gentler” approach towards them and allowing them religious freedom. 742
The legal tradition’s concept of the dhimmī raises a number of questions regarding
the historical process by which non-Muslims came to be included within the larger
Egyptian umma during the nineteenth century. Such a concept eventually met resistance
as Western powers began to exert influence over the Ottoman Empire and its rulers,
spreading the concept of equality, if not also the residues of superiority, within what they
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considered to be the “Sick Man of Europe.” 743 In 1855, the Tanẓimāt, 744 set reforms
aimed at “modernizing” a waning Ottoman Empire. Those reforms finally instituted
formal (legal) equality between Muslims and non-Muslims and allowed non-Muslims to
officially become soldiers and not pay the pool tax, the jizya. The jizya had already been
formally abolished in Egypt by Said Pasha in 1855, yet prior to that in 1820 Mehmed Ali
had already declared Muslims and non-Muslims equals before the law. 745 As a result of
that law, in theory, Egypt’s non-Muslims had less reason to view themselves and to be
viewed by others as a “protected” class.
In light of the top-down effect that this legal decree had on the equality of nonMuslims before the khedival state, it is, nevertheless, a main contention in this chapter
that Egypt’s non-Muslims toiled to obtain their own equality. What I am arguing here, in
contrast to what Tariq al-Bishrī, Hussein Agrama, and Saba Mahmoud may have
articulated, is that the abolition of the legal category of dhimmī within modern Egyptian
law was not only a product of a “secular” state (or the modern concept of “secularism”
that enveloped this state and directed its purposes) but was first and foremost a product of
a historical struggle—a historical struggle in which Egypt’s dhimmīs through dogged
attempts achieved their equality from the state. They did not achieve it simply as a “ruled
minority” (milla maḥkūma), but as agentive participants in their own history who
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demanded justice from their khedival state on an equal footing with Muslims.
Accordingly, this revised historical account becomes critical in revising a theory for why
Egypt’s non-Muslims should be considered as equals before the law: not simply, because
they stood against British (or French) Occupation, but rather because they in their own
rights and for their own rights, struggled to be seen before and by their khedival state—
both in tandem with and in opposition to this state’s efforts—in order to achieve their
own inclusion in the evolving conception of justice in nineteenth-century Egypt.
Half of a Man’s Worth
Al-Ṭahṭāwī was not only a pioneer in envisioning an Egyptian umma in which
Copts were an integral part but, like a growing number of nineteenth-century Egyptian
thinkers, began to develop a more inclusive vision of Egyptian society that entailed an
enhanced role for women. As Leila Ahmed noted in Women and Gender in Islam,
Mehmed Ali’s men of knowledge who travelled and imbibed Western ideas and
translated them into nineteenth-century Egyptian society, including Al-Ṭahṭāwī along
with ‘Alī Mubārak, one of the leading architects of Egyptian education during the
nineteenth century, became some of the leading voices in championing a space for
Egyptian women—and slaves—within Egyptian society. 746 In reiterating Judith Tucker’s
critical account of the harsh conditions that nineteenth-century women faced in
employment and subsistence under the structural changes, including the conscription of
their husbands in the civilian army or to work on irrigation cannals or railroads (instituted
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by Mehmed Ali and carried further by his heirs), 747 Ahmed, nevertheless, pointed out the
“state rhetoric and eventually state action” that brought about social and intellectual
changes, particularly for upper-class women in nineteenth-century Egypt. 748 For
example, by highlighting the opening of a Medical School in 1832, in which women were
trained as medical doctors (ḥakīmas), Ahmed focuses our attention on “a history
affecting…in one way or another and [on] a discourse in which that history, those
struggles, still live.” 749
As important as this account has been in highlighting the changes in both law and
politics that enveloped nineteenth-century Egypt, including the spaces that both men and
women came to inhabit within it, the account still does not capture the full extent of these
changes. This gap occurs mainly because while Ahmed highlights how an emerging
administrative state affected the socio-economic opportunities that were now available to
women in nineteenth-century Egypt, she omits a full description of how women affected
their own fates (how they became participants) during the nineteenth century, and more
specifically, how they affected the legal tradition that enveloped the socio-economic
conditions that subsequently affected both men and women. In other words, “those
struggles” that Ahmed alludes to recede in her narrative of how Mehmed Ali’s state
predominantly molded the plight of the workers, peasants, and women, showcasing little
popular resistance or ingenuity in making history and, consequently, little effect on the
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traditional barriers that kept members of these groups contained as subjects of the
administrative state.
Other accounts outline more clearly this agency. Amira Sonbol’s archival work on
eighteenth-century sheds light on the greater role that women had at the end of the
eighteenth century compared to what she considered to be the contracted agency of
women under Mehmed Ali’s state during the first half of the nineteenth century. 750
Relying on her own archival work, as well as that of Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot and
Mary Ann Fay on women in eighteenth-century registers, as well as Nelly Hanna’s work
on the seventeenth century, Sonbol in confronting Ahmed’s progressive thesis on the
nineteenth century contended that “the historical transformations of the last two centuries,
although allowing women a greater public role, actually brought about a general
deterioration in social maneuverability, especially for women.” 751 While Sonbol’s
historical archival approach elucidates the agency of nineteenth-century women, as that
of their predecessors, and shows how they were able to exert this agency onto their
administrative state, it does not support this deterioration in the “social maneuverability”
thesis, as the next section of this chapter will aim to show. 752 Rather, women in
nineteenth-century Egypt, even against the constraints placed on them vis-à-vis Mehmed
Ali’s administrative state, continued to appear before state councils.
Nevertheless, as Judith Tucker’s work illustrated, women’s socio-economic
power continued to contract under the khedival state’s monopolization of manufacturing,
which began in the 1830s. Yet this contraction, most notable amongst working-class
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women, did not mean that poor Egyptian women did not regularly engage the state
apparatus and demanded rights during the nineteenth century. On the contrary, as the next
section will illustrate, women in nineteenth-century Egypt regularly appeared before the
state’s administrative state councils and made claims against both men and women for
homicide and assault committed against them and their relatives. While it is plausible that
a decrease in poorer women’s economic roles may have led to a contraction in their legal
status, women in nineteenth-century Egypt hardly shied away from laying their claims to
criminal matters before the khedival state and demanding justice on behalf of their
murdered or injured brothers, sons, and daughters. It is in this retrospective light of the
juristic tradition, then, I will now turn to the second category in which the equality of
defendants within the legal doctrine came into question: between men and women.
As with the treatment of dhimmīs, Muslim jurists disagreed as to whether
defendants stood equally with respect to gender. As a general rule, Muslim jurists agreed
that capital punishment (qiṣāṣ) could not be exacted on a man for the murder of a woman
(annahu lā yuqtal al-dhakar bil-unthā). 753 As we will see, this rule would change
dramatically during the nineteenth century, as the khedival state, following Ottoman
qānūn, already exacted capital punishment on men for the murder of women, most
notably their wives, even if the legal tradition proclaimed that the punishment of a man
for the murder of a woman remained subject only to pecuniary measures (diya, “blood
price”), and even then, it remained the case that the blood price of a woman’s life was
half that of a man’s (idha qutila al-rajul bil-mar’a, kāna ‘alā awliyā’ al-mar’a niṣf al-
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diya). 754 Proponents of this hierarchical view relied on the Quranic phrase: “The female
for the female” (al-unthā bil-unthā) (al-Baqara 2:178). 755 On the other hand, some jurists
questioned whether capital punishment of a man for the murder of a woman was possible
in light of the Quranic restatement of the Biblical rule: “And we have commanded them
‘a life for a life’” (al-Mā’ida 5:45). 756 The question of whether a divine law in an earlier
revelation was mandated for the Muslim community as a whole became part of this
question of the value of a woman’s life within the sharīʻa. Yet, even medieval jurists,
such as Ibn Rushd, through Ottoman jurists, including Ibn ‘Ᾱbidīn, acknowledged that
the principle of “public welfare” (maslaḥa) would guide the policy of “capital
punishment of a man for the murder of a woman” (qatl al-rajul bil-mar’a huwa al-naẓr
ilā al-maslaḥa al-‘āmma). 757 Presumably, as it was imagined, a society that did not
punish a defendant, or punished a defendant to a lesser degree, for murdering a woman,
would be putting itself in harm’s way. As we will see, this “public welfare” (maslaḥa)
argument, while active within Ottoman politics (and reflected within Ḥanafī fiqh
doctrine), 758 would subsequently take on a new significance during the nineteenth century
andit would come to turn directly on the question of the attainment of equality before the
criminal law within nineteenth-century Egypt.
Bound by the Master
Nineteenth-century Ottoman Egypt reflected two important legal trends related to
emancipation of slaves: formal legal equality and formal abolition. Within the Empire’s
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remaining provinces, 759 Egypt, becoming more autonomous by the mid-nineteenth
century, especially after the 1860s, when Khedive Ismāʻīl (r. 1863-79) was given almost
complete control over his inherited province. 760 By the last decades of the nineteenth
century, one issue that did not appear to be within the Khedive’s control, however, was
the thorny issue of abolition demanded by British interventionists after the 1880s with
direct implications for another thorny issue at the time: Egypt’s relationship to its former
khedival colony, Sudan. The Sudan had been re-subjected to join British-Egyptian
control in 1898 after the incipience of the Mahdist revolt, against khedival forces in 1881,
the same year of the ‘Urābī Revolt.
Debates on this topic included the inclusion of Sudan in Egypt, as well as the
inclusion of former black slaves, who were referred to as “Sudanese” (sudānī) within late
and early-twentieth-century Egyptian society. A less well-studied aspect of the issue of
slavery in nineteenth-century Egypt, however, is the relationship between legal abolition
and its social and legal effects on the application of the various rules of fiqh that pertained
to slaves. In such cases, the legal category of slavery would persist in siyāsa councils and
in foreign consular courts until at least the 1853 in the case record, 761 while the legal
categories of “slave” (‘abd) and “free” (ḥurr) would continue to operate in sharīʻa courts
until their eventual replacement by National Courts in 1883. 762 These categories would
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designate a potential line of inquiry through which we may be able to trace the concept of
freedom and its absence within the legal tradition into the application of this concept into
nineteenth-century Egypt.
By accepting the concept of “slavery” (‘ubūdīya) and “slaves” (‘abīd) terms
extant within the legal tradition, just as we accepted the translation both linguistically and
socially of “criminal defendant” (muddaʻā ‘alayhi), we may illustrate the framework
through which the rules that affected criminal defendants as free or as enslaved
subsequently affected the legal landscape of nineteenth-century Egypt. According to the
doctrine of the Shāfiʻīs and the Mālikīs, a free defendant who murdered a slave would not
receive the death penalty (capital punishment). The basis that jurists gave for this opinion
was Qur’ān 2:178: “Retaliation is prescribed for you in the matter of the murdered; the
free man for the free man and slave for the slave and the female for the female.” Here, it
should be emphasized that it was the text of the Qur’ān that provided a clear statement of
the rule to be applied, not just the jurists’ legal interpretation (ijtihād). 763 It was only the
Ḥanafīs who held that a free defendant was liable for the murder of a slave that was not
his own (yuqtal al-ḥurr bil-‘abīd illā ‘abd nafsihi). 764 Here, the opinion of Abū Ḥanīfa,
the eponym of the official Ottoman school, embraced the most egalitarian doctrine as
practiced within the legal tradition through the auspices of the Sulṭān and later accepted
and mediated by late Ḥanafī jurists and applied into the nineteenth century. Yet, as we
will see, even this most egalitarian doctrine, affirmed by Ibn ‘Ᾱbidīn in the early
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nineteenth-century, would continue to be moved by the khedival administrative state
towards the adoption of an applied policy (siyāsa) of greater parity before the law. Slave
owners would stand as defendants punished for the murder and assault of their own
slaves that men came to stand as defendants who could be punished corporally (or
criminally in addition to monetarily) for their murder of women.
As will be discussed in the next section, these deviations from the fiqh tradition
show the limits of considering legal change in nineteenth-century Egypt only as an intrafiqh debate, for legal change does not only occur within legal treatises and manuals, but
most concretely, such change appears within history itself. Thus, taking into
consideration both the state’s priorities as well as the persons who regularly appeared
before it, we are reminded of the dynamism that undergirded nineteenth-century Egypt.
ON A MORE EQUAL FOOTING BEFORE THE STATE
Seen by the State
As a modern state began to scrutinize its subjects and their grievances, as the
Pasha saw young Manṣūra, this state began to see defendants as standing on a more equal
footing and became less strict in the application of the jurisprudential rules that defined
the legal tradition. The powerful, like the white man Jean Printz, were brought down
from their high horses to account for their crimes on the lowly peasant, the master’s
kurbāj, formerly used against his slave, was turned against him, and the husband’s body
came before the state to account for the violence that he inflicted on his wife. 765 Within
this new air of “high modernism,” as James Scott dubbed it, the khedival state came to
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view a defendant scientifically as both a mind (as discussed in Chapter Two) and a body
(as discussed in Chapter Three), as opposed to a subject of the divinely destined to exist
within a hierarchical structure. To this effect, the hierarchy through which defendants
appeared before the attentive eyes of the khedival state gradually disappeared.
The first reason had to do with the khedival state and how, during the nineteenth
century, the state began to see subjects like Manṣūra, Jamīla, and Girgis Buṭrus with a
focus on their bodies, their stories, and their communities—in a more intimate way.
Beginning in the 1830s, throughout Egypt’s governorates, police stations (ḍabṭīyāt)
embodied this new kind of scrutiny that Egypt’s subjects underwent under the watchful
eye of their khedival rulers and their agents. Interrogations took place in these police
stations in which defendants and witnesses were called, often dragged in for questioning,
with their testimonies presented and recorded before officials. Officials examined bodies
of victims for circumstantial evidence that became collected and admitted into evidence,
all in addition to an attendant search for human intention. The state came to use this
burgeoning evidence in order to trace the underlying causes of crime. 766 Through this
increasing scrutiny, in which full names, ages, birthplaces, locations, and occupations,
were collected and recorded by the state’s agents, the defendant was now read off a
transcript that appeared before the state, as described in Chapter Four. This gradual
process of individualization also included vaccinations, identification cards, and
passports that were now all issued and provided by the state to identify a burgeoning
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number of the khedival state’s local Ottoman subjects. 767 These effective nineteenthcentury processes culminated in defendants gradually beginning to appear before the
nineteenth-century khedival state—numbered, counted, and, scrutinized.
Through this ubiquitous scrutiny, the traditional categories of the sharīʻa,
according to which defendants sat and stood adversely against plaintiffs before the judge
gradually began to matter less before the khedival state councils that adjudicated over
criminal cases. How scrutinizing more defendants could bring about this notable parity
before the state is part of the larger story, despite the paradox that more scrutiny lead to
less discrimination. Several reasons may explain this seeming paradox of how criminal
defendants became equal before the law.
One explanation is the increasing number of state councils (or majālis) instituted
across the nineteenth century, established under Mehmed Ali and carried further by his
sons and grandsons. The majālis continued to adjudicate over criminal cases, holding
parallel jurisdiction with the sharīʻa courts. Through the state’s administrators, their
predecessors in previous centuries were concerned with the welfare of the Pasha’s
province—that is, the stability and well-being of Egypt and its subjects. Law and order
were not just prized for their own sake or treated as divine law but maintained as directly
benefiting the security and prosperity of Egypt’s peasants, foreigners, agriculture, army,
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and foreign investment. 768 When the fiqh was silent or reticent about the state’s
prerogatives to prosecute, the siyāsa councils heard cases that ordinarily would not have
entered sharīʻa courts: cases where plaintiffs (non-Muslims, women, and slaves) would
not ordinarily have legal standing in the sharīˊa. As depicted in previous chapters, the
state prosecuted defendants—foreigners, men, Muslims, and free persons—in the name
of various victims, despite the narrow definition of standing under the sharīʻa and despite
the privileges conferred on resident foreigners by the Capitulations and undertook it all
for the sake of protecting Egypt.
It should be noted that even before khedival siyāsa gradually undid the
hierarchical differences in legal standing within the juristic tradition, Ottoman criminal
law reversed these effects. First, it did away with the requirements for legal standing as a
requirement presented in the fiqh: for example, Ottoman criminal law made all of the
Sultan’s subjects—no matter who they were—prosecutable by the Ottoman state if they
committed one of the enumerated wrongs: murder, theft, assault, rape, and pulling on
someone’s beard. 769 The Ottoman Criminal Code (OCC), the ultimate emblem of
Ottoman bureaucratization and consolidation of state power that was applied in Egypt
since Selim I conquered it in 1517, effectively undid the shadows of the sharʻ that
required a defendant to stand in relation to a particular kind of victim. 770 Presumably, the
defendant committed the crime against the Sultan, the state, and not against the plaintiff.
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As Ottoman siyāsa persisted into the nineteenth century, 771 defendants now stood before
the Shadow of the Sultan through his state to account for a crime as opposed to the judge
and their victims.
But Ottoman law also added to these traditional hierarchies. It reconfigured the
fiqh by allowing for the harsher punishment of Muslims than for non-Muslims, where
free persons were punished for more acts than slaves, women less than men, and the rich
punished more than the poor. 772 It is this clear inversion of the traditional hierarchy that
stands out in the Ottoman Criminal Code. Here, the recidivist fornicator was shunned by
the community. Those who held greater status were now expected to act in the name of
their religion and their honor as respectable persons, and they, by the same token, became
liable to greater punishments than those of lesser status. As Rudolph Peters pointed out,
Ottoman criminal law also depended on “the culprit’s financial means,” a category not
considered in the rules of punishment articulated by the fiqh though it was recognized as
a valid consideration that fell within the discretionary punishments available to the
judge. 773 In this way, it appears that Ottoman law brought about a certain social hierarchy
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in which the interests of the state vis-à-vis society absorbed the meting out of punishment
to the Empire’s varied subjects across provinces.
In nineteenth-century Egypt, these distinctions, as we have already seen in
previous
chapters and as we will see below, came to matter less before an administrative state
concerned with ordering society through the criminal law than with observing the
distinctions enshrined within the legal tradition. Thus, free persons came to be prosecuted
in numerous cases for the murder and assault of slaves, including their own. Most
crucially, the murder of women by men now entered the purview of the state as an affair
that required public censure and punishment, beyond the defendant’s customary liability
for half the blood-money ordinarily due to the victim or her heirs from a male defendant
or his relatives (‘āqila), as had been prescribed within the tradition. 774 The khedival state,
thus, began to seek out and punish the males accused of harming women, primarily
motivated by a priority to excise latent criminality observed within Egyptian society. It
was this drive to excise criminality that the khedival state exhibited, which occurred to
the background of the burgeoning literary discussions in scientifica and legal journals in
Europe and in Egypt from the 1860s onwards.
We can say, then, that the major impetus behind this more egalitarian view of
Egypt’s subjects was the state itself. Through the various apparatuses instituted and tools
deployed by the khedival state—from police stations and state councils, forensic
medicine, identification cards, and vaccinations, as well as passports in nineteenth-
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century Egypt—the criminal defendant stood before the state, counted and scrutinized for
potential wrong, whether that potential wrong resulted from mental illness, disease, or
other underlying causes that would bring deleterious effects upon society. It was such
scrutiny that primarily drove a practice of seeing defendants as—not simply as souls that
belonged to God, but as bodies that belonged to the state—bodies counted equally before
the law. Yet, as this chapter also argues, the law was not the end-all-be-all for
establishing this practice of parity amongst Egypt’s Ottoman subjects. The caracoal, the
police station, the majlis, and the appeals councils came into existence as loci of where
petitioners arduously sought justice from the state. Still, it has to be emphasized that it
was Egypt’s own subjects who first sought this justice from the state. Like Mansūra’s
guardians, Jamīla’s parents, and Girgis Buṭrūs’ son, they took to the administrative state
in order to seek justice.
Seeking the State
Beginning in the nineteenth century, a notable change took place in Egypt.
Mehmed Ali’s domestic policies in many ways fueled his military ambitions abroad,
thereby putting him on a collision course with Istanbul, even if they made Egypt a
laboratory of modernizing reforms that seemed to define the nineteenth-century Middle
East. One of the earliest reforms occurred in the early 1820s. A new “equality between
Muslims, Christians, and Jews” 775 seemed to abolish the centuries-old Ottoman millet
system applied in Egypt, three decades before Sultan Abdülmecid’s 1856 Ottoman decree
of equality for all Ottoman subjects. Yet, as Eugene Rogan notes, “this earlier decree [of
equality] had more to do with Muhammad ‘Ali’s wish to tax and conscript all Egyptians
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on an equal basis, without distinction based on religion, than with any concern to liberate
minority communities.” 776 Although this new feature of Egyptian legal equality
distinguished it from the rest of the Ottoman Empire in the 1820s and 1830s, and made
cities including Alexandria and Cairo attractive to Christian and Jewish European
immigrants, especially Greeks and Italians, it would not be accurate to claim that
Mehmed Ali completely abolished the centuries-old millet system that continued to
define nineteenth-century Ottoman Egypt’s subjects in relationship to one another.
This interactive process took place for a number of reasons, not least of which
was Mehmed Ali’s civilian army, which brought together peasants conscripted from
various parts of Egypt, hardening their experiences decades before they became defined
by a concept of “society” comprised of equal members. Women of different socioeconomic backgrounds also continued to toil in fields and to make goods with their hands
at home and in factories. 777 They also worked in newly-built hospitals as doctors
(ḥakīmas) and nurses to serve the Pasha’s new army and in new schools built from the
1860s onwards for the education of girls. 778 And after the failure of conscripting enslaved
subjects in the Sudan during the 1820s, the Pasha established an empire through
territorial expansions that extended as far north to Crete and as far south to the Sudan. In
doing so, Egypt persisted on its dependence on slaves who became part of the household,
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including high-status eunuchs, and in the fields. 779 While Mehmed Ali “appears to have
defied many of the Capitulation restrictions that were supposed to apply in all Ottoman
territories,” 780 this was not entirely the case. In 1839, by the forced end of his reign over
Syria, European powers, namely the British, through the Treaty of Balta Liman in 1838,
had eliminated the vast majority of the Pasha’s monopolies and re-imposed the privileged
tariff rate of 3 percent to foreign merchants. 781 Nevertheless, the Pasha’s already vigorous
efforts to attract European savants, physicians, merchants, and investors since the 1820s
with the building of the Maḥmudīya Canal, contributed to making Cairo, Alexandria, and
(later) Port Said, and filled these urban centers with foreigners, their business, as well as
their legal problems.
Thus, while the police stations and state councils became signifiers for an
evolving sense of justice at the state level, the influx of diverse Ottoman subjects—both
local and foreign, peasants and elites—into nineteenth-century Egypt created a laboratory
through which Egypt’s subjects turned towards their state to resolve their grievances.
What also drove this evolving sense of justice in the nineteenth-century was the
increasing influx of foreigners who moved to Egypt during this time. 782 Their stories—
apparent in numerous court cases—were inextricably linked to local subjects (referred to
also as “Arab” in foreign documents), local authority, local streets, local streetcars, trains,
telegraphs, and all the other aspects that began to color (both figuratively and literally)
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nineteenth-century Egypt. 783 Meanwhile, a complex hierarchy between foreigners (and
their “protected” legal status) and locals (and their status as ordinary Ottoman subjects)
solidified during this time. 784 And so, throughout the nineteenth century, even though
markers of ethnicity (ajnabī ,‘arab), social status (bāshā, āghā, fallāḥ), religion (Muslim,
dhimmī), and gender (al-rajul, al-ḥurma) abound in court registers and official letters and
implicate a hierarchy of persons, these differences did not hinder subjects from raising
their voices and their cases against a person whose legal status precluded them from
having the legal standing to bring forward a case against them, petitioning authority, and
expecting justice be done on their behalf.
New institutions and technologies facilitated these new interactions in nineteenthcentury Egypt by allowing for Egypt’s own to see others, to hear their stories of injustice,
and to petition their state with these stories in mind. The railroad built in 1852 allowed
for an easier means of transport, for correspondences to be delivered, for subjects to
interact with one another across Egypt’s various governorates, and in doing so, allowed
subjects to see themselves compared to others’ across cultural formations—names,
appearances, occupations, social status. This exposure ineluctably developed within
Egypt’s varied subjects a sense, though more importantly, a memory of their reframed
identity within nineteenth-century Egypt. 785 This process of self-discovery and
remembering took place on plantations as early as the 1830s, in homes and brothels, in
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newspapers (al-Waqā’iʻ al-Miṣrīya beginning in the 1860s), but often, in police stations,
which became the linchpin of self-discovery and self-identification, and so occupied
center stage in the social dramas of nineteenth-century Egyptian life. 786
By the third quarter of the century, new cafés and salons, as well as journals and
newspapers in English, French, and Arabic filled new neighborhoods and newsstands
throughout Cairo and Alexandria, as Egypt’s existing neighborhoods underwent
architectural expansion under Khedive Ismāʻīl and attracted different persons. 787 It was
within these new social spaces that new ideas also developed about politics, society,
religion, law, and gender equality, while older concepts and categories were revisited and
redrawn. 788 Until the invention of the telegraph, the railroad also allowed for police in
one local to hear of the whereabouts of criminal suspects in other locales, and later, with
the telephone, revolutionized this crucial step of crime apprehension. It cannot be
overemphasized how police, police stations, and state councils established in the 1840s
had already become milestones that signaled how Egypt’s different subjects related to
their state, how they understood its expanding authority, but also how they themselves
stood in relationship to others vis-à-vis this expanded governmental authority.
A defendant’s appearance before the state became a means by which the
traditional social relations began to be equalized. Such appearances also allowed different
defendants who could change their appearance to appear more equal relative to others
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before the state. Whereas it had been prescribed for non-Muslims since the earliest
Muslim communities to signal themselves by wearing certain colors, the mass
manufacturing of clothing during the nineteenth century, including the fez (or ṭarbūsh)
and how it became part of school uniforms by the early twentieth century subsequently
revolutionized how Egypt’s Ottoman subjects came to see themselves. They could now
see themselves as equal to others, while their state also gradually came to see them more
equally. 789 These feelings of belonging as an equal within turn-of-the-century Egyptian
society contributed to the strong visceral feelings felt by Egyptians to the Dinshaway
hangings in 1906.
Without the traditional differentiation of sumptuary markers, non-Muslims and
Muslims, as well rich and poor, as well as peasant and pasha began to have a sense of
their space and an ability to blend in and belong while, most importantly, seen without
the traditional distinctions that had identified them in the past. This allowed for social
mobility and hard-working peasant women who were driven to succeed and to provide
for their children to arrive to Alexandria and Cairo from Upper Egypt and to assert
themselves even while carrying the traditional baggage. 790 While the traditional markers
denoting the dichotomies of Christian-Muslim, man-woman, enslaved-free began to
dissipate in the eyes of the state, another hierarchy in clothing also seemed to appear and
be played out in police stations: between foreigner and non-foreigner, which persisted
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into the twentieth century. 791 As in one notable case, “dressing foreigner” (lābis ajnabī)
made defendants less suspicious before the state well into the twentieth century. 792 As
such, if a defendant could mask himself in trousers, button-downed shirts or don herself
in a blouse and high-heels, effectively “passing” as a foreigner, they could thwart
detection by police authorities. 793 The rarity of European clothes and the privilege of
owning them within nineteenth-century Egyptian society may, thus, explain the numerous
cases in which, by 1919, “stolen clothes” marked the prosecutorial record. 794 Yet, even
when worn to marsk their identities, clothes began to have an egalitarian effect on how
defendants saw themselves, were recognized, and subsequently treated by their khedival
administrative state.
Claiming Justice
The hierarchy associated with the Circle of Justice began to disappear for two
reasons. The first was the state and its policy of maintaining public order, now supported
by police stations and state councils before which from the 1840s onward, different
defendants began to appear. The second reason had to do with the people who
increasingly had to look towards the state through these new avenues created by new
technological and cultural advancements, which cultivated a process through which
defendants—whether high or low in their status—became equals before the law. While
“being seen” has been described as a passive act, one in which the authoritative power
rested entirely with the state, there was, nevertheless, agency on the part of petitioners
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who approached their state with their grievances. It was an agency supported by the
cultural and technological advancements that placed defendants on a more equal footing
in relation to their traditional legal framework. It is through this dual process, of seeing
and being seen by the state, that a “high modernism” as described by James Scott came
about in nineteenth-century Egypt, a process that would inculcate a certain parity in the
treatment of religious minorities, women, and slaves that adhered less to the hierarchy
that traditionally defined defendants’ fates within the legal tradition. 795 Through this
violent act in which the privacy within the legal tradition became circumscribed by the
priorities of the state, a certain parity between defendants, nevertheless, evolved, and it is
through this entrenched practice of seeking justice—sought after first by Egypt’s subjects
and secondly by the state—that the concept of equality before the law came into
existence.
Embodying this practice of seeking justice and connecting Egypt’s subjects to the
new institutions where this justice was imagined to exist was the petition—or sharḥ. By
the mid-nineteenth century, the petitions that either Egypt’s non-Muslims, women, and
slaves themselves or through their legal representative (wakīl) brought against those who
caused them injustice, as well as the petitions brought against them before the state,
formed what Bruno Latour called “the moyen”—“this little vehicle on which is
transported the rule of law.” 796 Thus, the rules of legal standing entrenched within the
legal tradition, while they were already the most equitable under the Ḥanafī doctrine
adopted by the Ottoman state, saw Muslim defendants prosecuted by the state for crimes
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they committed against dhimmīs, with men punished corporally for crimes committed
against women, and with masters who were brought to account for crimes committed
against even their own slaves. Thus, just as the traditional doctrine of criminal intent or
the doctrine of evidence shifted to meet the state’s priority of establishing order, here the
traditional doctrine of legal standing transformed, allowing the prosecution of defendants
irrespective of their legal status, to meet that same priority. 797 Social status—whether rich
or poor, a pasha or a peasant, or a foreigner—would acquire greater significance as the
nineteenth century wore on. The traditional categories (dhimmī, ḥurma, and ‘abd),
however, began to matter less in the eyes of a khedival administrative state keen on
prosecuting defendants.
Petitioning reinforced this more leveled stage upon which defendants appeared
before the Egyptian state. By bringing their stories to the khedival state, Egypt’s various
petitioners called upon the state to see them and their grievances and to respond
accordingly. As “prayers” to government officials served a similar purpose in bringing
about equality in the U.S. during the nineteenth century, 798 they also became the vessel
through which the khedival state in Egypt saw its subjects as standing more equally. 799
Certainly, the petition did not enter the Egyptian legal landscape only in the nineteenth
century: it had already been the vehicle by which peasants could reach the Sultan. 800
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Nevertheless, the nineteenth century brought about tremendous changes within Egyptian
society. In tandem with the state’s priority to maintain order and the burgeoning cultural
and technological changes at foot (the medical school, the railroad, the telegraph, and the
telephone), the petition (the sharḥ) gave voice to those who sought to challenge the
traditional limitations to their own legal standing, as carved out within the fiqh. 801 By the
middle of the nineteenth century, however, within what may be described as a “middle
modernism,” the khedival state would gradually come to see defendants as standing on
more equal footing inspite of the traditional status quo limitations that quietedly place
defendants before the state.
As previously described, the Ḥanafī doctrine already exhibited the greatest
egalitarian mode with respect to the treatment of defendants, and for this reason, it
became adopted by the Ottoman state to provide leverage with which to prosecute and
convict criminal defendants without the protections that normally cloaked them within
the juristic tradition. While Ḥanafī doctrine delineated the state’s policy (or rather the
state’s policy here was determined by the Ḥanafī doctrine), Ottoman law (qānūn), as
Peters pointed out, governed procedural and jurisdictional matters while the sharīʻa still
effectively governed substantive matters, including the rules of homicide and assault
within the qāḍī’s court. 802 Qānūn undid the standing requirements within the fiqh (and at
times inverted them: Muslims generally received harsher punishment than non-Muslims,
for example) while with regard to the law of homicide or assault, the fiqh’s standing
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requirements still conformed the hierarchies described above. By this reasoning, the
hierarchical differences applied within the sharīʻa courts existed side-by-side between
defendants and came to define adjudication within the siyāsa councils.
The historically “protected” now became more confident during the nineteenth
century, less constrained to bring their grievances against Muslims they accused of
injuring them or killing their relatives. Seeking protection from the state, whether or not it
affirmed their traditional “protected” status, local and foreign Christians and Jews could
now bring their grievances to the state’s bureaucracy for adjudication weighed less by the
fact that they were traditionally seen as unequal to Muslims.803 They feared the
consequences of inequality less, whether fueled by the confidence that their khedival
state imbued in them to seek justice from it or by their own socio-economic mobility
propelled by the aid given to them by Christian foreigners as well as diplomatic and
evangelical missions. 804 Whatever the reason, we can see that Egypt’s Christians, both
local and foreigners, continued to take their cases to court, demanding remedy and
supported by the khedival state and its new buttressing institutions, in a way that began to
change the inscriptions of their status within the legal tradition.
For instance, on 16 Rabīʻ al-Awwal (June 26, 1869), a Cairene police station
received a letter regarding “one Muḥammad Shiḥāta, the Egyptian, who caused the injury
of one Christian named Buṭrus Ibrāhīm in his carriage” (tasabbaba fī iṣābat dhimmī
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yudʻā Butrus Ibrahīm fī ‘arabīyatihi). 805 Although the state (through its State Council,
Majlis al-Isti’nāf) had already expended 808 qirsh on the Christian man’s treatment,
showcasing what appeared to be an existing state health insurance scheme that had come
into being by the mid-1800s, the defendant, a Muslim, still received punishment by the
state (bi-irsālihi līmān iskandarīya) for assaulting Buṭrus. 806 Here, seeing the Christian
man’s injury by the defendant as problematic for the welfare of the entire state, the
khedival state worked to bring about a change in the legal tradition in which a Muslim’s
intentional assault (or homicide) against a dhimmī would have been received a lesser
censure or pecuniary punishment.
Nevertheless, the long-standing categories and perspectives on the religious other
within the legal tradition continued to define persons into the twentieth century. The
voices of dhimmīs like Butrūs Ibrahīm, as well as Girgis Buṭrūs’s son and wife (whom we
encountered in Chapter Three) allow us to re-conceptualize the inclusion of Egypt’s nonMuslims within Egypt’s nineteenth-century social and legal histories. 807 Non-Muslims
came to be defined not only by their participation in resistance against foreign rule, but
also increasingly seen as on a more equal level relative to Muslims by the khedival
state. 808 In this regard, although the khedival state aimed to prosecute defendants more
vigorously, its actions inadvertently allowed non-Muslims to see themselves as equals in
a way that they had not been within the traditional hierarchy.
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In a similar vein, nineteenth-century women did not remain silent in the face of a
khedival legal order that limited their voices, for women in nineteenth-century Egypt
persisted to decry injustices committed against them and their relatives. As several cases
in previous chapter have illustrated, women in nineteenth-century Egypt challenged men
who caused them and other members of their families grievous bodily harm. They did so
namely because new legal channels—police stations and state councils—became
available to them over the course of the nineteenth century, which came to hear and see
women’s serious grievances against men as problems for Egyptian society as a whole,
and therefore, as an impediment to maintaining law and order. Such was the case on 4
Rabīʻ Akhar 1294 (April 18, 1877), when a grievously injured Zahra bint Raḍwān
appeared before Cairo’s police station. Around 9 o’clock the evening before, Zahra was
in the local orange grocer (kānat bi-dukkān al-burtuqāl), near Bāb al-Sharʻīya, when
someone she did not know introduced himself to her as Sayyid (lamma shakhṣ lā
taʻrafuhu wa ‘arrafahā bi-anna ismahu al-sayyid). Women’s presence in grocery stores,
cotton fields, brothels, and other locales pushed them into public, even if limited, role
within nineteenth-century Egyptian life. 809 Nevertheless, upon seeing Zahra at the grocer,
Sayyid invited her over to his place for supper (thumma awrāhā bi-anna lahu manzil bilwalī wa ra’āha lil-tawajjuh maʻahu ilā al-manzil al-madhkūr lil-akl). 810 Her going with
him would eventually cost her her life: “he viciously beat her with a knife and threw
stones at her body injuring her stomach, cutting her lips, and leaving her body on the
809
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floor.” 811 It was this unrelenting violence towards women that became a growing concern
for the khedival state, 812 a policy that became enveloped with new ideas on the scientific
causes of this violence—alcoholism, mental disorders, unemployment, poverty, amongst
other social ills—that emanated during this time in scientific journals in Paris that made
their way to Cairo by the 1860s. 813 Through this knowledge, the state councils acted
where the sharʻ may have prevented or tied the hands of the state from doing so. 814 In
this capacity, the reality of dealing with violence of women by men compelled the state to
alter specific rules within the legal tradition, namely the rule that compelled men to pay
only half of the blood-money that would ordinarily be due to a man for murder.
It was in this same vein of maintaining public order that the state’s councils also
revisited the traditional rules related to the homicide and injury of slaves. Where even the
most liberal of the traditional rules (the Ḥanafī school) allowed for a master’s exoneration
for the murder of this own slave, here, the state’s siyāsa councils prosecuted masters for
murdering and injuring others’ as well as injuring their own slaves. 815 For example, as
early as 9 Dhū’l al-Qaʻda 1252 (February 15, 1837), the Pasha’s Vice-regal Council sent
Muṣṭafā Bey, the governor of Qiblī, a letter sent ordering the imposition of the death
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penalty (qiṣāṣan) by hanging of one Ḥusayn as a death penalty (qisāsan) for the murder
of a Christian slave, Mikhā’īl, who belonged to the shaykh of Salama. 816
It was not only one’s own slave whose death and injury the did the siyāsa
councils now sanction, but the latter councils now punished a master for the death or
injury of his own slave, moving away from the prescriptions within the fiqh that only
called for punishment for harming others’ slaves. On Dhūl Qaʻda 21, 1267 (September
17, 1851), following Mehmed Ali’s death and under his grandson ‘Abbas Ḥilmī I’s rule,
a case was reported to Majlis al-Aḥkām, which at this point was sitting in its first years as
Egypt’s highest executive judicial council. The case involved the death of a young
woman whose heirs claimed that she had been beaten by master ‘Alī using a long wooden
stick (nabbūt) after which the young woman fell to the ground and subsequently died. 817
The subsequent examination of the case made it clear that the state took a keen interest in
investigating any assault by a master against his own slave. 818 The interrogation of
witnesses brought forth the confirming testimony from Muṣṭafā, who claimed to have
been the slave of master ‘Alī himself and who witnessed and participated in the young
girl’s beating under the discretion of his master. While the prosecution of a master for the
assault or death of his own slave (a substantive legal issue) became a matter of state
concern, the procedural questions in the case were now governed by the sharīʻa. Here,
the question was whether Muṣṭafā was in fact ‘Alī’s slave or whether, as ‘Alī claimed, he
had been emancipated (kāna maʻtūq) at the time of the alleged beating, and therefore his
confession to participating in the beating could not be used as an admission against his
DWQ MS Box 95, File 1, Deftar 80, Doc. 84 (9 Dhūl-Qaʻdah 1252).
DWQ 0020-001303. Majlis al-Aḥkām. Case 98. 10 Jummādā Awwal 1267 (Tabiʻ Mudirīyat Qiblī).
818
DWQ 0020-001303. Majlis al-Aḥkām. Case 98. 10 Jummādā Awwal 1267 (Tabiʻ Mudirīyat Qiblī).
816
817

297

master. 819 For when interrogated, master ‘Alī, the primary suspect in the case, responded
by outright denying having ever beaten the young woman (wa bil-su’āl min al-sayyid ‘Alī
jāwaba bil-inkār). What this case highlights, however, beyond the discrepancies in
testimonies and evidence (not uncommon in criminal investigations), is that the khedival
state now undertook to prosecute the master for the injury of his own slave, molding a
different mode of justice in which both free and slave became equals before the law. 820
This move to punish master ‘Alī for the injury of his slave, however, was motivated less
by any theoretical inspiration to see the free as an equal to the enslaved but instead
motivated by a concretely calculated policy to stem reasons for rebellion or insurrection
and a larger policy to order Egyptian society. Egyptian law and the placement of
defendants on the same footing—including the enslaved and the free—would be shaped
in light of the ideas that emanated from Europe, imbibed by Egyptian intellectuals by the
end of the end of the nineteenth century and expressed through the khedival state’s drive
to order Egyptian society.
STANDING EQUALLY BEFORE THE LAW
Punished Equally
It was through a policy of scrutinizing Egypt’s varied subjects and their
grievances while maintaining public order that the strict rules of legal standing began to
change in nineteenth-century Egypt. In other words, before a Criminal Code in 1883
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infused the Enlightenment principle of equality before the criminal law, bringing about a
mode of equality and causing what some scholars have decried as an epistemic and moral
rupture in the fabric of the legal tradition, the khedival state had already begun to
gradually tilt the jurisprudential rules towards more equality between its subjects. 821
Punishing criminal defendants equally by the nineteenth-century khedival state began the
process of flattening out the Circle of Justice with its attendant hierarchies (with regard to
Muslims, women, and slaves), a process that led to a concept of society in which all now
stood equally before the law. To be clear, this was not a seamless process—but a
struggle—one in which the criminal law as a tool of governance was made most
apparent.
The process of seeing defendants as equals before the state eventually allowed for
the adoption of new laws and institutions that would imbue the criminal law with the
principle of equality. Through this process, Egypt’s subjects came to be scrutinized,
while also gradually coming to see themselves and others as standing on a more equal
footing before their state and their society. The story told by an earlier generation of
historians, including the one Albert Hourani elucidated for us in his canonical Arabic
Thought in a Liberal Age, generally begins with al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Parisian memoirs and his
translations of French penal and civil codes into Arabic, codes that made their way into
the Egyptian legal landscape and were realized through foreign consular courts and the
Mixed Court Tribunals. There is truth to this narrative, and the changes that we see in the
substance and procedure of siyāsa councils from what was traditionally understood and
821
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applied as legal standing within the tradition serves as adequate proof of this. However,
the birth of a certain instance of parity within a khedival administration of justice—the
treatment of criminal defendants—had already actualized al-Tahṭāwī’s translated
thoughts, even as the Azharite scholar was collecting them in Paris. The same logic, as
previous chapters have attempted to explicate, also went into the concepts of public
prosecution, criminal intent, and criminal evidence. In other words, the work of making
Egyptian law and, through it, Egypt, “modern” took place gradually and repeatedly, not
through any singular code or adaptation, but throughout the nineteenth century.
Part of this process, which unfolded over the course of the nineteenth century,
involved different criminal defendants who appeared across various plaintiffs in other
venues beside the state councils and sharīʻa courts. In these arenas, defendants stood as
equals within these venues as worthy of prosecution, a development that moved legal
practice further away from the tradition’s hierarchical doctrine on legal standing. 822 It
was within these venues that we come to see another legal change whereby multiple
plaintiffs stood against a single defendant, or vice versa. Certain entities now came to
stand, such as in 1898, when l’Société de tramways electriques brought a suit against
Jules Guillebert for “abus de confiance.” 823 The case file included several pieces of
evidence, including telegraphs and other correspondences, as well as the consular court’s
judgement. In this vein, consular courts, untethered from the hierarchical barriers within
the legal tradition and viewed criminal defendants on the same platform—or more
accurately, on the same platform for prosecution.
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Defendants who had traditionally been protected within the legal tradition became
targets of prosecution before the khedival state. Muslim defendants who held protected
status within the jurisprudence now had this protection stripped and allowed for them to
be prosecuted by the state for homicides and assaults, including those of public agents. 824
The consular court record abounds with such prosecutions, including the prosecution of
Idris and Hassan Nakrouf in 1898 for their assault of a police officer. Here, the case file
included the medical report of the criminal defendant (Idris Nakrouf) after the assault in
question. 825 By examining the case files, we can begin to see how defendants themselves
became the subjects of state scrutiny as their bodies (as we witnessed in Chapter Three)
became the object of this scrutiny. In an important transformation from within the legal
tradition, the state came to see the bodies of the accused as not within the hierarchy
prescribed within the legal tradition, but, rather, as sources of crime and social ills. 826 It
was this important shift that urged the seeing of criminal defendants as prosecutable on
an equal level before the state even with the continuance of foreign consural and Mixed
Court jurisdiction into the twentieth century.
One of the main reasons for the emergence of the Mixed Courts system in 1876
was the concern of foreign powers that their own subjects would not receive due process
of law in local sharīʻa courts. Yet, the initial hesitancy of khedival Egypt’s architects,
including Nubar Pasha, in the establishment of the Mixed Tribunals, nevertheless, had
less to do with these courts adjudicating over Muslim defendants who stood in front of
foreign plaintiffs; most of the cases heard by the Mixed Tribunals dealt with civil, not
824
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criminal matters, in which the defendant’s legal status was not implicated. 827 Moreover,
local siyāsa councils already heard, on behalf of foreign defendants, cases against local
defendants, and it was within these local siyāsa councils that defendants stood more
equally in front of the state prior to their formal equality enshrined in the criminal and
civil codes that animated the Mixed Court Tribunals, established in 1876, subsequently
followed by the National Court system, established in 1883.
Beyond the establishment of the Mixed Court Tribunals, the leveling of criminal
defendants in nineteenth-century Egypt also came about through the steps taken
internationally towards the abolition of slavery. British pressure to abolish the slave trade
in Egypt (the import and export of Sudanese slaves) led to the Anglo-Egyptian
Convention in 1877, which took place prior to the abolition of the sharīʻa courts’
jurisdiction over criminal matters in 1883. 828 The adoption of the 1877 Convention raises
the question of what effect such abolition had on the legal standing of slaves within the
sharīʻa courts. 829 As we saw above, the khedival state had already begun to put the lives
of slaves on a more equitable footing relative to their masters throughout the nineteenth
century—to consider the injury of slaves as an act worthy of punishment because it saw
the disposition of the free defendant to commit further crimes as something to be
stemmed within Egyptian society. 830 It is this state concern with the disposition to
commit crime that also led to the unfettering of the other unequal categories within the
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legal tradition, and it is this concern within this disposition that, as we saw, also affected
other persons whose standing was governed by the legal tradition.
Further aiding this move towards the placing of criminal defendants on a more
equal footing before the law was, as discussed in previous chapters, the Criminal Records
Form that created a standardized image of defendants in their appearances before the
khedival state during the period of British Occupation. A defendant’s name, age, height,
eye color, facial size as measured according to new rubrics, and past criminal records,
were now documented in detail and placed conforming with the new rubric of
measurements used to identify defendants. 831 The past criminal records of defendants
were now also documented in detail and placed into a “Resemblance Form” (waraqat
tashbīh, See Chapter Three) and defendants’ legal protections within the fiqh became
stripped away as they became equally prosecutable before the law irrespective of the
plaintiff’s social status. A fingerprint came to stand for the defendant an represented their
physical body in the light of the prescriptions of the legal tradition and carrying the
distinctions between defendants before the state. Thus, the new identification of the
defendant before the state brought the Muslim defendant down to the same level as the
Christian, turned a man into the same recognizable form as a woman, and placed the
descendants of slaves on the same footing as their ancestors’ masters before the law.
Seen Differently
Although Egypt’s 1883 Criminal Code, undergirded by the khedival policies
throughout the nineteenth century, came to see defendants as equals imbued with the
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same rights before the law, their actual treatment before the khedival state under British
Occupation rang a different tune. This dissonance between the law and its application
became embodied in the Committees of Brigandage that were now set up to deal with
what British officials perceived as an indigenous “Brigandage Problem” in Egypt by
1883. 832 The erection of these committees to adjudicate over local Ottoman subjects
within the Veiled Protectorate (1882-1914) exhibited this basic essential problem of
classical liberal theory (including due process of law) and its application. 833 As has been
explained above, British officials saw the Egyptian strand of highway robbery as bearing
“faint resemblance to European brigandage, going so far as to insist on calling it only
gang robbery.” 834 In the same vein as Buccianti’s chaos thesis and the French cartoon
described earlier, British officials, in apprehension of the tumultuous aftermath of the
‘Urabī Revolt, saw Egyptian brigands as “not averse to indulging in gratuitous
violence.” 835 Because of what they perceived as the violent nature of Egyptian brigands
and “lax law enforcement,” British authorities, therefore, felt the need to supplant Islamic
law and supplement newly-erected Egyptian native courts and codes with their own ad
hoc “Commissions of Brigandage” in order to ensure the punishment of suspected
brigands and to establish iron-clad “law and order” in their new, veiled protectorate. 836
By the early twentieth century, neighborhoods in Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said
attracted foreigners who lived side-by-side with locals. Still, while the diversity of these
cities by 1900 could draw on a rich history of social and legal relations between different
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Ottoman and foreign subjects that played out in consular courts throughout the nineteenth
century, historians have come to question the cosmopolitan nature of these cities. In
Alexandria, for example, Egyptian Jews filled entire neighborhhods. Thea Woolf, a new
Jewish migrant to the city in 1932, observed that upon her arrival “about 100,000 Jews”
lived in Egypt; 40,000 lived in Alexandria alone. 837 Still, as the influx of foreigners—
Muslims, Christians, and Jews—reconfigured the cultural landscape of Egypt’s emerging
urban centers (in film, literature, photography, and cafes), local “Egyptians”—formerly
Ottoman subjects—comprised the majority of those living under the British protectorate
in 1914. In this year, as reported in British records, Egyptians totaled 11,646,284 while
“foreigners” numbered 180,346. The following year, Egyptians totaled 11,798,948 while
“foreigners” were numbered at 184,380 and in 1916, Egyptians increased to 11,955,821
while number of “foreigners” rose to 186,390. 838 While smaller in numbers, foreigners
represented an important space by mid-nineteenth century as figures like the ItalianJewish director Togo Mizrahi and French-Jewish tycoon Solomon Cicurel continued to
be amongst Egypt’s leading entrepreneurs. By the time of the 1952 Free Officers’
Revolution, and certainly by the 1960s, the religious and ethnic diversity reflected in the
caseload of Egypt’s consular courts had also become dimmed within Egyptian society.
By then, once artistic and flourishing Jewish businesses seized to exist, including Togo
Mizrahi’s Egyptian Films Company, which was liquidated in 1966, and Solomon
Circuel’s Les Grands Magasins when Salvator Cicurel finally sold the mega Egyptian
department store in 1957 and joined the rest of his family in Paris.

837
838

Ada Aharoni, Not In Vain: An Extraordinary Life (Ada Aharoni, 1998): 29.
BNA FO 141/586/3.
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Amidst this ethnic and cultural diversity, however, defendants within turn-of-thecentury Egyptian society came to experience a certain “separate, but equal” status. The
primary reason for this was the persisting existence of the Capitulations, which placed the
adjudication of foreign defendants for crimes within consular courts sitting in Egypt in
the name of their respective sovereigns. Although the Capitulations could not be
activated without the administrative khedival state, as Judge Ernest Besley commented in
a lecture at AUC in 1935, entitled “A Survey of the Judicial System in Egypt”: 839
In every country there is one unifying principle in even the most elaborate judicial
system, namely the rule that the Sovereign is the fountain of justice. One could be
certain therefore in such a case that one has covered the whole field if one has set
out the various tribunals to which each part of the authority of the Sovereign in
839

Id. By initiating criminal procedures, as police investigations and reports throughout the nineteenth
century were initially conducted and penned in Arabic by Egyptian police and were subsequently sent with
foreign subjects as criminal defendants to their respective consular courts. These consular courts would
then apply their own criminal laws to the evidence of the case collected by the Egyptian police agents. Yet,
as Judge Besley succinctly put it in his 1935 AUC lecture: “All these [foreign] jurisdictions though
judicially autonomous and self-sufficing are very deficient in executive machinery. In criminal matters they
have no police force. It is the Egyptian Police which must effect the arrest of a foreigner who is to be tried
by a Consular Tribunal. It is an Egyptian prison which must harbor him when it is required to detain him in
custody pending his trial, and it is an Egyptian prison that he must work out his sentence.” In spite of
dampening the Capitulations’ perceived influence, confronting this unitary feature of the Pasha,
nevertheless, contributes significantly to the legal historiography of late Ottoman Egypt. Several legal
historians, most notably Nathan Brown, have studied and offered their own complicated theories for the
perpetuation of the Capitulations in modern Egypt and reasons for its toleration by a “subject population”
in spite of the perceived limitations on justice that they placed. Nevertheless, few have actually
acknowledged this underlying prerogative to punish continually held by the Egyptian executive and the
Capitulations’ dependency on the latter throughout late Ottoman Egypt. Within a context of imperialism,
this revision more accurately places the agency of the “subject population”—as vested in the Pasha—at the
center of criminal adjudication even within a “separate, but equal” justice system that animated Britishoccupied Egypt. But more importantly, this revision also factors this local agency—beyond the legal
codes, treatises, and curricula—within the trajectory of actual legal reforms that took place throughout
nineteenth-century khedival Egypt, an already-protected Ottoman province before it ever became a “veiled
protectorate” and later a formal protectorate of the British. Moreover, the revision further draws these socalled ‘foreign’ communities that once lived dynamically in Egypt, along with their laws, legal doctrines,
and unique administrations of justice, vis-à-vis the centripetal force exerted by the Pasha and his executive
agents, into the orbit of siyāsa that also circumscribed local communities and began to define an emerging
modern administrative state in Egypt.
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judicial matters has been delegated. In Egypt, however, there are in addition to the
courts in which judgment is pronounced in the name of the King of Egypt,
consular tribunals, following their own procedure and applying their own law and
speaking, when they pronounce their decisions, in the name of their respective
Sovereigns.
In light of Besley’s description, the application of law until the 1936 Montreaux
Convention brought an end to the Capitulations in Egypt and attests to the fact that
defendants stood in a position of being “separate, but equal” before the law. New
Ministry of Interior police forms instituted in 1895, as described in a previous chapter,
came to represent this disjointed system in which different defendants received a more
equal adjudication even in different jurisdictions.
It is through this bifurcated world that we may begin to understand the treatment
of criminal defendants amidst the diversity that came to color nineteenth and earlytwentieth century Egypt. Yet, the boundaries that we described in law above hardly left
the liminalities of space untraversed. Different ethnicities, as Egyptian films came to
depict, frequently went in and out of different tribunals from Mixed Courts, foreign
consular courts, and National Courts to ecclesiastical courts by the beginning of the
twentieth century. Nevertheless, what appeared to be unsurmountable distinctions within
the legal tradition began to have less significance. While Egypt’s 1883 Criminal Code
became the background upon which Dinshway’s ad hoc tribunal, such as the “separate,
but equal” Committees of Brigandage that preceded it, came to be evaluated, the history
of distinctions did not and could not vanish into thin air. Rather, while they continued to
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be seen as vestiges of the legal past, they, nevertheless, continued to have an effect on
everyday Egyptian society by dawn of the twentieth century.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this chapter examines the history of social and legal change by
looking at how the practice and concept of being treated as equal before the criminal law
evolved across the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries within Egyptian society. It is
a story that speaks of how equality came to be attained across the long nineteenth century
and one which culminated in a nation’s struggle for independence at the beginning of the
twentieth century. In this sense, it is a history of the struggle for equality that speaks of
layered, incremental change carried out at the behest of an administrative state that
sought to order Egypt, moving beyond the neat European designs for legal equality
eventually applied within and through modern Egyptian society. It is upon this trail of
struggles that we may position Dinshaway in 1906 within the larger arc of modern
Egypt’s history.
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Conclusion
“It is a providence, and no great change;
we are only what we always were, but naked now.”
―Arthur Miller, The Crucible
MURDERS IN THE FIRST-DEGREE (1920)
The surrealistic early-1920’s mugshots of Rāya and Sakīna that emblazoned the
front pages of newspapers in Alexandria and Cairo still haunt the Egyptian national
consciousness. They do so not only because they depict modern Egypt’s most infamous
women criminals—who were investigated, prosecuted, tried, and executed for the
conspiracy and felony murder of eighteen Egyptian women in the old Laban district of
Alexandria. These juxtaposed images of the Egyptian sisters persist to challenge the gaze
of a watchful camera belonging to a nascent modern Egyptian state born in the nineteenth
century and invested with new authority, powers, and institutions. The latter inevitably
became tools of social control against which Egyptian subjects had to defend themselves,
their freedom, and their community against state coercion, seen as legitimate in the eyes
of a transformed law. Rāya and Sakīna’s mugshots poignantly capture this struggle.
During the nineteenth century, concepts, doctrines, institutions, and practices
morphed and became subsumed by new ones. This dissertation seeks to bring to light
some of these transformations in a way by charting the history of the criminal defendant
in modern Egypt. A recurring theme in previous chapters, as we saw, was that the
transformations in law begin within the tradition. In looking at the tradition, we saw how
tradition conceptualizes, restricts, and places demands on the present, but as much as this
is the case, we have also seen the present transformed in light of social policy to make
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sense of the world that we inhabit and to navigate different people and spaces despite the
restraints of the past.
Although the past restraints the present, it also aimed to protect, guard, and
preserve. One of the things that legal tradition aimed to do was to preserve a particular
innocence that enveloped the criminal defendant. This dissertation aimed to chart what
happened to the criminall defendant’s presumed innocence across the various chapters in
light of the attendant technological and social changes that shifted over time and that
embodied a state that came to confidently prosecute the defendant, to confidently assert
her guilt, and even to place her on an equal footing amongst others in society. It is this
loss of innocence that became an indelible part of the story of the transformation of the
criminal defendant in modern Egypt, but that is also an inextricable part of the story of
the transformation of modern law.
With that said, however, tradition does not evade transformations because it still
embedded within the law, shaping and configuring its objectives and effects. Like
history, it remains, marking the present and the transformations that make what we
consider to be the modern. Pushing back against traditional historiographic
understandings of this cultural shift, one of the main contentions I have tried to
demonstrate is that the transformations in Egypt’s modern law began earlier in the
nineteenth century and prior to the British Occupation in 1882. At the same time, I argue
that these earlier nineteenth-century changes in Egypt did not, or rather could not, restrain
the dynamism that would encompass Egypt’s fate during the nineteenth century. The
technologies increased—from railroads, to telegraphs, to steam engines, to fingerprints
and photographs, but, most importantly, to people and to ideas and concepts. What is
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less apparent in what came to represent Egypt in the form of underlying dynamism that
continually fueled its people, their ideas, words, and their struggles. For within the
struggles they endured, they passionately lived and fought against their perceived
injustices. While part of my aim was to show how transformations grew out of Egypt’s
legal tradition and its past experiences, it is also a major contention that law continued to
change through this tradition and the inertia it has placed on the law’s transformation. For
as Walter Benjamin perceptively remarked, 840 tradition evolves with history, and it is the
historian as storyteller who has the burden of telling that story.
It is this flame of transformation that I have sought to better understand over the
past several years. In doing so, it has driven me deep into archives and case files to search
for answers, or to have not just a glimpse of Egypt legal past—its traditions—as simply
texts, but to see this tradition applied in history and to see its evolution into the modern
period. In this sense, tradition becomes a living thing, a changing concept, that adapts and
transforms over time.
At the same time, I have attempted to explore where transformations in legal
doctrine, practices, and concepts did occur during the nineteenth century. In Chapter One,
we explored the transformation of the right to punish from within the tradition through
the prosecution of the criminal defendant by an emerging khedival state. From a policy of
maintaining public order carried to a new novel institution of the Public Prosecutor
grounded in a new concept of a society in which everyone stood as an equal before the
law. In Chapter Two, we explored the transformation of the guilty mind through the
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See Walter Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections (Hannah Arendt, ed.) (New York:
Schocken Books, 1968): 109.
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state’s judicial search into the defendant’s mind, moving from the traditional
manifestation of criminal intent. It is this search that I argue brought about an
introspection into the defendant’s mind, one that came to approximate the concept of
premeditation. In Chapter Three, we explored the transformation of the proof guilt from
primarily being a method of eye-witnessing before the judge within the legal tradition
into a method of proving the truth of crime before the state. It is the transformation of this
mode of representing the defendant in relation to or in proximity to crime that I attempted
to trace the transformation in the law of criminal evidence. Following this inquiry further,
I attempted in Chapter Four to show the transformation of the presumption of innocence
as preserved within the legal tradition within a new method of the interrogation and its
attendant forms in nineteenth-century Egypt. Here, again the transformation of the
confession as an act performed before the judge and in which the criminal defendant sat
as presumed innocent, gradually—incrementally—transfigured, as I argue, into a
presumption of guilt before the state and its priority to drive and to order Egyptian
society. Finally, in Chapter Five, I tacked the transformation the concept of equality
before the law as this concept emerged through the practice of seeking justice from the
state.
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